A Comparative Study of Western Existentialism and the Principiality of Existence in Islamic Philosophy

Salih Hassanzadeh

Abstract

This paper is a study of Western Existentialism and the principiality of existence in Islamic philosophy. These two philosophical systems are examined considering certain issues such as the principiality of gradation in existence, mentally-positedness of quiddity, and man’s being in the world. After the preliminary discussions and explanations of the theories of these two philosophies concerning the issues related to existence, their methodological differences and similarities, as well as their contents and conclusions, are compared with each other.

 

Key Terms

existence                                                     principiality

man                                                            being in the world

non-existence                                              Mulla Sadra

Heidegger

 

 

Introduction

In philosophy, more than any other word or concept, man comes across the word and concept “existence”. This is because existence or existent is known as the subject of philosophy, i.e. the mind has to consider it as belonging to all things and, at the same time, does not view it in the same way in two things. This is because man’s mind has been created in such a way that it cannot construct even a single proposition unless it relates it to existence.

Therefore, the first thing to perceive is existence; it is also the last thing to be known. Now, if philosophy is a science that discusses “first principles and causes”, we can conclude that, because existence is the first principle of any kind of human knowledge, it is a fortiori the first principle of philosophy, too. This has officially turned philosophy into an independent discipline distinguished from all other ones. Therefore, we can consider philosophy as the knowledge of existence. Existence and essence or quiddity are the central points in Western Existentialism. If, according to Mulla Sadra’s view, the issue of existence is the origin of all philosophical principles, it is the same core around which all metaphysical teachings, such as the issues of knowledge, God, and resurrection, are centered. Therefore, he believes that ignoring existence means ignoring all basic issues in philosophy. Moreover, each of these two ontological approaches has led to certain revolutions and changes in different views of God, man, and the world in specific historical periods. There are certain similarities and differences between them, and, thus, it is necessary to study them comparatively. In this paper, after the preliminary discussions concerning the historical development of the concept of existence, first, Mulla Sadra’s theory of existence and, second, the view of Western Existentialism in this regard will be explained. Third, a comparison will be made between them.

 

Historical development of the idea of existence in Western philosophy[1]

They were pre-Socratic philosophers who, for the first time, posed some philosophical ideas concerning existence and its attributes, i.e. stability and change.[2] Based on one of these two important trends of philosophical thought, existence is by itself eternal, pre-eternal, fixed, and unchanging. However, based on the other one, all affairs are continually in a state of change. There were also some other philosophers such as Empedocles and Democritus who tried to explain the plurality and change of affairs in some way.[3]

These opposing trends usually led to similar conclusions. As we can see, the product of Heraclites’ philosophy is Protagoras’ theory stating that man is the measure of all affairs, and the truth is relative. Parmenides’ philosophy, too, leads to Gorgias’ theory stating that, if “existence” really exists, we cannot attain its knowledge, and, even if we can, we cannot put this knowledge into words.[4]

Socrates believed that if there are certain judgments, particularly, moral judgments, there must also exist some realities such as the Ideas, e.g. the Idea of beauty, the Idea of goodness, and the Idea of Justice. Socrates conceptualized existence through paying attention to the unknown and the predicate.[5] When conceptualizing existence, while assuming judgment to be impossible, Megarians fell into the trap of fallacy and sophistry.[6]

Plato, who was dissatisfied with these conclusions concerning the idea of existence, in opposition to Heraclites, affirmed stability; in opposition to Parmenides, affirmed plurality; and, in opposition to the Megarians, affirmed judgment.[7] According to Plato, stability in the world is intelligible and the plurality therein is sensible. Moreover, he maintained that there is a relation between plurality and unity, and this is the context for judgment. Plato continues the discussion of existence by explaining the nature of the truth and mistake and makes it clear that it is impossible for the truth or mistake to be there unless there is a decree or judgment.

However, Plato’s philosophy, which is mainly replete with essences or the same Ideas, does not seem to be sufficient for conceptualizing existence. That is why Aristotle tried his best to attain more meanings of existence than those Plato had provided. The theory of existence in Aristotle’s philosophy cannot be expressed in separation from his theory of substance. In his view, substance is either pure form, if it is non-corporeal, or the union of matter and form, if it is corporeal, and each of them as such is an existent in itself. In Aristotle’s philosophy, unlike in Plato’s, more importance has been attached to sensible existence.[8]

In the philosophy of the Middle Ages, existence was considered to be a transcendental issue (general issue), i.e. a word by which all existents could be described. In order to perceive the Middle Age philosophy concerning existence, on the one hand, one must pay attention to Neo-Platonic philosophy and, on the other, take Aristotelian philosophy, which can be seen in the works of Ibn Sina and his opponent, Ibn Rushd, into consideration. The whole Medieval philosophy (particularly that of Thomas Aquinas) emphasizes the importance of the act of being. That is, it argues that existence must be added to form, not to become the form of substance (because substance itself consists of matter and form), but for substance to come into existence. [9] The intention here is to reach the supreme act, which is God, by placing essence beside the act of being. There have been numerous discussions and arguments concerning the explanation of existence among scholastics. Even if we say that existence entails no ambiguity, their explanations are full of vague points. That is why Descartes rose to replace those ambiguities with clarity and distinction. [10]

Descartes first finds existence in his own mind, then, by extending it to the infinite substance (God) and by the help of both of them attains the substance of matter (the world). [11] Concerning the idea of existence, by studying Hume’s works, Kant puts the ideas of Christian Wolff aside and reaches transcendental idealism. That is, he considers only the sensible world, which is bound by time and place, as the object of man’s knowledge and closes the door leading to existence-for-itself (intelligible) to the theoretical intellect. [12]

When dealing with the idea of existence, Hegel reaches the idea of nothingness, and, by putting them together, he reaches a third one which is the same idea of becoming. Therefore, in his view, “to be” means the unity of existence and appearance in the form of the continuous development of rational dialectic which finally reaches existence-for-itself, i.e. absolute spirit, which dominates the entire being. This means the collapse of the basis of Kant’s philosophy. [13]

In the eighteenth century, the idea of existence was directed towards materialism in the light of the ideas of the encyclopedists, such as Holbach, La Mettrie, and Diderot. In the nineteenth century, empirical, positivist, and materialist theories reached each other.[14]

After the above periods, we witness the philosophical elements related to existence and the knowledge of existence in the philosophies of Kierkegaard, Jaspers, and Heidegger. Kierkegaard believes that the life of a Christian consists of relation with existence and, like Hamann, believes that existence is not reducible to thought. In opposition to Descartes' famous saying (“I think; therefore, I exist”), he says, "The less I think, the more I exist." However, Kierkegaard maintained that thought is always occupied with anxiety and fear of the idea of existence; an idea without which it cannot exist and which runs away from thought.[15]

According to Jaspers, existence is apparently divided into various parts, and when thought turns to one of them, it loses the other parts. He maintains that we know absolute existence from signs or symbols and, practically and theoretically, have no other way to know it. When religious ideas and philosophical ideas are known as symbols, our world of experience is illuminated in its light. [16]

An examination of the question of existence was Heidegger’s starting point. This question had not only been forgotten before him then, but also, considering its being obvious, never been posed correctly. If we wish to inquire into the meaning of being accurately, we must search for a being in itself, and this is the same Dasein. [17]

 

Historical development of the concept of existence in Islamic philosophy

The idea of existence in Islamic philosophy lacks its evolution and variety in Western philosophy, or it has not been paid much attention. The roots of this problem can be found in an unsystematic way in gnostics’ philosophical thoughts and theological discussions which have been posed in the mold of the distinctions among existences, plurality of existents, and the unity of being.

Concerning the issue of causality, the criterion of the dependence of the effect on the cause, the relation between the created to the pre-eternal, and the God-creation relation, we can witness the discussion and study of the idea of existence and the process of its descent and ascent among Muslim theologians, philosophers, and gnostics. However, as mentioned above, they are not as extensive as in Western philosophy.

In Islamic philosophy, the idea of existence is mainly concomitant with the issue of the principiality of quiddity or the principiality of existence, which is also a novel issue. That is, it is unprecedented in the philosophies of Aristotle, Farabi, and Ibn Sina.

This problem was initially posed in the time of Mulla Sadra and Mir Damad as follows: Does principiality belong to quiddity or existence? With his Peripatetic tendencies, Mir Damad defended the principiality of quiddity, and Mulla Sadra, although unanimous with him in this regard at the beginning, rejected this idea and advocated the principiality of existence. Later, this issue became the center and core of his other teachings. [18]

 

Principles of existence in Mulla Sadra’s view

The fundamental issue in Mulla Sadra’s metaphysics is existence. [19] In his view, existence is an objective reality, the source of every power and act, and, as a result,  principial. However, quiddity is the limit of existence, i.e. it is abstracted by the mind. The concept of existence is the most obvious of all things and its quiddity is hidden. It is impossible to define existence because it lacks genus and differentia. It is also wrong to define it in terms of its synonyms because the perception of existence as something clearer than itself or equal to it is unimaginable. [20]

As mentioned previously, Mulla Sadra was the first to propound the principiality of existence or quiddity as an independent issue and demonstrate the principiality of existence by accurate philosophical studies. In his opinion, it means that objective reality is the referent by essence of the concept of existence, and the concept of quiddity only speaks of the limits of reality and is predicated on it by accident. While rejecting the theory of the principiality of quiddity and the related arguments, Mulla Sadra presents eight proofs in al-Masha’ir and at least three in al-Asfar in order to demonstrate the principiality of existence. In this regard, we can refer to the following: 1) it is equally possible for quiddity to exist or not to exist, and this cannot reveal the objective reality. Moreover, as long as we do not apply the concept of existence to quiddity, we have not said a word about its objective reality; 2) in presential knowledge in which the objective reality is directly witnessed, there is no trace of quiddity.[21]

One of Mulla Sadra's core ideas is the gradation of existence and, following it, the theory of “unity in plurality and plurality in unity.” Based on these two theories, Mulla Sadra explains the complete chain of existents. Unlike univocal concepts (such as the concept of the body), the concept of existence is graded, i.e. attributing existence to objects is not the same for all of them. Rather, there are certain degrees of posteriority and priorities among them, as attributing existence to Almighty God, which is unlimited, cannot be compared to attributing it to other existents. Mulla Sadra and the followers of the Transcendent Philosophy call such gradations “general gradation” and believe in another kind of gradation for the objective reality of existence called “particular gradation”. The specific characteristic of this gradation is that no two referents of existence are independent from each other; rather, each is considered one of the grades of the other. [22]

Based on the gradedness of the “reality of existence”, Mulla Sadra introduces oneness at the same time as plurality, and plurality at the same time as oneness as the most conspicuous attribute of existence. According to this theory, existence, which is the only objective and principial issue, is a single truth but enjoys various degrees and levels. Accordingly, various and multiple quiddities that appear before the intellect and sense are not excessive; rather, they are abstracted from the levels and grades of existence.

Existence is not pure unity; therefore, the theory of the unity of being posed by gnostics is not acceptable. At the same time, these multiple existences are not distinct from each other (Peripatetic Philosophy believes in the marked differences among existences); rather, they are the levels of a single truth, enjoy certain commonalities, and are in unity with each other. However, difference and unity are not in contrast to commonality so that they stand in contrast with the simplicity of existence which is a certain and absolute issue. Rather, in ontological realities, “what is shared” is of the type of “what causes the difference”. Moreover, the differences originate in the levels of strength, weakness, perfection, and imperfection. Basically, strength and weakness are only possible about the levels of a single reality and not about other than that. [23]

From the study and discussion of the principiality, simplicity, and gradation of existence, which, according to Mulla Sadra, are among the most fundamental issues in relation to existence, the following principles are inferred, and Mulla Sadra himself has frequently and explicitly referred to them in his al-Asfar, al-Shawahid al-rububiyyah, and al-Masha’ir:

1. The reality of existence is a real issue and c annot be perceived by the mind (intellect) because it is only capable of knowing universal concepts. Hence, it cannot know the reality of existence which is a particular unique issue. [24]

2. Existence is dynamic and always finds a newer and more sublime form. This dynamicity creates different levels, and from their limits quiddities are attained. Real existence has no name (characteristic, cause, and attribute), while quiddities have names (attributive and causal features). [25] Therefore, it is not in the external reality but in the mind that quiddities appear as the secondary natures of the initial reality, i.e. existence. The more complete existence is, the less its quiddity; therefore, God has no quiddity at all… As long as quiddities are not illuminated by the light of existence, the mind cannot refer to them and say whether they exist or not …[26] When we say that quiddity and existence join each other or become one with each other, it is a mental consideration, and what is real and never comes to the mind is the reality of existence. [27]

3. Existence is not a universal concept of the category of the five-fold universalities. It is not, for example, a species or genus so that its relation to possible existences is the relation of the universal to the particular. Rather, it is the same objective reality, and the existence of possible things is shadowy and connective. [28]

4. In Mulla Sadra’s view the only rich and independent existence is that of Almighty God, and all possible things have indigent existences and are the modes of God. [29]

5. One of his fundamental thoughts is revealed in his view of the trans-substantial motion. He believes that motion is the mode of existence, and that the divine creative spirit acts through the trans-substantial motion and, through a temporal process, grants continuity to the trend of creation. [30] The assumption of the principiality of quiddity and also the assumption of the heterogeneity of existences is in contrast to intensified and perfectional motions. Since the occurrence of motion and the occurrence of perfection and intensification in motion are certain and indubitable, one must completely give up the assumptions of the principiality of quiddity and the heterogeneity of existences. [31]

6. Existence is a single reality enjoying various levels; the more these levels decline, the more their limits, and the narrower their realm. On the other hand, the more they go upwards and come closer to the supreme level, the fewer their limits, and the vaster their existence. Finally, they will reach a level above which there is none whatsoever, and that supreme level embodies all ontological perfections and is limitless, absolute, and infinite. Therefore, all levels of existence have certain limits except its supreme level whose limit is being limitless. [32]

7. The discussion of the issues related to existence inevitably involves non-existence because it contradicts existence, and wherever there is no existence, there will be non-existence. Of course, here we are referring to mentally-posited non-existence; otherwise, it has no essence, realization, and affirmation.

When explaining non-existence, Mulla Sadra says that it is a simple and general concept, and there is no disagreement concerning its meaning. Difference and variety arise when “non-existence” is attributed to various subjects. Those differences and varieties are the causes of such subjects. For example, the non-existence of the eye is different from the non-existence of whiteness, and this difference is a relative issue. [33] Non-existence is only one and cannot be divided into different types. In fact, there is nothing that can be called non-existence; therefore, if one asks, “What is non-existence?”, we cannot refer to something and say that it is. Thus non-existence does not exist because it is non-existence. [34]

In response to the question of how the human intellect can create a concept for something that does not exist and then use it as a subject, Mulla Sadra states,

The intellect has the power to imagine and create all types of intelligibles and ideas. For example, it can create the concept of non-existence itself and even absolute non-existence and make them the subject of certain judgments such as: absolute non-existence is impossible or the law of excluded middle is not allowed… Therefore, non-existence is made by the mind and has no reality. [35]

Philosophy of Existence (Human Existence)

A. What the philosophy of existence is not [36]

After the Second World War, Existentialism became fashionable in many countries. A difficult book such as Sartre’s Being and Nothingness was sold out on the market although reprinted eight times. At the same time, this popularity, particularly with ordinary people, led to some misunderstandings about this philosophy.

In this paper, we intend to compare this philosophy with the principiality of existence in Islamic philosophy. Hence, we should initially determine what philosophical Existentialism “is not” and “is”.

Existentialism, in fact, deals with those of man’s problems which are called “existential” today, e.g. the meaning of life, pain, and the like. However, we cannot call Saint Augustine or Pascal existentialists just because they have sometimes spoken of such issues. Moreover, we cannot consider novelists or poets who have spoken of them in a literary or poetic style existentialist philosophers.

Some of the misunderstandings have been spread by Thomists who intend to create an existentialist Thomas Aquinas. He has dealt with the subject of existence in terms of its traditional and classic meaning. Another misconception rises when Husserl, because of the influence of his thoughts on Existentialism, is considered an existentialist philosopher, while he himself excludes existence from his philosophy. Finally, we cannot equate this philosophy with an individual existentialist theory, e.g. that of Sartre, because there are some fundamental differences among existentialist tendencies.

When rejecting these misunderstandings, one must pay attention to the fact that the philosophy of existence is a specialized trend which was initially formed after the Second World War and can be, at most, traced back to Kierkegaard. This philosophy has spread in teachings which are distinct from each other in details and merely share their ideas concerning the philosophy of existence.

 

B. Existentialist Philosophers

At least four contemporary philosophers can, without any doubt, be called Existentialist: Gabriel Marcel, Carl Jaspers, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Heidegger. All of them refer to Kierkegaard, who is one of today’s highly influential Existentialists. Since these philosophers are not unanimous regarding philosophical issues, we will briefly present their ideas in separation from each other:

 

1) Kierkegaard (1813-1855)

The concepts of truth, choice, and God are of great importance in Kierkegaard’s philosophy. In this view, the truth cannot be discovered through logical discussions and objective arguments. It is closely related to man’s existence, and one must employ an inner-directed, intuitive, and faith-oriented method in order to perceive it. He does not agree with logical principles and rational reasoning. Kierkegaard says, “My existence is the same as my relation with something beyond me. We are concerned and enthusiastic about this existence.” In his view, God is the “wholly other” because, while protecting us, He is essentially other than human individuals in genus. While rejecting the necessity of pure thought and rational necessity in Hegel’s philosophy, Kierkegaard maintains, “True possibilities exist, and it is man’s choice and decision that can actualize them.” When explaining the idea of “human existence", he pays attention to itself, he says,

The human individual not only exists but also belongs to its own existence. Man is capable of deliberating upon his existence, confronting it, and forming it in accordance to the features of his deliberation. The other characteristic of existence is that it is continually in a process of “becoming”.[37]

The most famous existentialist principle, i.e. “existence precedes essence”, can be inferred from these aspects of man’s existence in Kierkegaard’s view. The essence of an individual consists of the mode of his existence at any given moment. His existence means the mode of his existence in the process of becoming.

2) Gabriel Marcel (1889-1973)

Marcel introduces Existentialism in a different way from those of Sartre and Heidegger. His method is similar to those of Kierkegaard and Jaspers.

His fundamental problem is: “Who am I?” He distinguishes between a problem and a mystery because a problem concerns a thing and can be solved objectively by means of wisdom, while a mystery is not so. It also embodies the solution to the problem and cannot be objectively solved. For example, the problem of existence cannot be resolved without taking man’s essence into consideration, thus it is a mystery rather than a problem and, unlike the latter, cannot be solved through rational analysis. It can be solved only through direct contact.[38]

According to Marcel, “I understand the existence of things and other souls in the light of faith. With the power of faith, I go beyond time and place and, finally, with the most exalted form of faith, I reach a transcendent existence that we call God." Neither the existence of external things, nor the existence of other souls, nor the existence of God is rationally demonstrable. We perceive all of them through contact and association. In his view, the purpose of philosophy is knowing about and discovering the secret of the profound possibilities of human existence rather than theorizing and concept formation. Marcel makes a distinction between having and being and believes that the latter is more important. Having involves ownership, which is an obstacle and burden; however, being means freedom and removing all limits. Ontological progress means going beyond the limit of having and moving toward the freedom of being. The ultimate freedom of individuals from all possessions and limits and attaining eternal existence is possible at the moment of death. [39]

In Marcel’s thought, as in Kierkegaard's philosophy, while it appreciates the human existence and assumes the impossibility of providing a logical definition for existence and its concomitants, emphasis is placed upon intuition, inner experience, and fleeing from rationalization. In this approach, being must be found, and human reality reveals itself at all times in a state of becoming. In this way, the contrast between external and internal minds is removed.

 

3) Jean Paul Sartre (1905-1980)

Sartre owes a great debt to Heidegger in his philosophy; however, he is also greatly influenced by Hegel and Husserl. Unlike Heidegger's philosophy, which is only intended for philosophy experts, Sartre’s ideas have spread among a great number of people through his stories and plays. His attention is focused on the particular affairs of the world which are unnecessary, illogical, and superficial. Of course, he is also the author of an accurate philosophical book called Being and Nothingness. He places Heidegger and himself among the atheist Existentialists who believe in the priority of existence to essence, but Heidegger was angry when Sartre called him a heretic.

a. Being-in-itself: By rejecting Aristotle’s principle of “possibility and potency”, Sartre maintains that everything that exists enjoys actuality or is in action. No possibility or potency can be found in what exists. The only thing that we can say about it is that it exists, it is itself; and it is what it is. What is in existence exists; it has no existence; that is, it did not attain existence. There is no reason or basis for the existence of what exists. Essences can be explained, but existence cannot. Here, we can conclude that existence precedes the essence of what is in being. What exists is “being-in-itself”; it rests in itself; it is coherent and firm, not a patient or an agent, not positive or negative, and not negation or affirmation. Here, another being has been omitted. Being-in-itself has no relation with the other. [40]

b. Being-for-itself: In addition to being-in-itself, there is a completely different other being called being-for-itself or the specific to human beings. This kind of other being can only be “no-being”, i.e. this existence is in nothingness. Being a man can only be realized through an existent’s making itself nothingness. Sartre equates negation with nothingness in Heidegger’s philosophy; in other words, we cannot say that nothingness makes itself nothingness. It is only the existent that makes itself nothingness, and nothingness can exist in an existent like “a worm”. Sartre emphasizes that negation does not provide the foundation for nothingness; in contrast, negation has its foundation in the object or thing itself. That is, negative realities exist. In Sartre’s view, man not only carries nothingness in himself but also is exactly placed in nothingness, as well. [41]

c. Being for (toward) the other: Being-for-itself is absolute, i.e. it knows its own being and judges about it. It knows itself, and this being-for-itself is the reality of man, who knows himself. However, a piece of stone or wood cannot have a being for itself because it does not know its being. Its being is for the other, and it is man who knows it. [42]

d. Freedom and responsibility: Freedom plays a great role in Sartre’s philosophy. In his view, freedom is the same as our being. It is the necessity of our being. Man is condemned to be free. His freedom is absolute, but he cannot escape responsibility because his individuation does not belong to the other. His responsibility before being and his behavior is exclusively on his own shoulders. Indeed, his responsibility is huge because he chooses a way which is for all. [43] We can conclude the following from the above: 1) Man has no specific essence; his essence is the same as freedom, which is the necessity of being. That is, man’s essence is unindividuated; 2) not only does being precede essence, but man’s essence is also his existence. This idea belongs to all Existentialist philosophers but has been asserted more emphatically in Sartre’s philosophy.

Here, one can ask Sartre how man can consider himself responsible by denying God and objective values, and before whom and for what he is responsible. He has no clear response for justifying man’s absolute responsibility and freedom.

d) Jaspers (1883-1969)

Jaspers’ thoughts and ideas, in a way, represent his interpretation of Kierkegaard’s philosophy. He has granted a new depth to his thought and then generalized it to various fields. In most cases, Jaspers’ philosophy is based on some ideas which are very close to those of Kant. He is also greatly influenced by the works of those who believe in pantheism and follow gnostic approaches, such as Nicholas de Cusa and Spinoza. On the other hand, he criticizes the ideas of Nietzsche and Descartes. The problem that occupies Jasper's mind is related to existenz. He asks, “… what is existenz?” “Why does a thing exist?” “Why is non-existence non-existent?” “Who am I?” “What do I want after all?” These are completely personal aspects because universal existenz cannot be found. [44]

At this point, Jaspers’ ontology becomes different from those of Sartre and Heidegger because he believes that we can never attain all-inclusive existenz.

According to him, we have various forms of existenz, which cannot be equated with each other, for example, being a thing, being by oneself, and being for oneself. These are the aspects or poles of existenz and cannot be changed into each other. [45]

He is also of the idea that, in the first view, the world is divided into “I” and “other than I”. “I” is related to “other than I” in two forms: first, in the form of matter, which it has to fight, on the one hand, and feed on, on the other; second, in the form of lives, which it is related to. “I” and the world are inseparable from each other. [46]

In Jaspers’ view, existenz is not the same pure thought in the philosophy of Descartes or Hegel; rather, it resides in man’s capabilities or potential. [47] For this reason, he speaks of possible existence (not real existence). existenz is always presented in terms of its possibility aspect and always faces the future. That is, existenz is essentially the same as freedom. Most Existentialist philosophers share this idea.

Two basic experiences in ontology dominate Jaspers’ philosophy: fragmented being and the narrowness of worldviews. Existenz is fragmented because the world is, indeed, presented to us from minor aspects. We cannot have a universal view of the world as Spinoza and Hegel, for example, assumed. [48] Following this idea, Jaspers attacks objectivity and universalism because universality is not under the control of the soul, and objectivity, too, even if one can attain it, cannot reveal the depth of the world to us.

Like other philosophers of existence, Jaspers believes that the rational and logical knowledge of existenz is impossible: “It seems as if existenz goes backwards from before our will to know and does not allow anything to remain in our hands objectively apart from some effects and remains of itself.” [49]

According to Jaspers and Heidegger, in order to answer the questions about existence, it is necessary to test the specific human existence: “Existenz is a problem the poser of which is not convinced unless he knows about his specific being in this problem once again, and he himself, i.e. a possible existenz, feels the joy of thinking by posing this problem." [50]

As we can see, all philosophers of existence are unanimous concerning the issue that the way to absolute being goes through a study of man’s specific existence. This indicates that this philosophy is human-centered.

 

5. Heidegger (1889-1976)

For more than half a century, Heidegger tried to invite people to think about the very truth. He emphasized showing that man is not the basis, and there is a truth upon which man is dependent. We are dominated by and open to it. Our openness to this truth is the same as our existence and the mode of our being, although it retreats from the reach of our knowledge, and we are ignorant of it.

This truth is not like anything and, even in comparison to other objects and existences, cannot be said to be in the sense that the word “is” is used for them. For this reason, Heidegger speaks of “non-existence”, and by this term, he means the same single truth that, in comparison to other things and individuals, apparently has no share of being but is itself the existence and essence of being. Heidegger conceives of the existence of existents as the basis of their being and uses everything as a mirror in which he can see the manifestation of existence. He tried to reveal the presence of this basis in everything. We will now briefly examine the details of Heidegger’s philosophy concerning existence. [51]

1. Method: Heidegger initially inquired into the “quality of the question of being”; i.e. he studied the profound meaning and the completely hidden features of this accurate being. However, the question is, “which method must be employed to attain this goal?” Being is the common context for everything; it even embodies the one who asks the question. Therefore, we do not use the method of reasoning and demonstration here; rather, we use the method of unveiling and insight, i.e. the method of phenomenology. One should always understand the question of being along with “being in existence” itself. Heidegger calls this kind of understanding “existential understanding”.

According to him, in order to analyze the question of being, we must first find an appropriate being in order to study him in terms of his existence. This being, in his view, is the same Dasein. This method of analyzing being is the very fundamental ontology.

2. Being in the world: A clear sign of Dasein is that it exists and always belongs to me. The basis of this mode of being is “being-in-the-world”; however, this “being somewhere” is not the ontological link or mediator between two continuous existents in place or the unity between the interior and exterior of the mind. Rather, it mainly enjoys concerned being (besorgen). “Being there” itself is essentially “being with”, i.e. paying attention to things or assuming the responsibility for the things which one must deal with for the sake of others or helps them to be free from worries. “Having the same feeling” or sympathy is possible only based on “being with”.

By his idea of being in the world and its attributes, Heidegger intends to present a picture of man which is different from that in traditional metaphysics. Here, man is not primarily, merely, and essentially the subject; rather, he is “being-in-the-world”. That is, he is the only existent that is open to the world (unlike the closed Cartesian I) and is associated with the world and existents. Familiarity with the world is neither the product of perception nor an attribute of our perceptions or even states. Rather, it is the condition and basis for any kind of our perceptions, feelings, and states. On the other hand, it is not the case that we initially come to the world, and then it opens and reveals to us, but being-in-the-world is the same as our openness. In Heidegger’s view, perception and understanding are not additional attributes of Dasein; rather, they are ontological affairs and some of the states of the existence of Dasein itself, i.e. another expression of the same being-in-the-world. [52]

In this picture, Heidegger comes close to Mulla Sadra, who believes that knowledge is neither an extra affair nor from the category of quality. He, rather, believed that it was a type of existence.

3. Dasein and anxiety: Dasein not only is in the world, but is also made in its essence by being-in-the-world: it is the Dasein of itself which is enlightened by itself; i.e. it is its own openness, and it is the ontological mode that provides the basis for knowing and makes it possible. This mode of being has three elements:  1. the feeling of place and time, 2. intelligence and perception, 3. discourse.

In other words, “man’s being in the world” is the mode of his appearance in the world. Moreover, Dasein determines how man interprets his place and station in the world, and how he expresses his perceptions and interpretations. In other words, man’s ontological constituent parts (feeling, perception, and discourse) are derived from his ontological mode in the world. This is not something perceptive and rational, but really ontological. Therefore, being in the world is nothing but worry or anxiety. Dasein or being in the world has wishes, recognizes things, pays attention, sympathizes with others, and acts upon things; all of them are manifestations of anxiety. Such a portrayal of man, unlike the definition of man in the history of metaphysics, is the same as substance. Dasein is not a substance that enjoys perception; rather, it is perception and understanding itself. According to the interpretation equating man with substance, it seems as if there is a wall between the world as it is and the visible as it shows itself to the subject. Nevertheless, in Heidegger’s opinion, there is not such a tarnished wall between the world and phenomenon or what appears, and perception is the product of the same transparency that exists in the openness of Dasein to the world. [53]

4. Being on the way until death: Dasein will never attain its totality as long as it exists, and there is always a permanent incompletion in its essence. The only end to Dasein is death; however, original death is the death of oneself not that of others. Death is the possibility of being and the last possibility. Dasein is afraid of facing death and seeks shelter in others. Others are a mode of being; however, this being is non-principial and foreign to Da Sein itself. Others free Dasein from all types of decision and responsibility. With true anxiety, Dasein points out that its end is death. Man has come into the world; his existence has been realized; and his destiny is death, from which he has no escape. Man must live between “two non-existences” and actualize his possibilities. [54]

5. Conscious and determinism: By finding its original being and paying attention to future, Dasein frees itself from the support of others; he makes his own decisions and listens to the voice of his conscience. This freedom saves man from loquacity, listening to others, and living in triteness. Having a choice and listening to the voice of one’s conscience prepares man to face fear, which is intensified in silence. This means existence’s loyalty to its particular self. This freedom leads towards death, which frees Dasein from the mischief of others but not from the world. By having a choice, the ability to decide, and freedom, man accepts his destiny bravely and plays his role in the world in a determined manner.

6. Being and time: The relation between Dasein and the world is established through time. Dasein is placed in a time which is principial. According to Heidegger, being is the mirror of time, and time is the mirror of being. This shows the temporality of being, that is, being is in the world. Time is the true meaning of being. Thus Dasein is a being in the past and, at the same time in the future. From the relation between the past, present, and future, we can infer the historicity of Dasein because the incidence of history means the incidence of being-in-the-world. [55]

7. Nothingness: One of the basic concepts in new Existentialism is “nothingness”. It includes the whole being, and being comes out of nothingness. According to this philosophy, being and nothingness are the same. The latter causes fear, and the former causes amazement. Fear is an event based on discovery in which man sees all existents standing on the basis of non-existence (existence). [56]

8. Poetry and thought: Heidegger’s interpretation of the relation between poetry and thought is fundamental and of great significance. Regarding this relation, he says, “Any kind of thinking is a poetic deliberation, and any poem is a kind of thinking." [57] Based on this view, the true origin of poetry is an incident, and it is, in fact, the origin that versifies. Therefore, languages, poetry, and thought share in stating and unveiling an affair.

“A poem mixed with thought is, indeed, the house of being and a place where it flourishes.” [58] The other point is that the eyes of a poet and thinker are not merely capable of seeing existents; rather, they view those existents which hide themselves from their existent-seeing eyes. This idea automatically appears in their words. Thus the language of a poet and a thinker is the same language of being in a broader meaning. [59]

A comparison of Western Existentialism and the principiality of existence in Islamic philosophy

So far, we have discussed two viewpoints concerning being or existence and essence or quiddity and their principles. Now, it is the right time to compare them with each other. Both Mulla Sadra and Western Existentialism affirm the precedence of existence to quiddity, and both maintain that essence or quiddity is a second-degree reality. Nevertheless, they disagree with each other regarding a basic point in relation to quiddity. According to modern Existentialists, quiddity means particular quiddity, and they have no idea of it as a universal issue. Thus the quiddity of each individual human being is limited to him. However, according to Mulla Sadra, man’s quiddity is an abstract concept that generally applies to all human beings.

In both philosophical systems, defining the reality of being remains impossible because it is not something of which one can develop a rational knowledge; rather, one must perceive it intuitively. In Mulla Sadra’s view, this intuition is gnostic, is not in contrast with the intellect, and is, rather, a higher level of knowledge. In modern philosophy, it is the same intentionality which is before sense-intuition. In Mulla Sadra’s philosophy, the gnostic knowledge of the absolute being is possible, while Existentialists talk about empirical and intuitive knowledge, which is finally limited to a limited knowledge of being.

New Existentialism is basically human-centered, i.e. it believes that man’s existence is prior to his essence or quiddity. According to the followers of this school, existence is the supreme feature of human beings, and their essence is posterior to their existence, because man must exist in order to be able to choose. Hence, it is only man who is free and has free will; however, the essence of other existents is prefabricated, and they have to do what they do.

Nevertheless, Mulla Sadra’s philosophy is not human-centered. In his view, the origin is universal, and its priority does not merely relate to human beings. All the existents of the world are dominated by it. Thus Mulla Sadra’s existentialism is general and inclusive. One of the disagreements of the two philosophical systems concerns the concept of nothingness, which modern existentialists consider to be existential. According to this philosophy nothingness and being are the same and the basis of beings depends on nothingness. However, Mulla Sadra maintains that nothingness is merely a mental concept and has no reality. In other words, there is nothing in reality that can be called nothingness. Therefore, nothingness qua nothingness does not exist, and it is only the intellect that makes and posits nothingness for some ontological principles. Therefore, it is a relative issue, and, according to Mulla Sadra, the intellect is incapable of perceiving the reality of being but can understand the concept of nothingness because it has no reality.

One of the other disagreements between new Existentialism and Mulla Sadra concerns the power of the intellect and its use. Although Mulla Sadra emphasizes that the reality of being cannot be perceived with conceptual intellect, and it must be experienced, he adduces certain rational arguments in order to demonstrate his theory. Following this method, he affirms the capabilities of the intellect, and, as mentioned before, considers gnostic intuition as a supreme level of the intellect, without being in contrast with it. However, the philosophers of existence have always referred to the irrational features of being by resorting to such terms as anxiety, fear, death, uselessness, and the like. While pointing out the limitations of rational knowledge, Mulla Sadra acknowledges its validity, but most Existentialists have a hostile attitude to the intellect. Hence, in Mulla Sadra’s view, the knowledge of man and the world is possible through the intellect and gnosis, whereas they only suggest the use of irrational experience in this regard.

Mulla Sadra poses absolute existence against quiddity. He maintains that existence is real and principial and enjoys gradedness, i.e. it has various levels, which have different degrees of strength and weakness in terms of existence. Similarity and difference in levels return to existence itself. By means of this theory, he manages to solve the Peripatetic philosophy's complicated problem, that is, the heterogeneity of existents, and the troublesome problem of gnostics, that is, the unity of being.

Heidegger propounds the issue of being-in-the-world and its priority to the essence of man, who has feelings, understanding, perception, and discourse by essence. Based on this theory, Heidegger, too, solves the conflict between world as object and man as subject. Man is not only the subject; rather, he is in the world and is associated with it (unlike the Cartesian closed I). Hence, Heidegger considers feeling, perception, and understanding to be the essential attributes of the existence of Dasein.

Heidegger has come very close to Mulla Sadra in considering knowledge as being rather than relative or something belonging to the category of quality. Another important element in Mulla Sadra’s philosophy is his theory concerning the trans-substantial motion. He holds that the divine creative spirit functions through the trans-substantial motion and grants continuity to the worldly process of creation through a temporal process. There is a strong similarity between this theory of Mulla Sadra and Bergson’s theory of creativity and both have led to somewhat similar conclusions.

Heidegger considers being as “being in the world” and being on the way and views time as the mirror of being. He also maintains that the relation between Dasein and the world is established through time. He examines time extensively and considers it the meaning and mode of being. However, Mulla Sadra’s discussion of time is more basic and fundamental because he solves the problem of time with motion in substance, which is the basis of time, and time is born out of motion. Time-being relation is possible through motion. Therefore, Mulla Sadra’s view of time is more basic than Heidegger’s.

One of the obvious differences between the philosophy of existence and Mulla Sadra’s Islamic philosophy lies in their methods. Mulla Sadra's method is metaphysical, while that of Existentialist philosophers is phenomenological. Like all Islamic philosophers, he believes that the basis of the world and all existents is being in the general sense of the word. He seeks the cause of all causes and the source and origin in the same being, and this unfolded being is present in all levels of existence (not in a pantheistic sense) and its highest level is Almighty God.

In this way, Mulla Sadra’s ontology ultimately reaches theology and God’s being the Origin of the whole world, and the door of gnosis opens to philosophy. Following a phenomenological approach, Heidegger analyzes man’s specific being in order to reach pure being. Nevertheless, in the middle of the way, the borderline between being and nothingness is removed, and nothingness is considered the basis of existents. This causes bewilderment and fear; however, they are mixed with and drowned in ambiguity and are different from those in gnosis. Therefore, Heidegger’s ontology leads to an ambiguous matter, and it has never become clear if it is God, man, nature, or something else.

These two ontological systems, in spite of their many differences, jointly emphasize a point indicating that man can be truly saved from crises, wanderings, and negligence only through resorting to original and serious ontology. This attention and recourse to ontology, according to Heidegger, can only be attained through poetry along with thinking, and thinking along with poetry. In Mulla Sadra’s view, gnosis, intuition, and gnostic illumination are the ways that lead to the reality of being (the Transcendent Philosophy).

 

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