Saint Anselm of Canterbury and Mulla Sadra on the Necessity of God’s Existence

By:J.G.J. Ter Haar

In the great monotheistic religions of the world the existence of God is first and foremost a fact to be accepted in faith or a reality to surrender to. Faith in God and surrender to Him are considered to be so basic and fundamental that attempts to go further and to make God and his existence the object of speculation of a highly philosophical nature are sometimes either outright rejected or at least viewed with suspicion. In both Islam and Christianity examples of this tendency can be detected. In the former e.g. in most Protestant Churches with their emphasis on faith alone, and in the latter in the Asha‘rite theological school in Sunni Islam.

And yet, in both these religions we find also very clear examples of a kind of philosophical speculation that does not stop short at God and His existence. On the contrary, this speculation sometimes takes even the form of drawing up rational arguments or proofs for His existence. As far as Islam is concerned both Ibn Sinà and Mullà Sadrà are important, or perhaps even the most important representatives of this tendency. In Christianity the attempt to prove the existence of God is inextricably bound up with the name of Saint Anselm of Canterbury, the “Father of Scholasticism”, as he is often called.[1] Scholasticism is that kind of philosophical and theological speculation that in the middle Ages in Christian Europe was practiced in the schools attached to cathedrals and monasteries, and later in the universities. Scholasticism rests on two pillars, auctoritas (authority) and ratio (reason). The authority is provided by the indisputable truths of the Christian faith, deriving from the Bible and handed down through the Church Fathers. The reason is the instrument used to analyze these truths and to bring them together into a coherent and comprehensive system.[2]

What I would like to do in this paper, is to raise the question what kind of argument or arguments Anselm of Canterbury and Mullà Sadrà have used to prove God’s existence and to compare these arguments in order to find out if a certain resemblance or analogy is to be detected. After all, these two men, each in his own right, have been very influential and they are still influential.

But before going into this matter, let me first give a very short biography of Anselm of Canterbury. I take it for granted that given the occasion; I am not expected to draw even a rudimentary sketch of Mullà Sadrà’s life.

The Life of Saint Anselm of Canterbury

Anselm was born in Aosta, modern-day Italy, in 1033. At the age of twenty-three he left home after a quarrel with his father and in abeyance to his call in 1060 he became a Benedictine monk in Bec in Normandy (France). There he received his theological and philosophical education as well as his spiritual training and there he started his career as a writer. In 1063 he became prior of Bec, and in 1078 he was elected abbot of the monastery. A year later he went for the first time to England to visit the monasteries affiliated with Bec, among others the monastery of Canterbury.  Some fourteen years later he moved to England to become Archbishop of Canterbury, where he was to stay till the end of his life in 1109.[3]

“Nothing greater can be thought”: Anselm’s Proof of God’s Existence

Saint Anselm’s proof of God’s existence is to be found in his Proslogion, a work written in 1077-78 as a sequel to his Monologion dating from the year before. These two works are “meditations on the nature of God”,[4] based on an operating procedure which Anselm himself formulates in opening sentences of the Monologion as follows:

Some of my brethern have persistently asked me to give them an example of meditation, by writing down some thoughts on the divine essence and other related matters [...]. They have asked me that nothing should be put forward on the authority of Scripture. [...] They also asked that whatever conclusion was reached in the course of each investigation should be expressed in plain language with intelligible arguments and simple disputation, so that the necessary conclusions and clear truth of the matter would be clearly expressed.[5]

It is from this point of departure that Anselm in his Proslogion formulates his proof of God’s existence, his ratio Anselmi (Anselm’s reason) as it is called in Christian Scholasticism. At the very root of this ratio (reason) lies the idea of God as “something than which a greater cannot be thought”. Let me quote two key passages. The first one is:

Well then, Lord, you who gave understanding to faith, grant me that I may understand, as much as You see fit, that You exist as we believe You to exist, and that You are what we believe You to be. Now we believe that you are something than which nothing greater can be thought. [...] And surely that than which a greater cannot be thought cannot exist in the mind only. For if it exists solely in the mind even, it can be thought to exist in reality, which is greater. If then that than which a greater cannot be thought exists in the mind alone, this same that than which a greater cannot be thought is that than which a greater can be thought. But this is obviously impossible. Therefore, there is absolutely no doubt that something than which a greater cannot be thought exists both in the mind and in reality.[6]

The second passage is:

And you, Lord our God, are this being. You exist so truly, Lord my God, that You cannot even be thought not to exist. And this is as it should be, for if some intelligence could think of something better than. You, the creature would be above its creator and would judge its creator – and that is completely absurd. In fact, everything else there is, except You alone, can be thought of as not existing. You alone, then, of all things most truly exist and therefore of all things possess existence to the highest degree; for anything else does not exist as truly, and so possesses existence to a lesser degree.[7]

It is for obvious reasons outside the scope of this paper to elaborate on Anselm’s argument in great detail and therefore I would like to limit myself to two aspects.

First of all, for a proper standing of this argument it is crucial to realize that for Anselm existence is not just a concept, but also a reality, preceding that concept. In other words, Anselm’s argument must not be interpreted as a kind of ontological argument as defined by Kant, i.e. as involving an unjustified change over from the concept existence to existence itself. In the eyes of Anselm to understand existence is more than to understand the meaning of the word existence. Therefore, in his argument Anselm makes very explicitly a stand against the way of thinking of those people who in the Bible are called “The Fool say in his heart, there is no God” (Psalms XIII,1;LII, 1). The Fool can understand the meaning of the word existence, but what he cannot understand, is reality itself, or, to be more precise, the relationship between words and concepts on the one hand, and reality on the other.[8]

Anselm’s argument was challenged already in his own lifetime. Almost immediately after it’s publication, the monk Gaunilo from the monastery of Marmoutier spoke out in defense of the biblical Fool in his Liber pro Insipiente (“Book on behalf/for the sake of Fool”), to which Anselm replied almost by return. Gaunilo’s objections to Anselm’s proof are twofold. Firstly, he points to the fact that the human mind is capable of having concepts to which in reality corresponds nothing. Existence in the mind does not necessarily involve existence in reality. Secondly, and more importantly, he questions the capability of human beings to have an adequate concept of God. In order to illustrate his objections Gaunilo refers to a Lost Island somewhere in the ocean, considered being of the utmost beauty and perfection. Now suppose that this beauty and perfection is of such a degree that is ‘an island than which nothing greater can be thought’, it would in Anselm’s line of arguing exist in reality, and even necessarily so. Anselm’s reply is essentially an elaboration of what he had already stated in his Proslogion. Regarding Gaunilo’s example of the Lost Island, Anselm argues that ‘an island than which nothing greater can be thought’ is of a completely different nature compared to ‘an being than which nothing greater can be thought’. By comparing the two Gaunilo resembles a man who claims he cannot see daylight because his eyes cannot stand the blazing sunshine.[9]

Anselm also writes: “... if anyone should discover for me something existing either in reality or in the mind alone – except ‘that than which a greater cannot be thought’ – to which the logic of my argument would apply, then I shall find that Lost Island and give it, never more to be lost, to that person”.  Almost a century and a half later Boventura (1221-1274) was to appreciate the true significance of this rather laconic remark by Anselm. Boventura explained:

Against the objection of an island than which nothing better or greater can be conceived, we must say that there is no similarity [between this subject and this predicate]. For when I say ‘a being than which nothing greater can be conceived’, there is no repugnance here between the subject and the predicate, so that this being can be conceived in a rational way. But when I say ‘an island than which nothing greater can be conceived’, there is repugnance between the subject and the predicate. For ‘island’ refers to a defective being, while the predicate designates the most perfect of beings. Therefore, since there is a direct opposition here, this island is conceived irrationally, and in thinking it the mind is divided against itself. It is no wonder, therefore, that we cannot infer that this island exists in reality. It is otherwise, however, in the case of ‘being’ or ‘God’, since this is not repugnant to the predicate.[10]

The second point I would like to make has to do with what was obviously Anselm’s guiding principle or leitmotiv in both his personal and professional life. He himself has set down this guiding principle at the beginning of his Monologion in a very succinct phrase that since then has become one of the most used expressions to characterize medieval scholasticism, of which he was such a prominent representative. I am of course referring to the famous Latin saying Fides quaerens intellectum (faith in search of understanding), which is his way of saying that faith is the point of departure. Reason is a very useful, and to a certain extent even an indispensable tool to elucidate and clarify the contents of faith, but nevertheless a tool. It is for this reason that Anselm in the passage quoted above explicitly states: “Now we believe that you are something than which nothing greater can be thought”. And it is for the same reason that in Anselm’s reasoning and in the way he presents his argument, prayer is not something additional, but plays a leading part. Anselm’s proof of God’s existence is not just the result of abstract reasoning; it is also the outcome of meditation. This meditation is according to Richard W. Southern based on cogitatio (thinking) and intellectus (understanding) and culminates in sapientia (wisdom), which is “the experience of God’s being which lies beyond this earthly life”.[11]

Mullà Sadrà’s Proof of God’s Existence

As far as Mullà Sadrà’s proof of God’s existence is concerned, his approach and his arguments can best be understood by comparing them and contrasting them with the approach of arguments used by other Islamic philosophers in their attempt to prove the necessity of God’s existence. I am following here the late Murtadà Mutahhari, whose works for me have been and still are an indispensable guide in my introduction to the world of Mullà Sadrà and his school. In his edition of Allàmeh Moåammad Åossein Ìabàtabài’s Usêl-i falsafah wa rawišh-i ri’àlism, in which he supplied Ìabàtabài’s text with copious and valuable notes, Mutahhari writes that in Islamic philosophy the various proofs of God’s existence can be divided in three types or forms. These are successively the “Aristotelian proof” (burhàn-i arasti yà arastê’i), the “Avicennian proof” (burhàn-i sinawi), and the “Sadrian proof” (burhàn-i sadrà’i).[12]

The “Aristotelian proof” is in its original form based on the reasoning that since every movement (åarakat) requires a mover (muåarrik), which in its turn is either mutaåarrik (put in motion by another mover) or thàbit (constant, fixed, steady, in other words not put in motion), and since an infinite regress (tasalsul) is impossible, there must of necessity be a first mover (muåarrik-i awwal). In the kind of Islamic theology, known as kalàm, this Aristotelian model was used to argue that the world as the aggregate of essentially transitory beings required the existence of God as the intransitory Being, i.e. the existence of God as Creator. In this approach pairs of concepts like “cause” and “effect”, “necessity” (wujêb) and “contingency” (imkàn) play a key role, and in this approach the created world is seen as a kind of mediator (wàsitih) from which we can infer the existence of God. In other words, in the created world there are “signs” (àyàt) to be found that point inescapably to the existence of God the Creator.

Islamic philosophers – åukamà-ye islàmi is the term used by Mutahhari, for which ‘Islamic philosophers’ is at best a weak translation – have tried to develop rational proofs of God’s existence in which creation does not figure as a mediator. Ibn Sinà in particular prides himself of having found such a proof. He does not deny the value of an Aristotelian type of proof based on the idea of creation as a “sign” of God’s existence. On the contrary, in the Qur’àn itself this proof is alluded to in the verse “We shall show them Our signs in the horizons and in themselves, till it is clear to them that it is the truth”[13] However, Ibn Sinà goes on to say, this proof is typical for a particular group or class of people. There is another kind of proof, that is also alluded to in the Qur’àn, even in the same verse as the one just quoted, viz.  in the phrase “Suffics it not as to thy Lord, that He is witness over everything? This is the proof of the so-called siddiqin (“the trustful”) which Ibn Sinà defines as those people “who give evidence with (or by) Him, not to (or on) Him” (yastašhadêna bihi là alayhi, in Mutahhari’s translation ki bi khudà istidlàl mi konand na bar khudà).[14]  The siddiqin do not base their proof of God’s existence on a more or less external factor like the ‘createdness’ or ‘ephemerality of the world’ (åudêth-i ‘àlam), but on an examination of ‘existence’ or ‘being’ (wujêd) as such. Being itself and as such, when approached or viewed from the perspective of being, is a direct proof of God.

In the eyes of Mullà Sadrà, Ibn Sinà’s proof of God’s existence is not entirely satisfactory. His is not the true “proof of the trustful”. To be sure, in comparison with the Aristotelian line of thinking his approach is a big improvement. However, contrary to Ibn Sinà’s claim, there is to a certain extent a mediating factor (wàsitah) to be detected in his argument, and that is the concept  ‘contingency’ (imkàn). Ibn Sinà’s approach is based on the idea that being is either ‘necessary’  (wàjib) or ‘contingent’ (mumkin) and on the idea that a contingent being ultimately, since an infinite regress is impossible, requires a being that is necessary. Mullà Sadrà, therefore, counts Ibn Sinà among “the other than trustful”, i.e. those who in their journey to knowledge of God resort as a mediating factor to something that is ultimately other than God and outside Him, be it ‘movement’ as in the case of Aristotle himself, or ‘the createdness of the world’ (åudêth-i ‘àlam) as with the ‘theologians’ (mutakallimin), or ‘contingency’ (imkàn) as with Ibn Sinà and others.[15]

Mullà Sadrà ’s own proof of God’s existence, which he considered to be the real “proof of the trustful’ (burhàn al-siddiqin), is so to say encapsulated in his overall philosophical system and for a correct understanding of this proof it is necessary to take into account the principles underlying this system. The most important ones for our subject are the “primacy” or – to use Seyyed Hossein Nasr’s translation – “principiality of being” (asàlat-i wujêd) on the one hand, and both the “unity of being” (waådat-i wujêd) and the “gradation” or – in Fazlur Rahman’s translation[16]  - “ambiguity of being” (tashkik-i wujêd) on the other. On the basis of these principles Mullà Sadrà argues – according to Mutahhari – that being is the only true reality. The unity of being implies that being from the perspective of its reality is not multiple; differentiation in being is a matter of graduation or ambiguity, and does not interfere, so to say, with the reality of being. Plurality and multiplicity in this world is not to be denied, but at the same time is not inconsistent with the unity of being. Not only plurality and multiplicity, but also limitation, weakness, deficiency etc. – phenomena that accompany plurality and multiplicity – can and must be explained from the perspective of ma‘lêliyat (being the effect of a cause), which implies that an effect as representing a lower level compared to its cause, always possesses a certain degree of weakness and deficiency, which are ultimately the concomitants of non-being (‘adam). From the point of view of mawjêdiyat (being an existent), however, existence excludes non-being (‘adam). Something that exists (mawjêd) will as such, i.e. as a being, never become non-existing (ma’dêm). Just like, conversely, a non-existent will from the perspective of its non-existence, never become a being. Being as such is unconditioned, and not dependent on something else. Being as such is also to be equated with absolute perfection, beauty, and independence, unlimitedness.[17]

Mullà Sadrà ’s reasoning is summarized very aptly by Mutahhari as follows:

We conclude that the reality of being in its essence, irrespective of what individuation from the outside may be attached to it, is identical with Gods eternal essence; therefore it is the primacy of being that guides our mind directly to Gods essence, not something else. What is other than God, which to be sure can be only His actions, His traces, His manifestations and His epiphanies, we have to discover by other means.[18]

 Another, equally apt summary of Mullà Sadrà’s proof of God’s existence is given by Fazlur Rahman, when he writes: “God is not, therefore, to be searched for beyond the realm of existence but is rather to found in it as its absolute ground: “God is His own Witness”, as the Qur’àn puts it”.[19]

Anselm’s Proof in the Eyes of Murtadà Mutahhari

This paper is not the first attempt to examine the way in which both Saint Anselm and Mullà Sadrà have tried to prove God’s existence and to raise question whether a certain similarity between their proofs can be detected. In a kind of appendix to his discussion of Mullà Sadrà ’s proof of God’s existence Mutahhari already raised the same question.[20]

He summarizes Anselm’s argument in a few lines, quoted from the first volume of Forêqi’s Sayr-i åikmat dar urêpà, and next makes his comments on it. In this book the Anselmian concept “something than which a greater cannot be thought” is rendered as dhàt-i akbar  (greater or greatest essence) and Mutahhari in his comments focuses on this term. He observes, first of all, that in this argument the existence of something – in this case the existence of God – is inferred from the idea or concept of that thing, which is both the basic point of the argument and at the same time its weakness.

Secondly, as far as the syllogistic form of Anselm’s argument is concerned, it resembles the type of proof that in the science of logic is called a reduction and absurdum (burhàn-i khulf). In such a proof the validity of a proposition is established by means of the impossibility of the opposite proposition. In the case of Anselm’s argument, if “the greater essence” (dhàt-i akbar) is referring to something in the human imagination, the khulf is invalid because the existence of something cannot be inferred from the idea or concept of that thing. But if it is referring to something real and objective, something outside and independent of the human mind, it is correct to say that such a ‘greatest essence’ must necessarily exist. However, this involves that the essence of something and its being are being separated, not only in the mind, but also in reality, outside the human mind. This separation of ‘essence’ and ‘being’, and the concomitant idea that ‘being’ is something additional to ‘essence’, something that as an accident is attached to ‘essence’, is a “total mistake” (ishtibàh-i maåè). And it is for this reason that Anselm’s argument is inadequate and that it is not on a par with the “Sadrian proof of the trustful” (burhàn-i siddiqin-i sadrà’i). Mutahhari concludes with the remark that Kant was therefore completely right in rejecting the reasoning of both Anselm and those who followed him.

It is unfortunate that Mutahhari did not have direct access to Anselm and his works, not even through a translation, and that he also, apparently, did not have specialist literature on the subject at his disposal. Had it been otherwise he might have realized that dhàt-i akbar is a defective, if not misleading translation of what in the Latin of Anselm is called id quod maius cogitari non potest, “that than which a greater can not be thought.” He might also have realized that Kant’s criticism of Anselm’s argument is not to the point, since Kant did not appreciate that in the eyes of Anselm existence is a reality, and not just a concept. Seen from Anselm’s point of view, his argument does not, as is already mentioned, involve an unjustified change over from the concept existence to existence itself.

A Few Concluding Remarks of a Comparative Nature

These remarks are not meant to show that Mutahhari, had he been acquainted with the writings of Anselm or with the relevant scientific literature, would have come to a completely different conclusion. But they make it clear, I hope, that the question as to whether or not a certain similarity Anselm and Mullà Sadrà can be detected in this respect, is still open. It would of course be very pretentious for me to claim that I am in a position to provide the definitive answer to this question. What I would like to do is to wind up my paper with a few suggestions that at best indicate the direction in which a possible answer to this question might be looked for.

But before making those suggestions I would like to stress the importance not to lose sight of the fact that Anselm and Mullà Sadrà not only lived more than five centuries apart from each other, but also belonged to two different religious traditions, each of them having a history and identity of its own. Moreover, for a true understanding and appreciation of the position and merits of each one of them, it is of the utmost relevance to interpret each in the light of his own tradition and culture. The question whether or not a similarity or even relationship can be discovered at best of secondary relevance. Nevertheless raising this question and trying to find an answer to it can be useful, since it can enhance our understanding of the particular approach and way of thinking of the two persons involved and of the two traditions and cultures they belong to.

Precisely from this latter point of view, I would like to draw your attention to a few facts or aspects, that seem to suggest a certain affinity or congeniality between Anselm and Mullà Sadrà. First of all, both Anselm and Mullà Sadrà represent a type of philosophy that is closely related to theology, a type of philosophy in which both belief and reason play an equally important part, and in which belief is not considered to be something extraneous In the case of Saint Anselm, this philosophy, scholasticism, is based, as was already mentioned, on two pillars, auctoritas (authority) and ratio (reason). In the Islamic counterpart of this philosophical tradition we find two almost similar pillars and even with, to a large extent, similar names, viz. Naql (authoritative tradition) and aql (reason). This is clearly encoded in the way Seyyed Moåammad Khàmene’i has characterized Mullà Sadrà as an intellectual “who associated logic with Sharia, mysticism with reasoning and Qur’ànic wisdom with human thought”.[21]

Moreover, both Anselm and Mullà Sadrà are representatives of a type of philosophy that is much more than just an intellectual occupation, because it also involves, or, better, presupposes a way of living centered around seclusion, ascetism, undivided devotion to the spiritual world. As far as Anselm is concerned, he found this way of living when he joined the order of the Benedictines. Later on, after he had become abbot, and particularly after he had been appointed archbishop of Canterbury, he had to abandon to a certain extent this secluded life within the four walls of the monastery and to occupy himself with affairs of a more mundane and even political nature.

But his Monologion and his Proslogion, the works in which developed his proof of God’s existence, are the fruit of some twenty years of almost undisturbed monastic peace and tranquility.

Mullà Sadrà having completed his period of his formal learning, “sought yet another dimension in the full development of his intellect and personality and so left Isfahan to devote himself to a life of ascetism and inner purification”.[22] According to the same author – Seyyed Hossein Nasr – Mullà Sadrà considered spiritual training “the absolute essential condition for those who aspire to reach the Divine Mysteries and to gain a true knowledge of åikmat-i ilàhi or Divine Science”.[23] And therefore – to quote Seyyed Hossein Nasr again – “The writings of Mullà Sadrà are as deeply influenced by the Sufi tradition as can be imagined, both ‘horizontally’ and historically, through his acquaintance with earlier Sufi writings, and ‘vertically’, through contact with the Truth (al-åaqiqah), which is itself the eternal source of all Sufism".[24] Fazlur Rahman, however, is very outspoken in his rejection of this interpretation He finishes the view that “according to Sadra or even for understanding his thoughts, Sufism is needed besides philosophy as though Sufism was an independent cognitive avenue to truth, indeed, over and above philosophy”, with a somewhat blunt “This is simply not true”.[25] However, a close reading of Fazlur Rahman’s introduction to his The Philosophy of Mullà Sadrà reveals that he does not deny that there is another side to Mullà Sadrà’s philosophy. But he takes objection to the use of a term like ‘Sufism’ to characterize this side, particularly, when Sufism is viewed as “an independent cognitive avenue to truth, indeed, over and above philosophy”, to use his own words. Such a view would indeed not render justice to Mullà Sadrà ’s way of thinking. In his dealing with Mullà Sadrà retreat from Isfahan Fazlur Rahman himself uses the following sentences. His new posture was:

therefore, one of prayer and utter resignation to God, with all his being. Rather than operate by the superficialities and artfulness of logical reasoning, he contemplated deeply and sincerely the fundamental problems of God, being, and the universe and ‘gave himself up’ to an intuitive invasion ‘from without’. This intense contemplation was accompanied by strenuous religious exercises.[26]

 Judging from such sentences the difference of opinion between Fazlur Rahman and Seyyed Hossein Nasr is not as strong as the formers outspokenness suggests.

In any case, it is in both Anselm’s and Mullà Sadrà’s philosophy, this extra-intellectual or supra-intellectual dimension that makes both men look for a direct and immediate – in the literal sense of the word, i.e. without a mediating factor – approach to God’s existence, an approach to God in which His existence is self-revealing, in which His existence presents itself as inescapable, not because of what He caused to be, but because of what He Himself is. In other words, both men looked for an approach in which He Himself would be the most convincing, and even the only convincing proof His existence. This is not to say that the actual proofs of God’s existence, Anselm and Mullà Sadrà devised, are essentially the same. What both men share is that each of them – within the framework of his own religious and philosophical tradition – formulated a proof of God’s existence is as a result of a quest for Him that is both philosophical and more than philosophical. Regarding Mullà Sadrà, in order to convey this aspect of his way of thinking, the term most commonly used is åikmat (wisdom). In order to express the peculiarity of Saint Anselm’s proof of God’s existence, Richard W. Southern has suggested, as was already mentioned, the term sapientia (wisdom), as a kind of coalescence of intellectus (intellect) and cogitatio (thinking). The resemblance between these two terms, sapientia and åikmat, is a felicitous illustration of the affinity and congeniality, that – notwithstanding the fact that they lived centuries apart and belonged to two different, and sometimes even opposite, religious traditions – can be detected between the two men, as least as far as their approach to the necessity of God’s existence is concerned.

 

Notes