The Principiality of Existence and the Natural Universal
Sayyid Mahmud Yusuf Thani
The discussions of the natural universal are directly related to the discussions of the principiality of existence or quiddity. Believing in the principiality of quiddity is in fact the same as believing in the essential and independent existence of the natural universal in the outside, while the principiality of existence is inconsistent with believing in the real and original existence of the natural universal. At the same time, it is of prime importance to find out which of these two theories is better able to justify and explain the existing unity and multiplicity in the world of object and mind. This issue is particularly important in our present discussion, because explaining the issue of multiplicity is the same as explaining the issue of the natural universal, and its mental or external origin. Of course, our purpose here is not to study the arguments related to the principiality of quiddity or existence; rather, we intend to inquire into the justifications for explaining multiplicity on the basis of the principiality of existence, and in fact to discover the relation between the theory of the natural universal and the principiality of existence.
According to the principiality of existence, what constitutes the reality of all objects and their essence of realization is their very existence, and quiddity does not play any role here. Rather, it is the mental and shadowy manifestation of existence which is the determining factor here. The expression of “shadowy and mental manifestation” itself reveals that according to those who believe in the principiality of existence, the perception of existents at the level of acquired perception takes place in the mould of quiddity. This reveals that the perception of existence takes place in two ways:
1. Through presential observation and the real unity of the existence of the knower and the existence of the known: In this kind of knowledge of existence, any assumption as to the mental form and its acquired knowledge is impossible. Here, the knower is united with the essence of the known, and the known is united with its reality before the knower, and there is no discussion of acquisition and form. The realization of this type of knowledge in the inner sense, and the soul’s perception of itself and its states and powers is common knowledge. Thus there is not much disagreement on the possibility and realization of this type of knowledge among thinkers. However, they do not completely agree with each other on the possibility or realization of presential knowledge of the realities of external objects, while according to the principles of the Transcendent Philosophy, no original and real perception of the existence of objects would be possible, unless through presential unity with their existence. Mulla Sadra says:
The knowledge of the modes of existents is not possible, unless the existents themselves, and not their forms, are presented to the knower as they really are, and this is not also possible except through the union of the knower and the known, causality (relationship), or existential supermacy.1
These words imply the restriction of true knowledge to the modes of existents in presential knowledge, and also reveal the ways for the acquisition and realization of this knowledge. Accordingly, true knowledge is obtained either through unity (like the soul’s knowledge of its essence), or through causation (like the soul’s knowledge of its imaginations).2 Such a perception of existence is an original and real one which is related to the context of the reality of existence.
2. Through the knowledge of its effects and concomitants, or the same quiddities which represent its existence and appearance: It goes without saying that the appearance of an object is other than its reality. Such a knowledge of existence is, therefore, a low-level and weak one. As Mulla Sadra says:
The knowledge or existential realities is obtained either through presential observation or through their effects and concomitants. Such effects and concomitants are known only through a weak kind of knowledge.3
Of course, the knowledge of quiddities is the same as what Ibn Sina considers difficult and impossible for man’s perception, let alone the perception of existential realities. Quiddities are in fact the same as forms in the mirror, representing the owner of the forms. Even if we perceive these forms (in spite of all the difficulty involved in knowing them), we have just recognized the form of the object, while there is a great difference between the form and its owner. Quiddities are, indeed, like moulds which are identified by the mind while perceiving and recognizing external objects. This statement, however, does not imply that quiddities are what the mind itself creates for perceiving external objects. Such moulds do not represent the external objects accurately, since according to those who believe in the principiality of existence, quiddity is the limit of existence, and quiddities only represent the limits of objects. This limit or mould is only proportionate to the limited, can only be applied to that limited thing, and is abstracted from its own existence. For example, what distinguishes man from other things and the limit which characterizes him is the specific mould which is only suitable for his body; however, it is nothing more than a mould or limit. A mould is empty from within, that is why we can say that: ‘man is existent’, or ‘man is non-existent’. Thus quiddity reveals nothing more than the limits of things.4
The question which might arise here is: Does the limit exist in the outside? The limit is abstracted from the limited one’s coming to the end, and does not exist in the external world. It is always the limited which possesses real existence in the outside, rather than the limit. The limit is the end of the limited, and the end is not an existing and external thing. Now one might wonder if the reality of principiality in the outside belongs to existence; if quiddity is its limit and end; if it is a mental abstraction; what the basis for such an abstraction is, and why it emerges in the mind sometimes in the form of a quiddative classification, and sometimes in the form of different existential degrees and levels.
To explain this issue, we must say that as an external and original thing, existence has different types of gradation. The most important division of gradation of existence consists of vertical and horizontal gradations. The confirmation of vertical gradation depends on the following points.
First, we should agree that there are certain things in the external world which are the referents for perfection and imperfection when compared to each other. In other words, we can consider some of them imperfect and some others perfect in relation to the same criteria. This is an undeniable fact; however, for the time being, we will not deal with the reasons and origins for such perfections or imperfections.
Second, if the difference between the perfect and the imperfect is not reduced to a single point, in the sense that what distinguishes one from the other should not be the same as what makes them similar to each other, there would be no sense in talking about perfection or imperfection.
Third, with respect to the mental manifestations of existents, which are the same as quiddities, it is impossible to talk about being perfect and imperfect, or being finite and infinite. This is because quiddities qua quiddities are concepts, and concepts have no quality other than being separate from each other.
Fourth, even if existences were fully separate realities (as the Peripatetics say), it would be pointless to talk about perfection and imperfection. Therefore, perfection and imperfection must ultimately refer back to a single thing that is not of the type of concepts. Also, it should be a real thing, and this thing could be nothing but existence. 5 It is this very difference in perfection and imperfection that causes a vertical difference in the levels of existence, and we refer to it using different terms, such as strength and weakness, priority and posteriority, superiority and inferiority, and the like. In this way, while enjoying unity, existence is subject to a kind of plurality, and different concepts are abstracted from its different grades. In vertical gradation, due to the unity of the point of difference (ma bihil ikhtilaf) and the point of similarity (ma bihil ishtirak), the unity of the reality of existence is never ruptured, and the single thing appears at different levels.
On the other hand, at the level of unity, where there is no word of poverty and wealth, strength and weakness, and priority and posteriority, and in fact, where vertical plurality is meaningless, existence enjoys a kind of plurality which our mind perceives in the form of different quiddities, or the different individuals representing the same quiddity. Now the question is why at the level of unity, for example, at the level of inanimate things, existence is prone to a kind of plurality which has no connection to the issue of the levels and degrees of existence, and does not belong to the category of vertical gradation.
In response to this question, some have said that this plurality is due to the connection of existence to various quiddities, in the sense that a single thing of unified levels becomes plural because of being connected to different receptacles. Quiddities are in fact like numerous receptacles which accept the received or existence, and with each perception, that single thing becomes many. Of course, the reception or being received, as discussed here, is not of the type of ordinary and external perceptions in which the receptacle has essential existence before the received. Here, if we say that the receiver, the reception, and the received are all in the receptacle of the mind, we mean that it is the mind that creates plurality and chooses the quiddity as the subject and existence as the predicate. According to Mulla Sadra:
And existence is allocated to its subject, that is, the quiddities which are qualified by existence in the container of the mind, of course, not through the levels and modes of existence, but through the quiddities which originate from existence and are different from each other. 6
Another question which demands an answer here is: If according to the principiality of existence, all unities and pluralities must ultimately return to existence and be justified and explained on the basis of the principiality of existence, how could we say that allocating existence to different quiddities causes plurality? Misbah Yazdi refers to this problem in relation to Mulla Sadra and ‘Allamah Tabataba’i’s firm belief in the essential individuation of existence, and also its allocation to quiddities as follows:
And if their remarks can be interpreted so that the allocation of existence to higher levels, as well as other levels, means that existence is specified by its own essence, and that it needs no other thing to be specified, the overall meaning will not be consistent with “existence is specified by what has originated from essentially various quiddities”.7
As a result, the plurality originating from quiddity should ultimately return to existence and be accordingly explained. Hakim Sabziwari, too, believes in the same idea (plurality of existence because of quiddities), and explicitly refers to it in his works. 8
This philosopher, too, believes that the accidental plurality of existence originates from its relation to different quiddities; however, this idea, in addition to the problem posed before, is criticized for another reason. The problem here is that in such propositions (those in which quiddity is the subject), in fact, existence is the subject and quiddity is the predicate, and not the other way round. This is because their real form is, for example, as follows: existence is specified by the nature of humanity. This explicitly indicates that, indeed, quiddative plurality, too, originates from existence.
In his glosses on al-Asfar, Hakim Sabziwari has stipulated that accidental plurality must be essentially attributed to existence, not to quiddity. For this reason, he poses the question: How could we say that the cause of the distinctions among existences is quiddities (they do not exist prior to existence so that their distinctions could be the origin of existences)? At the same time, he provides three answers to this question:
1. When we consider quiddities as the cause of distinctions among existences, the priority or principiality of quiddities is not a necessary condition. Rather, in order to attribute such distinctions to quiddity, it suffices for plural quiddities to come into existence with existence itself. Basically, this is the case in reality, since quiddities are realized because of existence, and turn into accidental existents with existence.
2. Quiddities have priority in terms of substance (substantial or essential priority is one of the types of priority and means the priority of the causes of effects in the same quiddative thingness and essential substance (such as the priority of genus and differentia).
3. Quiddities have priority in modes of being. Their distinction in prior configuration could be the source of their distinction in posterior configuration. This will ultimately lead to archetypes, which are necessary for Divine names and attributes at the level of Oneness (wahidiyyat). Here, once again, the concomitants are made like their necessary materials and, thus, questioning their distinction is absurd. 9
However, according to authorities, all three answers suffer from some defects. Jawadi Amuli says: “Although none of these answers is foolproof, they show Hakim Sabziwari’s awareness of the root of the problem”.10 Of course, he does not refer to the flaws of these answers. Also, in his T‘aliqah ala nihayat al-hikmah, Misbah writes: Sabziwari has provided three answers for this question, but none of them is perfect.11 He does not refer to the flaws of these answers, either. In what continues we will refer to what seems to be responsible for the imperfections involved in the above-mentioned three-fold answers:
The first answer is imperfect, because if quiddity is accidentally realized and made, how could its simultaneous acquisition with existence be the source of the distinctions of existents which are themselves essentially made and originally realized?
The second answer is imperfect, because the priority of substance, too, is either quiddative or existential. Quiddative priority is based on the principiality of quiddity, rather than the principiality of existence. According to Mulla Sadra:
One who believes that the effect of the Maker is the quiddity of the made rather than its existence, and that what exercises the effect is the quiddity of the Maker rather than His existence, has to maintain another priority, and that is the priority of quiddity.12
The third answer is also imperfect, since it can be asked: What is the distinction of archetypes in the Creator’s knowledge? And the next question is: How could this distinction be generalized to existence?
Another answer given to this question (explaining accidental plurality) is that the distinction in mentally-posited pluralities which occur to existence on the part of quiddity, like the distinction between man’s existence and the existence of the tree, is the result of the addition of existence to the essence of quiddities rather than to different quiddities. It is not the case that the very existence is realized in the outside, separately from the man and the tree, and then it becomes many, because of being predicated on the two, and also because of the relation between them. Rather, the existence of man with the tree is the same as the essence of man’s subsistence, or that of the tree. The plurality or distinction which quiddity ascribes to existence is in accordance to the principle of the application of the judgment of one of the parties in unity to the other. Quiddative specifications are ascribed to existence because of quiddities, rather than their grades or modes, or the essence of existence. Nevertheless, since quiddities themselves originate from existence and represent it, such distinctions are attributed to existence in the outside, and at the level of subsistence. Therefore, it is only at the level of affirmation and in the mind that such specifications are attributed to existence through quiddity.13
Nevertheless, it is obvious that the distinction between the levels of subsistence and affirmation, and attributing the former to existence and the latter to quiddity does not solve the problem of explaining accidental plurality. This is because the question will again refer back to the same distinction of existents at the levels of subsistence and oneness, and it might be asked for what reasons this plurality occurs to existents, particularly because it can be inferred from some of Mulla Sadra’s words that the difference between one existent and the other is at the same existential level, so that the individuals of one or more same-level quiddities, too, have such a difference.14 Of course, this interpretation is evidently far from reality and unacceptable and, therefore, we should seek for another solution for explaining accidental plurality, while adhering to the principiality of existence.
According to some authorities, this explanation is based on, and can be inferred from the discussions related to the issues of cause and effect. Wherever there is a cause-effect relation among existences, there will be gradation. All existents have such a relation with the Necessary; however, the distinction among same-level effects, which are needless of each other and the same in terms of strength or weakness, lies in their essence, whether they are two individuals of the same quiddity (like two drops of water) and correspond to a single quiddity, or whether their quiddities are different from each other (like man and horse). Nevertheless, existences have existential gradation in terms of their true cause, and this is because there is a cause-effect relation between them.15 It goes without saying that this interpretation does not go against the plurality of same-level existences in some of the links of the chain (like the world of nature), yet it embodies that their distinctions totally originate from their simple existence.16
Now one might ask how a single concept, called existence, is abstracted from things which are completely different in essence and is true about all of them, or how it is possible to abstract such a single concept from things which have nothing in common. The answer is that this principle is true about quiddative concepts as primary intelligibles, rather than philosophical concepts and secondary intelligibles. As an example, we can refer to the abstraction of the two concepts of substance and accident from their primary referents, that is, high genera, which are totally different in essence, or the abstraction of different concepts from the Simple Necessary Being, which is not plural.
In such cases, it is the mind which detects a common point among the referents. Thus if there is a concept of the type of philosophical secondary intelligibles which lacks an external referent, but has an origin of abstraction, neither does its unity indicate the existence of a particular unity in the origins of abstraction, nor its plurality indicates plurality. This is because it is not necessary for the referents of a concept belonging to the category of secondary intelligibles to have external communalities, since the plurality and unity of secondary intelligibles depends on the unity and plurality of intellectual outlooks, not on the objective and external unity. 17
However, this theory, in spite of all the efforts made to revise it, suffers from the flaw discussed below:
As mentioned before, according to the firm principle of the principiality of existence, all the differences and similarities in the world should necessarily refer back to existence, not quiddity. What is more, all quiddative differences, too, should ultimately refer back to differences in existence. Referring vertical plurality to existence is an almost obvious issue, and there is not much disagreement on it, since this plurality originates from the different levels and degrees of existence itself. Moreover, existence, because of strength and weakness, or priority and posteriority (all of which ultimately refer back to the modes of causality), is subject to such a plurality. And this plurality does not lead to the disruption of the unity of existence. On the other hand, the plurality which occurs to existence at the level of oneness and, according to the previously mentioned principle, is called quiddative or individual plurality, should ultimately refer back to existence. Quiddative plurals are not of the type of secondary intelligible pluralities. Therefore, if we say that quiddities of the same level are abstracted from the same-level existences which are completely different in essence, or that the individuals of a single quiddity are in the same relation to each other, again it might be asked which aspect of existence the origin of the realization of different quiddities of the same level is. At the same time, other quiddative concepts can be predicated on these very quiddities, such as the predication of genus on species, or the predication of species on individuals, and this is apparently inconsistent with the essential distinctions among the same-level individuals, and we should find another answer to justify the issue.
The martyr Mutahhari, in his Sharh mabsut-i manîumah, following the statement, “because of the plurality of subjects, predicates become plural”, clearly poses the problem of horizontal gradation and provides an answer for it. He says: “there is a point that Haji (Sabziwari) has not referred to. The late Akhund, (Mulla Sadra) too, has not paid much attention to it, either. However, he has occasionally referred to it, particularly in the chapter on quiddity”. 18
In this part, after posing the problem, Mutahhari provides the following response:
If we do not wish to object to Haji here, and say that he was too sharp for this problem to remain hidden to him (incidentally, his commentators do not refer to this point, either), and specifically, considering the fact that Akhund mentions this problem, although implicitly, we must say that the origin of plurality everywhere is existence itself. In other words, as in the case of vertical plurality, in horizontal plurality, too, the point of similarity, which you call plurality depending on quiddity, is identical with the distinctive point. However, there the problem is different; that is, existence obtains an extensive occurrence in its own essence. In other words, as in the case of vertical levels, in horizontal levels, too, each level of existence constitutes its essence. Therefore, like in vertical levels of existence, in horizontal levels of each existence, each level is the same as its own essence – quiddity obtains receptivity from the posterior level, whether horizontal or vertical; that is, it is the mind which considers the specific receptivity for things at different levels.19
Form what Mutahhari says about Hakim Sabziwari, and considering the way he explains horizontal gradation, it can be inferred that either Sabziwari was not able to understand the problem of horizontal gradation, which is impossible for such a knowledgeable thinker, or he solves the problem in the same way that Mutahhari does. However, as we saw, it is not the case, since Sabziwari was fully aware of the problem and referred to it in his works (though not in Manîumah, but in his glosses on Asfar). Nevertheless, as mentioned before, none of the three answers given by this philosopher was similar to the solution provided by Mutahhari. Apparently, Mutahhari’s solution does not solve the problem of horizontal gradation, either. This is because in this type of gradation we require not only an explanation for the appearance of quiddative plurality at the level of oneness, while adhering to the principiality of existence, but also a justification for the appearance of multiple individuals for a single unity, while adhering to the same principle. However, Mutahhari’s words do not explain any of these two pluralities.
Now it is the right time for reviewing the natural universal from the viewpoints of the Transcendent Philosophy and the principiality of existence. Mulla Sadra has presented his view of the natural universal in different places in his works. What can be collected from his ideas is that since reality and principiality belong to existence, and since quiddity has no share in this regard, real existence can never be ascribed to the natural universal. This is because the natural universal is identical with quiddity, and quiddity is the limit of existence. In the same way, limit is the same as non-existence, and non-existence, in turn, lacks principiality and realization. Therefore, the natural universal lacks a real, original, and essential existence. Exactly in the same way that quiddity is the representation of existence, and is qualified by existence through existence, the natural universal possesses the same shadowy and dependent existence: “but as for the natural universal, it is primarily non-existent for theologians and essentially non-existent to us, since quiddity has no conceptual existence, unless with respect to existence and individuals”.20 Concerning the issues of quiddity, we might say that quiddity is not qualified by any opposite qualities such as origination or eternity, unity or plurality, and existence or non-existence. In the same sense, the natural universal, which is identical with non-conditioned quiddity, obeys the same principles, and is not qualified by any of these qualities. Therefore, that philosophers considered the natural universal as being truly existence (although through the existence of individuals) and, in order to prove it, resorted to the argument of particularity, was not consistent with the principiality of existence in reality, and originated from the fossilized thoughts emphasizing the principiality of quiddity. That is why it is said:
It is not out of place to believe in the external existence of the natural universal, which is one of the profound ideas rooted in the principiality of quiddity.21
In al-Shawahid al-rububiyyah, after explaining and proving the point that quiddity is void of all attributes and accidents in its essence, and that all its qualities are due to existence, says that the real object of existent in the outside is its very existence, and the intellect, either from the essence of this external existent or its accidents, abstracts universal or particular concepts, and predicates them onto it, and refers to such concepts as genus and differentia, or the universal and particular accidents. Therefore, this is the meaning of existence of the natural universal in the outside. This is neither a specified existence, as philosophers think, nor does it have an individual existence, as theologians maintain.
Mulla Sadra believes that this idea comes third in line, with the first belonging to theologians, who completely deny the existence of the natural universal, and the second belonging to philosophers, who believe that the natural universal is originally existent in the existence of individuals. Mulla Sadra views natural universals as what the intellect abstracts from external existents, which merely possess a source of abstraction, but do not necessarily exist: “The natural universal is essentially non-existent, but is essentially existent in a particular existence”.22
Commitment to these ideas requires our accepting that natural universals, like other abstract concepts, are merely of the type of classification that man’s mind creates for perceiving, recognizing, and remembering external objects. However, it does not necessarily indicate that such conceptual classifications have external objects, and represent the external realities exactly as they are. Of course, this is not an idea in which even the founder of Transcendent Philosophy himself believes, since according to what he says, we can accept both the principiality of existence and the existence of the natural universal in the outside. Nevertheless, after accepting the principiality of existence, the question is whether the existence of the natural universal in the outside is original or dependent. We might say that any belief in the existence of the natural universal leads to the principiality of quiddity; therefore, if we believe in the principiality of existence, we cannot say that the natural universal exists in the outside anymore, whether it has a dependent or original existence. According to some authorities:
We admit that we cannot bring these two issues (the principiality of existence and the existence of any form of the natural universal) into agreement with each other. In our view, there is no difference between the principiality of quiddity and the existence of the natural universal in the outside.
Some say that the existence of the natural universal is due to the existence of individuals, and it does not have an independent existence; however, we assume that accepting the existence of the natural universal in the outside is the same as believing in the principiality of quiddity.
If one acknowledges the principiality of existence, he cannot agree with the existence of the natural universal in the outside. Accepting the existence of the natural universal in its real sense represents the residuals of believing in the principiality of quiddity. If we manage to purify our minds from such residuals, we should accept that the natural universal does not really exist, and that what exists is the individual. 23
That is why Hakim Sabziwari reduces the different positions related to the natural universal to two ideas: 1) The natural universal is basically among impossible entities, since it is a quiddity, and quiddities are mentally-posited; 2) The natural universal is existent; however, its existence is either the quality of the state of the object which is an individual, or a quality in terms of its essence. Later, Sabziwari adds that the second idea is true, but not in the sense of the principiality of quiddity, since the basis for the realization of objects is real existence; rather, in the sense that realization by quiddity is real and not metaphorical, since quiddity exists because of existence, and it is this very non-conditioned quiddity which is the source of all ontological divisions, and is predicated on its individuals (the many types) through ‘it-is-it’ predication. Of course, the real existence is a mediator in occurrence for quiddity and not one in subsistence. To clarify this issue, it is necessary to provide a short account of the difference between the mediator in occurrence and the mediator in subsistence.
The mediator in subsistence is sometimes against the mediator in affirmation, and sometimes against the mediator in occurrence. The mediator in subsistence which is against the mediator in affirmation indicates that the mediator of the cause of the positive or negative relation is the result of reality and the thing itself, as it is the case with a priori demonstration. In such cases, the mediators for subsistence and affirmation are the same, since the middle term in demonstration (whether a priori or posteriori) should be the reason for proving the major for the minor. Yet, in posteriori demonstrations, the middle term is the mediator in proving the major for the minor, not a mediator in subsistence. Therefore, the mediator in affirmation is not necessarily a mediator in subsistence at all times; however, its opposite holds true. The mediator in subsistence which is against the mediator in occurrence indicates that the mediator is the origin of the qualification of a thing by a quality by essence. This kind of mediator is of two types: a) the mediator itself is qualified by a quality, like fire, which is the mediator in creating heat in water, and is also qualified by heat itself; b) the mediator itself is not qualified by the quality, like the sun, which blackens people’s face. In both cases, the thing is truly qualified by a quality, but the mediator has two states.
The mediator in occurrence is the mediator of the origin of the qualification of the mediated by something, however, accidentally and metaphorically rather than really. The example here is the mediation of the ship for qualifying the crew by motion. In this case, it is in fact the mediator, and not the mediated, which is qualified by the quality. Yet, this type, too, both in terms of hiding and appearance is of different types. The most obvious of all types is the very example of the ship and its crew, in which the quality could be openly denied to the mediated. This quality is hidden in certain cases, such as denying whiteness to the object in reality and attributing it to the whitener, and in some other cases, it is the most hidden, such as denying realization to genus and ascribing it to differentia in reality, as well as denying existence to quiddity in reality and ascribing it to existence. It goes without saying that the last case is more accurate than others, and denying existence to the natural universal or quiddity requires accurate demonstrative judgments; otherwise, it must be said that the realization of the mediated in this case is also real, that existence cannot be denied to it, and that the natural universal is existent as the theoretical and speculative intellect indicates. That is why it has been said that such a conception of the existence of the natural universal is a rational reality and mystical metaphor. However, the first conception, in which existence is denied to the natural universal, is the most convincing from a mystical and demonstrative approach: “It is not known except to those who are greatly knowledgeable”.24
In this way, we might be able to say that the theologians’ idea as to the negation of the existence of the natural universal, and that of the Transcendent Philosophy as to denying existence to the natural universal, are identical, although formulated on different bases.25
1. al-Asfar, vol. 6, p. 230.
2. Ibid., Sabziwari’s Glosses.
3. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 53. In the sentence quoted above, he defines the knowledge of existence in two ways, while in the sentence before it, he limits it only to presential knowledge. However, these two sentences are not different from each other, since when he limits the knowledge of existence to one type, he means the perfect knowledge and true unveiling, while here he is referring to knowledge in a broad sense. As we can see, in al-Shawahid al-rububiyyah he refers to knowledge as “inner sense”, and then adds: “However, the knowledge of existence cannot be obtained unless through observation. It is something beyond words and arguments.” p.6.
4. Misbah Yazdi, The Lessons of Philosophy, p. 96.
5. Sharh mabsut-i manzumah, vol.1, p. 231.
6. al-Asfar, vol. 1, p. 46.
7. Ta‘liqah ala nihayah al-hikmah, p. 42.
8. Sharh al-manzumah, Qism al-hikmat, pp. 178-178.
9. al-Asfar, vol. 1, p. 46. Sabziwari’s Glosses.
10. Rahiq-i maktum, vol. 1, Ayatullah Jawadi Amuli, Asra, 1375, p. 365.
11. Ta‘liqah ala nihayah al-hikmah, p. 42.
12. al-Asfar, vol. pp. 256-257.
13. Rahiq-i makhtum, pp. 348-349.
14. The Lessons of Philosophy, pp. 340-341.
15. Ibid., p. 123.
16. Teaching Philosophy, vol. 1, p. 344.
17. The Lessons of Philosophy, pp. 119-122 and Teaching Philosophy, p. 342.
18. Sharh al-mabsuti manzumah, vol. 2, p. 176.
19. Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 176-177.
20. al-Asfar, vol. 4, p. 47.
21. Ta‘liqah ala nihayat al-hikmah, p. 26.
22. al-Asfar, vol. 4, p. 213.
23. The Lessons of Philosophy, p. 91.
24. Sharh al-manzumah, Qism al-mantiq, p. 146.
25. Ibid., p. 141, Hasanzadeh’s Glosses.
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