A Study of the Different Views on the Place of Inhering Existence and Copulative Existence in

Inhering and predicative existences hold specific places in logical propositions. The relation and unity between the subject and predicate in predicative propositions are not established without a copula. Simple and compound "whatness" questions are distinguished from each other based on these two types of existence. The differences of inhering existence from copulative existence, judicial relation, judgment, and concept have led to the development of unprecedented ideas concerning the structure of logical propositions: binary and ternary propositions, as well as the components of predicative propositions and the related disagreements, are completely related to these two types of existence.

On the other hand, these two terms are also discussed in philosophy because the subject of this field is existence. Besides, inhering and copulative existences are considered to be the two types of existence the discussion of which started at the time of Farabi and Ibn Sina and reached its culmination in the Transcendent Philosophy. The commentators of this school have also paid particular attention to it and derived certain conclusions from it.

By analyzing the principle of causality, Mulla Sadra viewed the effect the same as relation and belonging to its cause. Thus he concluded that all existents are the same as copula, relation, and dependence in relation to the essence of the Truth, and it is only Him Who is an Independent Existence.

This paper intends to clarify the true place of inhering and predicative existences in logic and its difference from the place of this discussion in philosophy.

The discussion of inhering and predicative existences began in logic. This issue is dealt with in relation to two topics in this field: the issue of "whatness" and predicative propositions and their component parts. "Whatness" is divided into simple and compound types. In other words, affirmative "whatness" either questions the essential existence of the thing or its other existence. In the former case, existence (or existent) is the predicate and comprises simple "whatness". In the latter, existent is not the predicate independently; rather, it is a relation between the subject and the predicate. This type is called compound "whatness".

In predicative propositions, too, inhering existence is known as the element uniting the subject and predicate. In this case, it comprises none of the sides of the proposition but assumes existence along with them. However, if existence functions as the predicate independently, it is discussed under the title of predicative existence.[1]

Some believe that the application and dependence of existence is the basis for its being predicative and inhering. Accordingly, if existence is absolutely a predicate in the proposition, it will be predicative, and if it is dependent, it will be inhering.[2] According to some views, binary and ternary propositions are developed in the same way.[3] In literary debates, these two types of existence are discussed under titles such as nominal and literal meanings, imperfect and perfect "be", and the like.

Philosophy, which centers around existence, definitely deals with this issue. The divided of these two types of existence is nothing but absolute existence. Thus this discussion is noteworthy both in philosophy and logic. Now, the question is, "to which of these two fields is the discussion of this problem really related?" In other words, the discussion of inhering and predicative existences is related to philosophy since their divided is absolute existence. However, it is also related to logic since existence is sometimes the predicate and sometimes the copula in a proposition. Therefore, we repeat the question of "to which field is this issue originally related?"

In what follows, in addition to trying to answer this question, reference will be made to the cases in which this issue has been dealt with in logic.

The Debate on the Philosophical or Logical Nature of Inhering and Predicative Existences

In response to the question posed above, various ideas have been propounded. Some believe that dividing existence to inhering and copulative ones is related to the concept of existence. They maintain that the place of this discussion is the field of logic, and its transfer to the reality of existence is due to mixing logical issues and judgments with philosophical ones.[4]

In contrast, some believe that it is wrong to consider the division of existence into predicative and inhering types as a conceptual issue or to assume that inhering existence is a philosophical one under the pretext that such issues must be discussed in the field of logic. According to this group, logic is a creditor to philosophy in this regard exactly in the same way that the principle of the existence of the three-fold substances is a philosophical one, and logic relies on it in the division of propositions.

For this group, another sign indicating that inhering existence is a philosophical problem is that it functions as a basis in many philosophical arguments. For example, they believe that it is one of the arguments underlying the principiality of existence.[5] If existence were not principial, inhering existence, which is a kind of it, would be mentally-posited. In this case, there would be no predication in propositions.

Another evidence testifying to the philosophical nature of inhering existence is said to be that after demonstrating the principiality and gradedness of existence, it is divided into the three types of inhering, copulative, and in-itself, and then their specific unity is decreed.[6]

Furthermore, when discussing the univocality of existence, Mulla Sadra considers the oneness of the concept of inhering existence as evidence for the oneness of the meaning of existence in other cases.[7] This also indicates the philosophical nature of this issue.

Attention should also be paid to the fact that separating a philosophical discussion from a logical one requires a criterion based on which we can distinguish them from each other. Although the issues in philosophy and logic, due to their great similarities, are discussed in both fields, presenting a clear criterion can determine to which field a specific issue belongs.

It seems that the subject of each of these two disciplines can function as a clear criterion for this purpose. As its main subject, the domain of philosophical discussions covers issues related to existence and its related judgments. Therefore, the principle of the existence of predication and the unity between two things is related to philosophy; however, the judgments of predication and other related issues are discussed in logic.

The results of research reveal that the meaning of the inhering existence that Mulla Sadra derived from the analysis of the principle of causality is totally other than what is discussed in logic in relation to the issue of the components of predicative propositions. Moreover, it is wrong to say that existence is used in philosophy in the predicative sense everywhere and to refer to Mulla Sadra's[8] words concerning the univocality of these two types of existence as evidence.[9] This is because the conclusion that he derives from analyzing the principle of causality is an exact issue which is not only totally distinct from the relation used in the predicative propositions discussed in logic but also incomparable to predicative existences, and only one existence, i.e. the same essence of the Necessary Being, which is independent in the real sense of the word, is exempt from its inclusion.

Hence, inhering existence, which is the product of Mulla Sadra's deliberations on the discussion of causality, has no relation to logic and is a purely philosophical issue. However, what is discussed in logic in the part on "propositions" and "subjects" is basically a logical issue because what is intended there is the concept of inhering and predicative existences. This conceptual discussion, due to the similarities between philosophical and logical debates, is also noteworthy in philosophy for certain reasons. Clearly, speaking of the origin of being and existence is related to the field of philosophy.

Inhering and predicative existences play a determining role in the structure of predicative propositions. The subjects of propositions the predicate of which is existence or existent are quiddities. The sides of such propositions enjoy unity in the outside and are distinguished from each other only in imagination. Therefore, they are called simple propositions. Moreover, since existence occupies the place of the predicate independently, it is called predicative existence and, technically, the content of "be" in its perfect sense.

If the predicate of a proposition is something other than existence, a relation must be established between its sides because no proposition can be developed with two disjunctive concepts, and, as a result, the foundation of predication collapses. The oneness and unity in a predicative proposition is created by inhering existence, and that is why it is called a copula.[10] Moreover, since it does not appear independently in propositions, it enjoys a literal meaning. Such propositions consist of three parts and are known as ternary propositions.

The copula, in addition to the relation between the sides of the proposition, sometimes explains the time and kind of relation as well. This kind of copula is called "temporal relation". In Arabic, imperfect verbs are used for such purposes.

Inhering existence never comprises one of the sides of a proposition; rather, it always exists in addition to the subject and predicate. This is because if it were one of the sides of a proposition, it would require another copula relating it to the subject and predicate. This will also be true about the other copula and, hence, impossible regression will arise.

There are some disagreements concerning the component parts of predicative propositions and their number between logicians and philosophers, on the one hand, and among philosophers and logicians themselves, on the other. These disagreements have also risen regarding the issues that, in a way, relate to this problem, such as binary and ternary propositions and propositions lacking a copula.

In this part, we will first provide an overview of the theories and ideas of famous logicians and philosophers about the component parts of predicative propositions and, then, deal with the source of their differences. Later we will discuss the rise of these disagreements concerning the quality of binary and ternary propositions, as well as those lacking a copula.

Logicians[11] in their logical works have referred to three components for predicative propositions:

We can show these three-fold components in the Persian language in the example of "Ferdowsi is a poet." However, through distinguishing negative and affirmative propositions, and compound and simple propositions from each other, philosophers have developed certain ideas which can be summarized in the following four theories:

a. All compound propositions have four components: subject, predicate, judicial relation, and judgment. Bahmanyar believes that if in a predicative proposition, in addition to the subject, predicate, and copula, one of the three-fold directions is also mentioned, then the propositions will have four component parts, although the proposition is also perfect with the first three components (al-Tahsil, pp. 46-47).

b. Only compound affirmative propositions have these four-fold components, while compound negative propositions have only three components. In other words, there is no judgment in such oppositions because their content entails the negation of the affirmed judicial relation.

c. Compound affirmative whatness propositions have four components, while simple ones have three. In other words, the latter lack judicial relation because their content entails "affirming a thing" rather than "affirming one thing for another thing". However, compound negative "whatness" propositions, through omitting the judgment, have three components, since their content is the negation of the affirmed relation. Simple negative "whatness" propositions have no more than two components since their content is the negation of the affirmation of the subject. Therefore, they lack a judgment and a judicial relation.

It appears form Mulla Sadra's words in al-Asfar that he, too, agrees with this idea.[12] However, in another place he maintains that all propositions have a judicial relation.[13]

d. Affirmative propositions, whether simple or compound "whatness" propositions, have three components: subject, predicate, and judgment. Nevertheless, negative propositions have two: subject and predicate. 'Allamah Tabataba'i believes in this notion. He holds that judicial relation is not a part of a proposition; rather, it is among the necessary concomitants of compound "whatness" propositions. Therefore, unlike Mulla Sadra, he believes that it cannot be generalized to all propositions.[14]

As mentioned before, the disagreement between philosophers and logicians concerning the components of a proposition is rooted in the distinctions between the modes of philosophical and logical judgments. Philosophical issues are related to reality and external realities, and that is why simple "whatness" propositions are called the "affirmation of a thing". Thus their components (irrespective of the differences) are said to be only three in number, and negative propositions are believed to lack judgment.

Nevertheless, logical issues relate to the content of these components, which exist in all propositions in the form of mental existence. In the mind, all four-fold components are different from each other in terms of meaning. Hence, unlike the case in philosophy, in logic not much attention has been paid to the distinctions among propositions when explaining the components of predicative propositions. Accordingly, it can be said that all logical propositions have four components: subject, predicate, judicial, and judgment.

Moreover, lack of attention to the differences between the judicial relation and copula is another factor leading to the rise of various ideas concerning the components of a proposition and its related issues. Reference will be made to these differences further on.

Logicians have not presented any distinctive and single criterion concerning binary and ternary propositions. Some maintain in their logical works[15] that the criterion for determining whether a proposition is binary or ternary is verbal. In fact, the criterion for making such a distinction between them is whether one emphasizes the existence of a copula in the proposition or not. That is, if the existence of a copula is mentioned in the proposition, it is ternary; otherwise, it is binary.

Some others have set the criterion for this distinction more than a verbal one and paid more attention to the contents and meanings of propositions. Ibn Sina believes that in any predicative proposition, along with the meaning of the predicate and subject, the meaning of their union with each other as a third element must also exist. This third element is omitted in some languages such as Arabic e.g. "Zayd Katib" (Zayd is a writer). Here, it is correct to say: "Zayd huwa Katib" (Zayd, he is a writer). Ibn Sina calls this third element "copula". [16]

In addition to what Ibn Sina says, Bahmanyar refers to another kind of proposition in this regard and calls it a "quadrain" proposition. He believes that if "huwa" is emphasized as the existence of copula in the proposition, it will be a ternary proposition; otherwise, it will be a binary one. However, if in addition to the subject, predicate, and copula, the direction of the proposition is also mentioned, it will be called a quadrain proposition.[17]

In another place, Ibn Sina maintains that in two cases there is no need to stipulate the relation in the proposition: first, when the predicate is a verb, and, second, when the predicate is a derivative.[18] That is why Fakhr Razi believes that his statements are inconsistent. He argues that, if the predicate is a derived word or noun, the proposition must be a binary one[19] because the copula � indicated by implication � is its signification. Therefore, referring to it necessitates repletion. If the predicate of the proposition is a concrete noun, it will be a ternary proposition.[20]

In response to Fakhr Razi's objection, Tusi, another commentator of al-Isharat, says that a verb or derivative enjoys an essential relation with the subject, and there is no need of a copula. However, if the subject precedes the verb, the need of a copula is felt because the predicate functions as a concrete noun, and, in order to establish a relation with the subject, a copula is required.[21] In Ta'liqat, in cases where no copula has been mentioned, Ibn Sina maintains that the pronoun "huwa" is implied as copula.[22]

Therefore, there is no inconsistency in Ibn Sina's words such as that Fakhr Razi referred to. This is because he argues in al-Isharat that we should truly replace the proposition "Zayd Katib" with "Zayd huwa Katib" (Zayd, he is alive), and, in Ta'liqat, he maintains that the pronoun "huwa" is implied as copula.[23] Moreover, in Mantiq al-mashriqiyyin, he has merely referred to its non-existence and said that there is no need to refer to this copula in the proposition.[24]

The commentator of Matali' al-anwar believes that words such as "huwa" in Arabic are among pronouns and, in no way, indicate relation, particularly, a judicial one. Rather, they refer to a referent which has been mentioned before them. For example, when it is said "Zayd huwa hay", "huwa" merely refers to Zayd and is not a relation. Rather, in Arabic a copula is the same harakat-i raf' and the like. This harakat indicates an agentive meaning, which is the same attribution. Accordingly, if compounds in a proposition are mu'arrab, such as "Zayd qa'im", the proposition will be a ternary one, and if it is made of basic words, such as "Haza Sibwiyyah", the proposition will be a binary one. [25]

Siraj al-Din Urmawi is of the view that if the copula is not mentioned in a proposition, it will be a binary one verbally, but a ternary one rationally. He believes that it is impossible to imagine a proposition without taking the relation between its sides into consideration. Concerning the point mentioned above, following Ibn Sina,[26] he divides propositions into three types:

a. Perfect ternary: a proposition in which the copula is non-temporal and indicates a definite subject.

b. Imperfect ternary: a proposition in which the copula is temporal and indicates an indefinite subject.

c. Binary: propositions such as "Zayd Katib", which is, in fact, "Zayd huwa katib."[27]

Qutb al-Din Razi, while arguing that the above is inconsistent with Ibn Sina's words, advances some objections to the collection of his ideas in this regard:

1) If the predicate is a derivative, it cannot by itself create a relation with the other side. This is because a copulative relation is the same as a judicial relation, while it is impossible for a derivative to indicate such a relation.

2) A copula is a word which indicates the relation of a definite or indefinite subject. In the former case, the temporal copula will not be a copula, and, in the latter, the derivative will not require a copula.

3) If what is considered in the relation indicates a specific subject, the copula will not be non-temporal. This is because when we say, "Zayd huwa Katib", "huwa" is not merely used for Zayd. Otherwise, it could not be replaced by "'Amru". And, if the copula is pure indication, whether due to position or mood, the temporal copula will also indicate any definite subject due to a mood preceding the subject.

4) A non-temporal copula, even if it is accepted, only indicates a definite subject rather than a definite predicate. This can be inferred from Ibn Sina's words in al-Shifa. According to him, "The word huwa in the example "Zayd huwa hay" does not indicate the predicate by itself; rather it signifies that the word Zayd has not been mentioned� and the word huwa is only used for emphasis."[28] Therefore, a proposition in which huwa has been mentioned is not a perfect ternary one, either. It is like a proposition in which there is a temporal copula. We should, indeed, content ourselves with indicating a relation between two definite things concerning a copula, whether the indication is due to position or mood. This is because we mean nothing by a copula but a statement which signifies a judicial relation. However, its indication due to position is not necessary.

5. If in a ternary proposition the predicate is a derivative, it cannot be a binary proposition, and if it is binary, its levels will not be limited to three. Rather, it will be a binary proposition in which relation has been indicated.

b. A perfect binary proposition in which a copula has not been mentioned and does not signify a judicial relation.

c. An unnecessary binary proposition in which the judgment has been made about relation. This is because it is impossible for judgment not to signify the relation. However, it is possible that the copula signifies the judicial relation and, at the same time, not indicate the judgment. Therefore, if the copula signifies judgment, it also signifies the judicial relation. In this case, the proposition will be a ternary one; however, if the copula does not signify the judgment, it might not signify the judicial relation, either. In this case, the proposition is a perfect binary one. It might also signify the judicial relation, whereby the proposition will be an unnecessary binary one.[29]

Perhaps, we can say that in binary propositions existence is the predicate. In such propositions there are only two components in terms of form, and they are simple propositions in reality; for example, "Zayd hast" (Zayd exists) in Persian,

Nevertheless, in ternary propositions existence merely plays the role of the copula although it might not have been explicitly referred to. For example, in Arabic there is no equivalent for the word ast (is). Therefore, in some cases no word is used as the copula in the propositions,[30] while the proposition is a ternary one. As mentioned before, Qutb al-Din Razi maintains that the raf' harakat in Arabic is the sign of such propositions.[31]

Hence, we can say that in philosophical propositions existence mainly plays the role of the predicate, while it is a copula in the propositions related to other disciplines. However, this idea is not general, i.e., in some philosophical propositions existence can also play the role of the copula.

The judicial relation and the copula are sometimes used in the same sense. In this case, both are considered to be the components of a proposition. However, they are also sometimes distinguished from each other. 'Allamah Tabataba'i believes that the judicial relation is among the modes of the predicate and is not an independent component in propositions. He believes that a proposition consists of a subject, a predicate, and a judgment.[32]

If the judicial relation is intended in the sense of a copula, 'Allamah's words will come very close to the analysis of the modern logic of predicative sentences. In modern logic, the "predicative part" is equivalent to the collection of the "predicate and copula" in traditional logic.

In modern logic, the proposition "Ferdowsi is a poet"[33] consists of two parts: "Ferdowsi" and "is a poet". The first part is nominal and signifies an existent. The second part is a phrase by which an attribute has been predicated on the existent. Accordingly, the first part is called nominal and the second part predicative.[34]

In another place, 'Allamah Tabataba'i maintains that judgment means affirmation and is not a mental concept; rather, it is an external act of the soul. That is, for the soul the subject is the same as the predicate, and the realization of this issue does not require the concept of judicial relation. Accordingly, in simple "whatness" questions the judgment is given immediately after conceiving the sides, needless of a judicial relation. Therefore, according to 'Allamah Tabataba'i, affirmation does not require a judicial relation. The conception of judicial relation in his view is among the connected concomitants of a proposition. He, finally, concludes his discussion by stating that affirmative propositions, including simple and compound ones, have three components: subject, predicate, and judgment. In negative propositions this number diminishes to two: subject and predicate. However, the judicial relation appears in propositions only because the mind has to conceive the predicate in relation to the subject in compound "whatness" questions. Therefore, it is wrong to generalize it to all propositions.[35]

In contrast, when discussing the difference between judicial relation and inhering existence, some argue that the judicial relation exists in all agreements, whether simple or compound, and affirmative or negative. However, inhering existence can only be found in affirmative predications.[36]

The judicial relation might also be applicable without inhering existence like when there is suspicion in relation because doubt in relation is possible only after it is conceptualized. However, inhering existence is only found after judgment. It is possible that we find a relation which is not inhering, e.g. by paying attention to the meanings of words without adding anything to them. Some have also said that inhering existence is the same union relation between the subject and predicate. [37]

In order to clarify the distinction between judicial and inhering relations, we must distinguish between an affirmation and a proposition. A proposition is a perfect, compound entity which consists of at least three parts: a subject, a predicate, and an inhering existence. However, affirmation is the composition and act of the soul, which is the origin of a proposition. Wherever these components come together, there will be a proposition, but affirmation means conceptualizing them, following which a relation is established that is called judgment.

One of the other signs of this difference is that in poetic comparisons propositions exist while affirmations do not.

In 'Allamah Tabataba'i's words, the subject, predicate, and judgment are among the components of propositions. However, by distinguishing the meaning of a proposition from that of an affirmation, it becomes clear that the components of a proposition consist of a subject, a predicate, and an inhering existence, while judgment is related to affirmation.

There is also a difference between judgment and judicial relation[38] because when the affirmation of the predicate for the subject is doubtful, the judicial relation exists, but there is no judgment. The judgment is given by the soul after resolving the suspicion concerning the relation between the sides of the proposition and affirming the predicate for the subject. This judgment becomes the relation in the proposition.

Therefore the judicial relation is among the modes of predication and not the predicate. Accordingly, the judicial relation does not exist in propositions the predication of which is a priori essential. This is because, due to its being a priori, there is no doubt concerning the relation between the subject and predicate.[39]

According to a common belief, the difference between judicial and inhering relations is that the copula does not exist in a negative proposition because its content is the negation of relation. However, in the same negative proposition, if there is any doubt concerning lack of relation between the two sides, the judicial relation exists. After removing any doubt regarding the relation or lack of relation between the predicate and subject, the judgment is given by the soul. Then, if this judgment is affirmative, inhering existence will appear in the affirmative proposition. However, if the judgment entails the affirmation of a lack of relation between the sides of the proposition, there will be no copula; rather, relation has been negated. As a result, there will be no copula in negative propositions. [40]

Aqa Ali Zunuzi has placed the judicial relation within the realm of propositions in his treatise entitled Copulative Existence. In this regard, he says, "The unity judicial relation is the same unity that is considered for learning about the relation between the predicate and the subject. It can be affirmed or negated."[41]

We can see in his words that judicial relation is the object of both negation and affirmation, whereas what becomes the object here is the relation of the predicate to the subject in the proposition. However, the judicial relation, as we can read in the first part of his statement, means knowing about the relation between the predicate and the subject, which belongs to the realm of affirmation.

Concerning this issue, some have pointed out that entity is the judicial relation and judgment in the mind, but copulative existence is an external issue from whose characteristics and intensity and weakness the three-fold substances are derived.[42]

Nevertheless, there is no unanimity concerning the external nature of copulative existence in the sense discussed in logical propositions, and it needs more scrutiny and deliberation.

Based on the issues discussed above, we can show the differences between copulative existence and judicial relation in the following table:

The previous discussion leads to the following question: In which predicative propositions does copulative existence not exist? Before dealing with this question, one must pay attention to the fact that the main pillars of a predicative proposition consist of a subject and a predicate.

One of the characteristics of these two pillars is that each of them can be separately perceived. As mentioned before, the difference between a proposition and an affirmation indicates that judgment is related to affirmation and does not belong to the realm of propositions. Moreover, judicial relation is a mode. Therefore, in addition to the two main parts of a proposition, namely, subject and predicate, copulative existence must also be considered as one of the components of a proposition.

On the other hand, it was mentioned that the distinction between logical and philosophical judgments totally changes the process of discussion. This is because what is intended in logic is related to concepts that are in the mind.[43] Due to their extensions in the outside, concepts have a different situation; however, they are taken into consideration in the mind separately and due to their differences in meaning. Accordingly, irrespective of its being simple or negative, propositions have their own mental components. However, in philosophy it is the external realities of these concepts which are taken into consideration. Naturally, many concepts exist in the outside through one existence and have no external plurality so that a relation is established between them, and a judgment is issued accordingly.

Based on this analysis, it becomes clear that many propositions which are considered to lack relation have been explained from a philosophical point of view, while the same propositions include relation from a logical perspective. This is because, logically speaking, each proposition consists of at least three concepts in the mind which, regardless of the world of reality, are separately taken into consideration in the realm of the mind. This is an important point, which Farabi took into careful consideration.[44]

Now, we will refer to some propositions which are believed to lack relation in order to clarify the differences between philosophical and logical approaches in this regard. Of course, it does not mean that there are no disagreements among logicians or philosophers themselves concerning this issue. Rather, as mentioned before, these differences of opinion exist among the members of both groups:

1. Simple "whatness" or binary propositions: In these propositions, since what is conveyed is the "affirmation of a thing", and the subject and predicate are in fact the same and only different at the level of the mind and perception, there is no need of a copula. A copula always creates a relation between two things when the intention is the "affirmation of a thing for a thing". The union of quiddity and existence is not the union of two actualized things; rather, one is actualized and the other is non-actualized. Based on the principles of the Transcendent Philosophy, a non- actualized thing is the same quiddity. In fact, there is no real relation between the subject and predicate of simple propositions so that there would be a need of a copula. There is only a judicial relation, which is the context of affirmation and one of its modes.[45]

The question here is as follows: If there is no attribution between the subject and predicate of secondary or simple "whatness" propositions, how could the proposition be formed? When it is said, "Zayd exists" or "Zayd is", there can be a pause. That is, the relation between the sides of the proposition is a perfect one, and the actualization of a perfect relation requires the existence of a copula.[46] Therefore, if there is no copula in secondary propositions, how could they be formed? And, if their formation requires relation and inhering existence, how could it be considered secondary and simple?

Clearly, simple "whatness" propositions do not need a copula in the exterior and the real world. However, the subject and predicate of these propositions are conceptually different in the mind and, in order to create a relation between them in the abode of the mind, a copula is necessary.

If we consider the exterior, we will not have three components. Neither will we even have two components because, based on the principiality of existence, there will be only a real thing in the exterior which is called existence. Thus these components are actualized based on mental analysis, and their receptacle is the mind.

2. Negative Propositions: The content of negative propositions is the negation of the copula, and the existence of a copula between the sides of the proposition creates a unity. Where there is a difference and separation between the sides, this unity is also abolished. In such propositions, predication does not take place; therefore, the application of the term predication to them is only metaphorical. Thus in negative propositions, including compound and simple ones there is no copulative existence.[47]

There is no unanimity among logicians regarding such propositions; however, some believe that they do not lack relation because there is also negation in judgment. In fact, judgment is given about occurrence and non-occurrence; in other words, the relation there is a negative one.[48]

3. Propositions that are considered negative: In propositions in which one of the sides is non-existence, non-existent, or a non-existential word such as ignorant, poor, impossible, etc., there is no copula. This is because copulative existence which enjoys verbal meaning depends on both sides. Now, if both sides or one of the sides is non-existence or non-existential, dependence of existence on non-existence will be necessary, which is impossible. For example, when we say, "The partner of the Necessary is non-existence," if in this proposition, in which both the subject and predicate are non-existential issues, there is a copula, it will be necessary that copulative existence depends on two non-existences, while the dependence of an existential issue on non-existence is impossible. This is also the case if one side of the proposition is a non-existential issue. For instance, when it is said, "Zayd is non-existent", the copula depends on two sides, one of which is non-existent Even if the predicate refers to non-existence, and, for example, it is said, "Zayd is ignorant", the same problem will arise.

In this case, we must say that the non-existential nature of both sides or one of the sides of a proposition is due to the exterior. However, they exist in the mind through mental existence and, thus, require a copula.

4. Propositions involving primary predication: This group of propositions, although including a copula in mental act, does not have anything other than a subject in reality so that the existence of a copula is required. In the proposition, "Man is man", the subject and predicate are the same even in concept. Even if there is any conceptual difference, they are in unity in terms of reference. Therefore, the existence of copula in such propositions is meaningless.[49]

As mentioned above, such propositions include a copula in terms of mental act, which is noteworthy in logic.

5. Propositions the matter of which is pre-eternal necessity: In the propositions in which the subject is the essence of the Necessary Being, no duality exists between the sides in reality because the subject is not the cause of the predicate; rather, the predicate has been derived from the essence of the subject and is never different from it.[50]

Thus the subject and predicate of such propositions have no objective difference from each other. They are, rather, a single thing but are only conceptually different in the receptacle of the mind. Hence, they are similar to simple propositions.

As mentioned above, the sides of this type of proposition are conceptually different from each other in the mind. Clearly, no proposition is formed in this place without a copula. Therefore, they need one in the same receptacle.

Thus, by distinguishing logical judgments from philosophical ones, this problem will also be solved. Philosophical judgments are related to the objective reality of affairs and go beyond words. These propositions, at the level of objectivity and external realization, lack inhering existence. However, the logical view, as Farabi admits, is related to mental acts and the forms of propositions. From this point of view, each proposition has some formal components, one of which is a copula. This is because without a copula, no proposition can be realized.

The philosophers preceding Mulla Sadra and his master, Mir Damad, made no distinction between inhering and copulative existences and used them interchangeably. Even some of the philosophers after Mulla Sadra did not clearly distinguish these two terms from each other.[51]

Some others, such as Hakim Sabziwari, have considered the two terms of inhering and copulative as divisions of the same thing, while the copulative is not a sister division to inhering; rather, it is a kind of its division. In other words, copulative existence is a kind of spiritual existence. This philosopher has clearly expressed this point when explaining his words.[52] However, there is a problem with his poetry when dealing with this issue.[53] In one of his couplets, copulative, inhering, and spiritual existences have been considered as divisions of the same thing, while copulative existence is a kind of spiritual existence. That is why he has tried to modify his idea in this regard.[54]

Existence in itself for other is either copulative or descriptive. Descriptive existence enjoys a soul and a kind of independence; however, its essential existence is realized in the other. Archetypal forms and accidents enjoy this feature. These two groups of existents have essential existences but are continually actualized in place. Inhering existence has no spirituality and continually comes into existence in other than itself. Therefore, inhering existence cannot be a predicate. However, copulative existence can because of being descriptive. In other words, predicative existence is either descriptive or non-descriptive. Descriptive existence is called copulative existence; however, inhering existence is non-predicative and was called copulative existence univocally in the words of early scholars.

Therefore, based on the applications introduced for copulative existence by Mulla Sadra,[55] the first application of copulative existence is the same inhering existence which is in contrast to predicative existence. Inhering existence in this sense is the same "existence in other".

Nevertheless, the second application of copulative existence means "essential existence", but it is mentally posited in two ways: in one sense, it is descriptive, and in another it is non-descriptive. That is, mental meanings sometimes exist for themselves, e.g. the Necessary Being, which, in this case, are non-descriptive, and sometimes they exist for the other. The second case has some states: either they are for another thing, such as form for matter, or they are before something else, such as cognitive form before the soul, or they belong to another thing, such as blackness for the body. In the second sense, copulative existence is descriptive. All accidents are descriptive; however, if substances indwell in the other, they will also be descriptive.

The unity that is created between the subject and predicate can be justified in two ways. First, inhering existence creates a relation between them. Second, if the subject and predicate are two independent substances, there will be no relation of unity between them, unless, at least, one of them is a dependent substance. In other words, either the subject and predicate are both accidents, enjoy descriptive existence, and one is predicated on the other, or the predicate enjoys descriptive existence. If the predicate is an accident, it will have an existence in itself for the other. The accident's being in the other is the element causing the relation and unity between the predicate and subject and refers to inhering existence.

By drawing on the differences between copulative and inhering existences, Mulla Sadra tries to solve a problem related to the inconsistency between two philosophical principles: one is a derivative principle expressed as follows: "The demonstration of one thing for another, primarily, necessitates the existence of that thing;" the second is a famous principle among philosophers stated as follows: "The existence in itself of an attribute is the same as its existence for the other." That is, an adjective has two faces: one is its in-itself face, which is stated by "perfect be", and the other is its being-for- the other, which is expressed by "imperfect be". According to this principle, these two faces are the same as each other. In other words, it is not the case that descriptive existence is sometimes found independently and sometimes comes into existence in its own subject.

The derivative principle is not limited by fixed affirmation because sometimes certain non-existential issues such as blindness becomes the predicate of propositions. As a result, based on this principle, there is no need of fixed affirmation, rather; only positive affirmation is required. However, based on the other principle, each attribute or description must, in addition to its being for the other, enjoys an in-itself existence. Placing these two principles beside each other necessitates inconsistency in their predicates. Based on one principle, fixed affirmation (= predicated) is not necessary, while based on the other one, it is.

Mulla Sadra's response focuses on distinguishing between inhering and copulative existence. That is, the content of the derivative principle is inhering existence, and its place is compound "whatness" questions; however, the other principle is related to a copulative existence including accidents and archetypal forms.

According to the derivative principle, whenever the affirmation of the thing for a thing is intended in a proposition, it is necessary for an in-itself existence to be realized in which the inhering existence relies on the copulative one. In such cases, the predicate can have two forms: it can be descriptive or non-descriptive. If it is non-descriptive, it will enjoy an in-itself existence, and if it is non-descriptive, it will be a non-existential thing. However, the second principle is related to a descriptive predicate whose in-itself existence is for the other, and, at the level of realization, they will be the same as each other.[56]

When we say that accidents have two aspects, it means that this group of existents enjoys both predicative existence and inhering existence. We can place the attribute of whiteness, because of its independence, at one side of the preposition and say, "Whiteness is"; however, this attribute, while being in-itself, must rely on its subject of qualification. Thus we must say, "Snow is white". If the objection of how a single existent can have two distinct inhering and predicative aspects is raised, we can say that they are one in terms of their external objectivity, which is realized due to the above two senses.[57]

a. Inhering and predicative existences are discussed in both logic and philosophy.

b. The discussion of this issue in logic is totally different from that in philosophy, particularly, the Transcendent Philosophy. The mixture of these two discussions will lead to some harmful consequences.

c. The subject of philosophy (existence) is an appropriate criterion for determining the quality of the belonging of this discussion to this field.

d. The structure of logical propositions consists of inhering and predicative existences. The disagreements between logicians and philosophers in this regard leads to more attention and accuracy regarding the types and components of predicative propositions.

e. Inhering existence is different from judgment, judicial relation, and copulative existence. Paying attention to this point can remove some of the surface inconsistencies in the two fields of logic and philosophy.

[1]. The gathering of two inhering and predicative existences in a proposition is irrational.

[2]. Hassanzadeh Amuli, Regulative Act in Inhering and Copulative Existences, pp. 89-90.

[3]. This point will be discussed later.

[4]. Misbah Yazdi, Philosophical Lessons, p. 71.

[5]. In this regard, refer to Sabziwari, Sharh al-manzumah, vol. 3, p. 63.

[6]. Jawadi Amuli, Rahiq makhtum, vol. 1, part 1, pp. 321-323.

[7]. al-Asfar, edition, research, and Introduction by Ch. A'awani, supervision and Introduction by S. M. Khamenei, vol. 1, Sadra Islamic Philosophy Research Institute, p. 42.

[8]. al-Asfar, vol. 1, p. 92.

[9]. Misbah Yazdi, Philosophical Lessons, p. 71.

[10]. Accordingly, since non-existence is non-existent and annihilated, it cannot be a copula.

[11]. For example, Ibn Sina in al-Isharat wal-tanbihat, vol. 1, p. 241, Qutb al-Din Shirazi in Sharh al-shamsiyyah, pp. 68-69, Qutb al-Din Razi in Sharh al-matali', p. 113, Siraj al-Din Urmawi in Bayan al-haqq wa lisan al-sidq, p. 100, Tusi in Asas al-iqtibas, p. 65.

[12]. al-Asfar, vol. 1, p. 428.

[13]. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 92.

[14]. Ta'liqat al-Asfar, vol. 1, pp. 365-366, Nahyat al-hikmah, pp. 250-251.

[15]. Sharh al-shamsiyyah, p. 69; Asas al-iqtibas, p. 66; Jawhar al-nahid, p. 39; al-Tahsil, p. 46; Majmu'ah musannafat Shaykh al-Ishraq, vol. 4, p. 156; Mantiq Suri, p. 215; Durrat al-taj, p. 347; al-Shifa, al-Mantiq, 2^nd article from the 3^rd fan, ch. 1; al-Luma'at al-mashriqiyyah fil funun al-mantiqiyyah (New Logic) pp. 13-14.

[16]. al-Isharat wal-tanbihat, vol. 1, p. 241.

[17]. al-Tahsil, pp. 46-47.

[18]. Mantiq al-mashriqiyyin, p. 66.

[19]. In another place he has mentioned that if the predicate of the proposition is a derived word or noun, it is a binary proposition in word and a ternary one in terms of nature (al-mukhlis, pp. 19-20).

[20]. al-Anarat fi sharh al-isharat, al-mantiq, p. 74.

[21]. al-Isharat wal-tanbihat, vol. 1, p. 241.

[22]. al-Ta'liqat, p. 145.

[23]. Ibid.

[24]. Mantiq al-mashriqiyyin, p. 66.

[25]. Qutb al-Din Razi, Sharh al-matali', pp. 114-115

[26]. al-Shifa, al-Mantiq, al-'Ibarat, pp. 76-77, al-Isharart wal-tanbihat, vol. 1, p. 241.

[27]. Bayan al-haqq wa lisan al-sidq, p. 100.

[28]. al-Shifa, al-Mantiq, al-'Ibarat, p. 39.

[29]. Sharh al-matali', pp. 115-116.

[30]. We will discuss propositions which lack a copula in the next parts.

[31]. Sharh al-matali', p. 115.

[32]. al-Ta'liqat al-Asfar, vol. 2, p. 93.

[33]. In modern logic, this proposition is shown in the form of "Fm". "F" represents its predicative part, that is, "is a poet", and "m" shows its nominal part, that is, "Ferdowsi" (Zia' Muwahhid, An Introduction to Modern Logic, pp. 148, 150).

[34]. Zia' Muwahhid, An Introduction to Modern Logic, pp. 148, 159; Gholamhossein Mosahib, An Introduction to the Logic of Form, pp. 208-209.

[35]. al-Ta'liqat al-Asfar, vol. 1, p. 366.

[36]. Mulla Sadra, al-Asfar, vol. 1, p. 92.

[37]. Hassanzadeh Amuli, Regulative Act in Inhering and Copulative Existences, p. 84.

[38]. Qutb al-Din Shirazi, Sharh al-shamsiyyah, pp. 68-69.

[39]. Jawadi Amuli, Epistemology in the Qur'an, p. 77.

[40]. This point is examined concerning the propositions lacking in relation because lack of relation in negative propositions is at the level of reality; however, it can exist formally in the proposition due to its being a proposition. Moreover, doubting the relation between the sides of the proposition requires lack of absoluteness, in which case, as no judgment is made by the soul, no judgment is made about its non-existence. When no judgment is made about the sides of negation and affirmation, no proposition can be formed. Therefore, negative propositions are said to be called predicative metaphorically.

[41]. Collection of the Writings of Aqa Ali Mudarres, vol. 2, p. 149.

[42]. Jawadi Amuli, Rahiq makhtum, vol. 1, part 1, p. 522.

[43]. Misbah Yazdi, Ta'liqat bar nahayat al-hikmah, vol. 2, p. 75.

[44]. Collection of Farabi's Treatises, Risalah fi masa'il mutifarraqah, p. 9.

[45]. Jawadi Amuli, Rahiq makhtum, vol. 1, part 5, p. 117, 'Allamah Tabataba'i, Nahayat al-hikmah, p. 251.

[46]. Hassanazadeh Amuli, H., Regulative Act in Copulative and Inhering Existences, p. 87.

[47]. Mulla Sadra, al-Asfar, vol. 1, p. 428.

[48]. Qutb al-Din Razi, Sharh al-matali', p. 114, Tusi, Kashf al-murad, pp. 36-37.

[49]. 'Allamah Tabataba'i, Nahayat al-hikmah, p. 29.

[50]. Jawadi Amuli, Rahiq makhtum, vol. 1, part 2, p. 451.

[51]. Majmu'ah musannafat Aqa Ali Mudarris, vol. 2, pp. 210, 238.

[52]. Sharh al-manzumah, vol. 2, p. 240.

[53]. Ibid., p. 237.

[54]. Hassanzadeh Amuli, Regulative Act in Copulative and Inhering Existences, p. 95.

[55]. al-Asfar, vol. 1, p. 92.

[56]. al-Asfar, vol. 1, p. 160.

[57]. Ibid., p. 94

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Copulative Existence	Judicial Relation
- only appears in positive predications (Mulla Sadra).	- exists in all propositions (Mulla Sadra). It only exists in composite "whatness" propositions and cannot be generalized to other propositions ('Allamah Tabataba'i)
- appears after removing suspicion and issuing a judgment	- might appear without a copula. This is the case when suspecting the relation or lack of relation between the two sides.
- does not exist in negative propositions (based on a well-known idea).	- In case of doubt, it exists in negative propositions.
- is an external issue (Jawadi Amuli)	- is a mental issue.
- is the product of an affirmative judgment made by the soul	- exists before making the affirmative judgment and at the level of doubt.
- is in the realm of propositions.	- exists in the realm of affirmation (in contrast to Zunuzi's ideas).

The Difference between Inhering and Copulative Existences
Inhering existence	Copulative existence
- is the division of a copulative divided	- is a kind of inhering division
- has no spirituality	- enjoys spirituality
- is in the other	- is for the other
- does not become a predicate in propositions	- can be a predicate in propositions
- had no independent referent	- has an objective referent, such as accidents

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