The Principle of Presupposition and Categorical Existence
(Qualification of Quiddity by Existence)
Thubutu shayin lishayin far‘u thubuti al-muthbati lahu is a philosophical and theological principle, known as the “principle of presupposition” and indicates that the realization of predicate for the subject is secondary to the realization of the subject itself.
This principle has occupied the minds of philosophers since long ago. Farabi poses this principle in his Fusus al-hikam  and Ibn Sina refers to it in his al-Isharat wal-tanbihat in most affirmative categorical propositions. However, it seems that it was Fakhr al-Din Razi who suggested it for the first time in the form of a philosophical principle.
Philosophers and theologians have used this principle in the following philosophical issues:
1- The truth of affirmative propositions: When an affirmative categorical proposition is true, its subject should exist in nafs al-amr (the thing as it is in itself), or in Ibn Sina’s words, it should have a rational or hypothetical existence.
2- The issue of mental existence: This principle is used in proving mental existence as follows: According to the principle of presupposition, an affirmative judgment which is true about a subject that is certainly non-existent in the external world signifies the existence of the subject in a receptacle other than the outside.
3- The identity of existence and quiddity: Some theologians who believe that existence is identical with quiddity have appealed to the principle of presupposition to prove their claim. Fakhr al-Din refers to their reasoning in his al-Mabahith al-mashriqiyyah.
4- The thingness and stability of contingent non-existent: Qushchi maintains that some theologians might have based their ideas of the thingness and stability of contingent non-existence on the principle of presupposition. In other words, since they agree with the principle of presupposition, they have no way but to believe that the thing is more extensive than existence and that non-existence is more extensive than negation.
As we see, the scope of the principle of presupposition was initially limited to the proving of the thingness of things; however, deeper studies of the issue, and, particularly, confrontations with the problem of existence in simple whether-it-is-ness propositions on essence and its occurrence to quiddity have expanded its scope to covering the following issues: the occurrence of a thing on a thing, the qualification of a thing by a thing, considering a thing through a thing, and the abstraction of a thing from a thing.
Therefore, in the above cases, the existence of the subject, the qualified, the considered, and the source of abstraction are necessary prior to anything else.
This principle is not only acceptable, but also evident, necessary and even primary to most philosophers. According to this principle, the existence of subject is not limited to external existence ; rather, it enjoys universal realization. Therefore, if realization is an external thing, the existence of subject in the outside is necessary, and if it is a mental issue, the existence of subject is necessary in the mind. According to Mulla Sadra, in the case of actuality propositions, the subject exists in the outside; in the case of propositions of verity, the subject is predetermined; and in the case of mental propositions, the subject exists in the mind.
The principle of presupposition is usually put forward in the form of an affirmative categorical presupposition in the works of philosophers and theologians. They believe that the existence of subject is necessary for its truth; however, logicians do not see the existence of subject as necessary in negative categorical propositions. Technically speaking, a negative categorical proposition is more general than an affirmative proposition, for the former is true even in the absence of a subject. Not only have they considered the affirmative categorical proposition as the context for the principle of presupposition, but also some of them have regarded “the affirmation of something for something” (thubutu shayin lishayin) as the content of affirmative categorical propositions.
With reference to the context of this principle, one might ask whether it is compatible with the content of any affirmative categorical proposition, or whether “the affirmation of something for something” constitutes the content of an affirmative categorical proposition at all times. Fakhr al-Din Razi gives a negative answer to this question.  This is because in his view the predication of a concrete noun on a derivative noun like al-mutaharrik jismon (the moved is a body), which he interprets as a derivative predication, is not of the type of “the affirmation of something for something”, since the essences of the moved and the body are identical, not that the body is something different which has been predicated on the essence of a moved.
Mulla Sadra, too, gives a negative response to this question, for there is no need to a subject in the predication of a thing on itself, and the predication of the essences of a thing on itself. Of course, being needless of a subject in such cases is due to the external referent of the proposition; however, with respect to the proposition itself, the existence of a subject and predicate is necessary in every affirmative categorical proposition.
What made the acceptance of the principle of presupposition difficult for philosophers was the qualification of quiddity by existence in simple whether-it-is-ness propositions whose predicate consists of existence. This is because if a quality occurs to a quiddity, on the basis of the principle of presupposition, quiddity should pre-exist the predicate of existence so that the predicate of existence could occur to it. The reason here is that if existence occurs to the quiddity of non-existent, it will necessitate the agreement of two opposites, and if it occurs to the quiddity of existent when the existence of the occurred is identical with the existence of the subject, it will necessitate the priority or posteriority of the thing to itself. If the existence of the subject is another existence occurred to the essence of the subject, the question of the occurrence of existence to quiddity will be repeated on the basis of the principle of presupposition. Ultimately, this will necessitate the priority of a thing to itself and the occurrence of a vicious circle or infinite regress.
Undoubtedly, philosophers and theologians believe that the qualification of quiddity by existence is different from other qualities attributed to quiddities; however, the major concern here is the presentation of a rational solution.
On the whole philosophers are divided into two groups with respect to the way they justify the qualification of quiddity by existence. A few of them believe that the principle of presupposition is not correct and; therefore, it should be eliminated. ‘Ala al-Din Qushchi is of the view that either the principle of presupposition is applicable to joint predicates (while existence is not among such predicates), or if “the affirmation of something for something” means predication, the principle is not correct, since the content of the predication is the identity of the subject and the predicate of the referent.
Dawani also questions the truth of the principle of presupposition, firstly because of qualification of quiddity by existence, and secondly because of qualification of matter by form. He reasons that the prior existence of quiddity and form in these two cases is not only unnecessary, but also rationally impossible. Accordingly, Dawani seeks the remedy in deviating from the principle of presupposition and appealing to the principle of implication.
Issuing a decree on the exclusion of qualification quiddity by existence from the domain of application of the principle of presupposition actually testifies to the invalidity of this principle. Thus Fakhr al-Din Razi can be accused of giving such a decree, as we can infer from his words in al-Mabahith al-mashriqiyyah. ‘Adad al-Din Īji, who has also given a decree in favor of this exclusion, can be considered as one of those philosophers who have blemished the truth of the principle of presupposition.
This group of philosophers have decreed the falsity of the principle on the basis of the assumption that the principle of presupposition includes every affirmative categorical proposition or, at least, every simple whether-it-is-ness proposition. Their idea is confirmed if we fail to prove that the principle of presupposition does not include the simple whether-it-is-ness propositions at all, or if it does, rationally impossible issues such as the priority of the thing to itself (as mentioned here), or the vicious circle and infinite regress (as mentioned by others) would be necessitated. However, believing in the existence of an exception and the exclusive exit is incompatible with reason, since, unlike mentally-posited judgments, rational judgments are not open to exceptions.
The second group admit the truth of the universality of the principle of presupposition and try to justify the predication of existence on quiddity or qualifying quiddity with existence. They have also presented a series of solutions in relation to such issues.
1- In Shaykh Ishraq’s view, the problem of qualification of quiddity by existence originates from the fact that quiddity is the limit and level of the essence of the subject of existence, while existence is among absolutely rational predicates and is not realized in the outside so that it could occur to quiddity.
Therefore, qualification of quiddity by existence is a mental issue and, according to Mulla Sadra, simple whether-it-is-ness propositions are of the type of mental propositions. However, the problem with this solution is that, firstly, a mental proposition is one whose subject is mental existence, because existence is mental, while the subject of simple whether-it-is-ness propositions is not the mental existence of that thing. Secondly, if something exists in a receptacle, it is qualified with existence in that receptacle and not in another. Thus if Zayd exists in the outside, it is qualified with existence in the outside.
2- Mulla Sadra presents another solution in which the occurrence and affirmation of existence for quiddity in the outside comes second to the existence of quiddity in the mind; therefore, simple whether-it-is-ness propositions are among external propositions, yet the qualification of their subjects by existence occurs in another receptacle such as the mind. It can be inferred from Dawani’s words that the commentators of Tajrid believe that this is Khwajah Nasir al-Din Tusi’s solution.
This solution can remove the problem of the occurrence of external existence to quiddity. Nevertheless, if it is inquired how existence has occurred to a quiddity which has come into existence in the mind, and if it has occurred to an existent or non-existent quiddity, we see that the impossibility of the occurrence of existence to quiddity has still remained unsolved.
3- Another solution is to suggest that existence is an abstract issue and does not have a referent in reality so that quiddity could be qualified by it. Accordingly, the referent of “Zayd exists” is Zayd himself without being existent.
In rejecting this solution, Mulla Sadra says that the principle of presupposition also applies to abstractions. He explains that if the source of abstraction does not exist in some way, no abstract concept could be derived from it. For example, when there is a pencil on the table, the concept of something’s being on something else can be abstracted from the relation between these two existents; however, if there is no pencil, the abstraction of this concept will be meaningless.
4. Mulla Sadra still refers to another solution indicating that existence is by no means existent. It neither exists in the outside, nor in the mind. It neither exists in reality, nor is it mentally posited. Rather, it is a false image (false invention) and a criterion for the truth of the derivative in affirmative categorical propositions. In our discussion, it is the criterion for the truth of the quiddity’s being “existent”, or the union of the subject and quiddity with the concept of derivative. Of course, it does not mean that the source of the derivation of the derivative is a real or abstract thing depending on quiddity. The concept of derivative is a simple one, referred to as “hast”, “dana” and “tawana” in persian. Thus the occurrence of existence to quiddity merely denotes that existence is predicated on quiddity and is outside its essence, and that is why quiddity is never qualified by existence for this qualification to be secondary to the existence of quiddity itself.
There is no problem with this solution by itself, but it is based on the theory of the principiality of quiddity and will lose its efficiency if this theory is refuted. Therefore, Mulla Sadra does not object to this solution at all; however, when discussing the solutions he has in mind, he expresses his dissatisfaction with the solution based on the principiality of quiddity. This solution is attributed to Sayyid Sanad.
5. There is still another solution which is famous as the taste of mutallihin. According to this solution, “existence” is a personal unit which is the same as the necessary being, and “existent” is a universal concept which is both predicated on the necessary being and the possible existent. The criterion of this predication is that the subject of the proposition should be the source of effects in nafs al-amr. The existence of possible things does not mean that a portion of existence depends on them; rather, their existence relies on their attribution to the personal existence of the necessary being. Therefore, possible things are not qualified by existence so that their quiddity be existent prior to being qualified. Mulla Sadra’s objection to this solution is that if the criterion of the existence of possible things is their attribution to the necessary being, this will require infinite regress in attributions. The reason is that this attribution itself is a quality and, according to the principle of presupposition, the qualification of quiddity by this quality comes second to the existence of quiddity.
After restating the previous solutions, Mulla Sadra offers three other solutions which are presented below, along with the explanations provided by some of his advocates:
6. The occurred is of two types: the occurred quiddity and the occurred existence. The distinguishing feature of the occurred quiddity is that the subject comes into existence through the occurred and not prior to it. The occurrence of differentia to genus and the occurrence of individuation to species are among quiddative occurrences. Here, the subject is the quiddity as it is. The distinguishing feature of the occurred existence is that the subject exists before the occurrence of the occurred and occurs with the occurrence of the occurred qualified by quality. An example here could be the occurrence of whiteness to the body and the occurrence of existence to quiddity, which are of the type of the occurrence of quiddity. Therefore, before the occurrence of essence and existence to it, the quiddity needs no other existence; rather, it comes into existence with the same existence. The difference between the occurrence of essence and the occurrence of existence is that quiddity depends on causal inference in the occurrence of existence to it, although this mode is not included in the subject. In other words, the subject is still quiddity as it is; nevertheless, the occurrence of essence to quiddity does not depend on causal inference. It was Muhaqqiq Tusi who for the first time proposed and explained this solution in brief in his Tajrid al-i‘tiqad. This solution is based on the super-addition of existence to quiddity, in the sense that the reason can take quiddity into consideration without existence. In this way, the reason considers a quiddity which is not accompanied by existence as the subject, and then predicates existence onto it. However, viewing quiddity in separation from existence is itself a kind of granting existence to quiddity. Of course, it is emphasized that although this view entails a kind of granting existence, it is not important. Accordingly, the occurrence of existence and the predication of existence on quiddity is not secondary to the existence of quiddity.
7. Mulla Sadra’s other solution which is also rooted in Muhaqqiq Tusi’s words indicates that the content of the principle of presupposition is the “affirmation of something for something”, which is consistent with compound whether-it-is-ness propositions. The content of simple whether-it-is-ness propositions is the “affirmation of something”. Therefore, simple whether-it-is-ness propositions cannot be considered as referents for the principle of presupposition so that the existence of subject be necessary for them. Aqa ‘Ali Mudarris Zunuzi’s interpretation of this solution is that existence qua existence is not considered a thing among things so that the principle could be applied to it, since in this respect, existence will be the realization and affirmation of existence.
Of course, if we consider existence independently, rather than as the existence of something, it will count as a thing to which existence can occur. Existence is a mental concept and its container is the mind; therefore, if we consider the concept of existence as something which signifies external things, it would be nothing but things. The content of simple whether-it-is-ness propositions signifies such a meaning of existence. The realization of a thing is not different from the thing itself so that it could have a realization, and if the concept of existence does not signify the existence of something, it cannot be the quality of anything. Therefore, the principle of presupposition indicates that a compound whether-it-is-ness proposition comes after a simple one. Of course, an analysis of the parts of a simple whether-it-is-ness proposition demands the existence of a subject, and the existence of the subject is in the mind of the existent; however, with respect to the external reality of simple whether-it-is-ness propositions, the existence of subject in separation from the existence of the predicate is not correct, since the content of a simple whether-it-is-ness proposition is the “affirmation of a thing”, not the “affirmation of something for something”.
8. According to the principiality of existence, the reality of existence is the subject, and quiddity occurs to it, thus what has filled all reality is existence, and this is the intellect which analyses this reality into existence and quiddity at the level of mind, and refers one to the other. In such a reference, if we pay attention to the outside, we see that existence is principial and quiddity occurs to it, since the existence of the possible by essence originates from the maker, and quiddity is something secondary, made, and accidental.
In the first two solutions, Mulla Sadra considers simple whether-it-is-ness propositions out of the domain of the principle of presupposition. In other words, his response to these solutions is that the content of the principle of presupposition does not include simple whether-it-is-ness propositions, since the occurrence of existence to quiddity is of the type of the occurrence of the occurring quiddity, or since the content of a simple whether-it-is-ness proposition is “the affirmation of a thing”, while the content of the principle of presupposition refers to the occurred existence or “the affirmation of something for something”. Nevertheless, in the last solution Mulla Sadra agrees that the content of simple whether-it-is-ness propositions is the referent of the principle of presupposition, but his solution indicates that, according to the principiality of existence, the subject in a simple whether-it-is-ness proposition is the existence of existence itself and quiddity occurs to it. In this case, the occurrence of quiddity is secondary to existence itself; that is, the principle of presupposition also applies to abstractions and, according to the principiality of existence, quiddity is abstracted from existence.
Undoubtedly, the principle of presupposition is intertwined with the categorical proposition in philosophers’ words. Even Ibn Sina stipulates that the content of the affirmative categorical proposition is “the affirmation of something for something”; therefore, one might ask whether there really exists a relationship between the principle of presupposition and the affirmative categorical presupposition. In order to provide an answer to this question, we should refer to the two types of predication identified by logicians and philosophers: derivative predication and non-derivative predication. Any concept which could be predicated on another concept without any change, and could be used in developing a predicative proposition could be contained in a non-derivative predication; for example, “Mulla Sadra is a sage”. Every concept that cannot be predicated without change, and should be transformed into a derivative, or includes the word “dhu” (possessor), could be contained in a derivative predication; for example, we cannot predicate philosophy on Mulla Sadra without deriving “philosopher” from “philosophy” or adding “dhu” to it. Therefore, the predication of “philosopher” or the “possessor of philosophy” on the subject is of the type of non-derivative predication, and the predication of “philosophy” itself on the subject which is apparently not in the form of “predication as it is”, but is philosophically the origin of this subject, is of the kind of derivative predication. Non-derivative predication is actually the same as categorical proposition, thus one might ask: Is the principle of presupposition related to non-derivative predication? As quoted from Ibn Sina previously, he believes that the content of the affirmative categorical proposition is “the affirmation of something for something”, and other logicians, too, are more or less in agreement with him in this regard. Therefore, it must be said that in logicians’ view, the affirmative categorical proposition is a referent for the principle of presupposition. However, Fakhr al-Din Razi does not believe that all referents of affirmative categorical propositions represent the meaning of “the affirmation of something for something”, and as mentioned before, he does not believe that the content of the proposition of “the moved is a body” is “the affirmation of something for something”. According to logicians, this proposition is a referent for non-derivative predication, but Razi considers it a derivative one. It was also mentioned previously that in Mulla Sadra’s view, the contents of the predication of a thing on the soul and the predication of the essentials of a thing on essence are not the same as the content of “the affirmation of something for something” in all their referents. Fadil Qushchi, too, says that there is a possibility that the content of predication in the affirmative proposition merely signifies the existence of a single referent for both the subject and the predicate. It seems that logicians agree with such content for categorical propositions. ‘Allamah Hilli has also some interesting points concerning non-derivative predication. Such a meaning of predication is true about the highest form of predication, i.e., the predication of a thing on the self, since every essence is the same as itself, and the difference between the subject and predicate in the predication of a thing on itself is mentally-posited. Accordingly, we can say that the content of predication is not “the affirmation of something for something”, since there is no duality between the thing and itself so that one would be affirmed for the other. This can be negated only if the meaning of “the affirmation of something for something” is exactly predication, when used in the definition of predication, and not in its literal sense or what is literally perceived from the content of the principle of presupposition. In other words, if the meaning of “the affirmation of something for something” which is used in the definition of predication is the same as the meaning referred to in the principle of presupposition, we have no reason to believe the truth of this definition of predication. More importantly, Fakhr al-Din Razi and Mulla Sadra have proved the falsity of this definition. Therefore, if the content of predication in affirmative propositions indicates the existence of a single referent for the subject and predicate, we can refute the relation between the principle of presupposition and categorical propositions. Of course, since predication is a subjective judgment, its subject and predicate should exist in the mind, because the existence of the subject and predicate is necessary in negative propositions, and this has nothing to do with the principle of presupposition. Besides, the existence of both the subject and predicate in nafs al-amr is necessary for true affirmative categorical propositions, and this is not due to the principle of presupposition, but due to the necessity of judgment in nafs al-amr. If the content of categorical proposition is the objective or essential identity of the referent for the subject and predication, this identical reference is posterior to both of them, and such posteriority is different from the posteriority of “the affirmation of something for something”. This is because the content of predication is not “the affirmation of something for something”; however, in negative propositions the existence of the subject and predication is not necessary with respect to nafs al-amr and the outside world, since it is claimed in such propositions that the two have no shared referent, and not having an identical referent is more general than their being in existence, not being compatible with the same referent, or the absence of one or both of them.
As for derivative predication, one might ask if it is related to the principle of presupposition. As mentioned before, derivative predication means that the subject involves the source of predication. Thus we are talking about something that has a source and, accordingly, as in the case of the content of “the affirmation of something for something”, we take the existence of duality in the content of derivative predication for granted. What has been discussed so far reveals that there is a relationship between the principle of presupposition and derivative predication. However, the scope of derivative predication is not known clearly; that is, all we know is that there is certainly some kind of relation between derivative predication and non-derivative predication, but we do not have any information as to its nature. Each non-derivative predication will give way to derivative predication if its predicate is a derivative and is considered as one of the accidents of the subject, and if the source of that derivative is evaluated in terms of the subject. In this way, one might ask whether it is possible to derive a derivative predication from the heart of each non-derivative predication. The first answer which comes to the mind is “no”, since the predication of something on itself, such as “Zayd is Zayd”, is a kind of non-derivative predication. However, a derivative predication does not apparently have an assumption, since there is nothing between Zayd and himself so that one could include the other, and this is also the case with a thing and its essence. We said the “first answer” because a derivative predication could be derived from the heart of any non-derivative predication in non-simple whether-it-is-ness propositions, provided that we consider the predicate as a derivative, and evaluate the source of the derivative in terms of the subject in the receptacle of consideration. For example, in “Zayd is Zayd”, we should consider the second “Zayd” and a derivative such as “laughter”, and say that the essence of “Zayd” possesses “Zaydness” (being Zayd). In such cases we can derive a derivative predication from the heart of a non-derivative predication. Thus through the employment of consideration, we see that there is a derivative predication for each non-derivative predication in non-simple whether-it-is-ness propositions. Accordingly, we can say that derivative predication is a referent for the principle of presupposition. In other words, due to the source, the predicate of the principle of presupposition permeates non-derivative predications, since when Zayd’s being Zayd is something excess to the essence of Zayd, and Zayd possesses it, Zayd’s essence should exist in the receptacle of consideration. Moreover, its being Zayd should also exist so that Zayd could possess it, and it is not rational for Zayd not to exist and possess being Zayd at the same time. Even in “non-existence is non-existence” the source of derivation permeates the predicate of the principle of presupposition through consideration. This is because a land of non-existence is assumed in the receptacle of consideration and each non-existent essence possesses non-existence in this receptacle. Through this consideration, even in the predication of the essentials of a thing, each essence could be considered a referent for the principle of presupposition with respect to its essential source. For instance, “man is a rational being” is considered the essence of man who possesses reason as his real differentia. The only case to which the principle of presupposition cannot be applied is a simple whether-it-is-ness proposition, since in “Zayd exists”, we cannot consider Zayd so that it possesses existence, since if the non-existent Zayd possesses existence, this will necessitate the agreement of opposites. And if the existing Zayd possesses existence so that the second existence is the same as the first one, it will require the priority of the existence of a thing to its existence. And if there are two existences, this will firstly necessitate the multiplicity of the existence of a thing, and secondly, the occurrence of the first existence to its subject will obeys the principle of presupposition. This will force either a vicious circle, or the priority of the thing to itself, or an infinite regress. What is more, if Zayd, who has no existence and non-existence, possesses existence, the law of excluded middle would be enforced on the subject. Therefore, no reasonable derivative predication could be derived from the heart of simple whether-it-is-ness propositions. In simple terms, we say that “Zayd exists”; that is, he possesses existence. However, this is not rationally correct, because Zayd is the same as existence in reality. Accordingly, in line with Ibn Sina and Muhaqqiq Tusi, Mulla Sadra states that the relation between existence and quiddity is “the affirmation of a thing” rather than “the affirmation of something for something”.
As a result, a generalization of the validity of the principle of presupposition reveals that it permeates every non-derivative predication through the consideration of the source of the derivation of the predicate, even if the source is fake and mentally-posited. Simple whether-it-is-ness propositions are definitely excluded from the domain of application of this principle. However, attending to a specific point forces us to limit the principle of presupposition to compound whether-it-is-ness propositions whose predicates are of the type of “mediate predicates”. In this case, there is no need to generalize its validity, assuming that through this generalization the principle permeates compound whether-it-is-ness propositions. The point emphasized above is that with respect to this principle, philosophers agree that the existence of subject is necessary, but it is not the case with predicate. In this regard, they provide the example of blindness. The fixity of blindness and the predication of “blind” on Zayd come second to Zayd’s existence, but not to the existence of blindness in the external world. Blindness is an abstract predicate and not a mediate predicate. Therefore, in mediate predicates, such as the predication of wisdom on Mulla Sadra, the subject is secondary to existence, while in predicates other than this it is not necessary for the subject to exist in the outside. Thus the predication of possibility on phoenix is not secondary to the existence of phoenix in the outside. We can truly grant existence to the subject through paying attention to the consideration of this point. It seems that the generalization of validity has its roots in the fact that the principle of presupposition has been adjusted to non-derivative predications. In affirmative non-derivative predications, since they are affirmative, the existence of subject is necessary, as the existence of the predicate is necessary, too. However, the necessity of the existence of the subject and predicate does not indicate that the subject and predicate have two different existences, since the content of categorical propositions signifies that two things can have the same referent. Thus the existence of the subject is necessary in affirmative simple whether-it-is-ness propositions, since with respect to judgment, not until Zayd is imagined in the mind and obtains a mental existence, could the concept of “existent” be predicated on it. The criterion for “Zayd exists” is an external reality on which the two titles of Zayd and existent are predicated.
1. Farabi, Fusus al-hikam, Hasan Zadih Amuli, Nusus al-hikam bar fusus al-hikam, Tehran, Markaz-i Nashr-i Farhang-i Raja, 1365, p. 22.
2. Ibn Sina, al-Isharat wal-tanbihat, commentary by Muhaqqiq Tusi, Daftar-i Nashr-i Kitab, 1403 A.H.. vol. 1, p. 129.
3. Fakhr al-Din Razi, al-Mabahith al-mashriqiyyah fi ‘ilm al-ilahiyyat wal-tabi‘iyyat, Lebanon, Dar al-Kitab al-‘Arabi, 1410 A.H. vol. 1, p. 130.
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5. al-Mabahith al-mashriqiyyah, p. 119.
6. ‘Ala al-Din ‘Ali Ibn Mohammed Qushchi, Sharh tajrid al-i‘tiqad, Manshurat Razi, Biddar wa ‘Azizi, bita, p. 8.
7. Mulla Sadra, Risalah fi ittisaf al-mahiyyah bil wujud (al-Rasail), Qum, Maktabat al-Mustafawi, bita, p. 110, Mohammed Mahdi Naraqi, “Qurratul ‘uyun”, Journal of the University of Theology and Islamic Sciences, No. 15, 1354, p. 112.
8. Risalah fi ittisaf al-mahiyyah bil wujud (al-Rasail), p. 113, Qutb al-Din Razi, Sharh al-matali‘, p. 104, ‘Abdul Razzaq Lahiji, Shawariq al-ilham, Tehran, Maktabat al-Farabi, 1401, p. 132, S‘ad al-Din Taftazani, Sharh al-maqasid, Qum, Sharif Radi, 1370, vol. 1, p. 346, ‘Abdul Rahim, Hawashi al-hashiyah, Qum, Institute of Islamic Publication, 1415, p. 283.
9. Khwajah Nasir al-Din Tusi, Ajwabat al-masa’il, Astarabadi, Mantiq wa mabahith-i alfaz, Institute of Publication of Tehran University, 1270, pp. 253-254, Sharh tajrid al-i‘tiqad, p. 11.
10. Mulla Sadra, Risalah al-tanqih fil-mantiq, philosophical treatises of Mulla Sadra, Research by Hamid Haji Isfahani, Hikmat Publication, 1375, p. 208.
11. Shahab al-Din Suhrawardi, Mantiq al-talwihat, Tehran, Publication of Tehran University, 1334, p. 25. Nasir al-Din Tusi, Sharh al-isharat wal-tanbihat, vol.1, p. 129.
12. Ibn Sina, al-Najat fil-mantiq wal-ilahiyyat, Beirut, Dar al-Hial, 1412, p. 21, Bahmanyar, al-Tahsil, Institute of Publication of Tehran University, 1375, p. 47.
13. Fakhr al-Din Razi, Sharh ‘uyun al-hikmah, Tehran, Muassisah al-Sadiq, 1373, p. 120.
14. Mulla Sadra, Kitab al-mashair, Tahuri Library, bita, p. 27, Risalah fi ittisaf al-mahiyyah bil wujud, p.115.
15. al-Mabahith al-mashriqiyyah, vol. 1, pp. 120, 126.
16. Sharh tajrid al-i‘tiqad, p. 16.
17. Dawani, Hashiyah bar sharh tajrid al-i‘tiqad, p. 59, Risalah fi ittisaf al-mahiyyah bil wujud, p. 111.
18. al-Mabahith al-mashriqiyyah.
19. ‘Azad al-Din Īji, al-Mawaqif, sharh al-waqif, Qum, Sharif Razi Publication, 1373, vol. 2, p. 131.
20. Shahab al-Din Suhrawardi, Hikmat al-ishraq, collection of Suhrawardi's works, Tehran, Institute of Cultural Studies and Research, 1372, pp. 64-72.
21. Risalah fi ittisaf al-mahiyyat bil wujud, p. 110.
23. Hashiyah bar sharh tajrid al-i‘tiqad.
24. Risalah fi ittisaf al-mahiyyat bil wujud.
25. Ibid., p. 114.
26. Ibid., p. 114.
27. ‘Ali Mudarris Zunuzi, Risalah hamliyah, Cultural and Scientific Publication Co., 1363, p. 62.
28. Risalah fi ittisaf al-mahiyyah bil wujud, p. 111.
29. Ibid., pp. 114-117.
30. Risalah hamliyah, p. 61.
31. Khwajah Nasir al-Din Tusi, Tajrid al-‘itiqad, Kashf al-murad fi sharh tajrid al-it’iqad, Qum, Maktabat al-Mustafawi, bita, pp. 10-11, 47.
32. Ibid., p. 11.
33. Risalah hamliyah, p. 51.
34. Ibn Sina, al-Najat fil-mantiq wal-ilahyyat, p. 21, ‘Uyun al-hikmah, Sharh ‘uyun al-hikmah, p. 120.
36. Risalah fi ittisaf al-mahiyyah bil wujud, p. 115.
37. Sharh tajrid al-i‘tiqad, p. 16.
38. Jamal al-Din Hasan bin Yusuf Hilli, al-Jawhar al-nazid fi sharh mantiq al-tajrid, Qum, Bidar, 1363, p. 13.
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