al-Qur`an al-Karim 3:18
Rumi wrote sometime ago a collection of his lectures on Sufi sama sessions (majlis) it was entitled“ Fihi ma fihi”, literally meaning “in it, what is in it”. It was a symposium on the contents of the Sufi path, literally the what is it of Sufism, the contents. These contents are known as the quiddity (latin: quidditas; Arabic: mahiyya or `ayn) The question of what it is of the path is a major question for the quiddity is the distinguishing characteristic between the unitarian[1] schools of sufism, waodat al-wujud and waodat al-shuhud.
Mahiyya is defined as “… it is that which replies to the question: what is this? It expresses the genus (jins), while the question ayu shay`huwa (what kind of thing is it?) relates to the species (naw‘) …Ibn Sina writes with regard to the ‘oadd’: ‘it is that which indicates the quiddity of a thing, this being the perfection of its existence in essence (kamal wujud al-dhati): it is composed of the genus and of the specific difference’. This question will be encountered again with regard to the inniya”. (Arnaldez, EL Vol. Vl, pg. 1261, “mahiyya”)
Another definition is given with a slight difference “The mahiyya is that through which a thing is what it is (ma bihi al-shay’huwa huwa)….In this sense, the term is synonymous with essence (dhat) and with reality (oaqiqa). This reality, like quiddity and essence is beyond the universal and the particular, the existent and the non-existent, meaning that it can express not only the genus but also the individual essence, not only that which exists in beings themselves (fi al-a`yan), but that which does not exist thus, while existing in though (fi al-dhihn)”.[2] (El Vol. Vl, pg. 1261)
Whereas Mulla Sadra shows a different understanding of the quiddity or essence giving it a subsidiary role to Absolute Existence:
“Existences (al-wujudat) are genuine [determinate] realities (oaqa`iq) and essences (mahiyyat) are the eternal “thisnesses” (al-a`yan al-thabitat) which have never inhaled the perfume of real existence at all. These existences are merely the rays and reflected lights of the True Light and of the Eternal Existence--Exalted Be His Sublimity!--, however, each of them has essential predicates (nu`uta dhatiyyat) and contains intelligible concepts (ma`ayn`aqliyyat) called essences (al-mahiyyat).” (M 85,pg.43)
Mulla Sadra conceived of the Quiddity of having two meanings[3] The Quiddity which is a universal and exists in the mind. And the Essence of “mahi ash-shay,huwa huwa” (What thing is it?). The concrete existing individual.
In the following I shall be examining the question of the quiddity in determining the relationship of Sadrian and Sufi doctrines in regards to existential unity. My starting point is to look at the theory of God’s Knowledge in popular Islam. We shall see that it is the quiddity which lends itself as definer to the definitive separation amongst the different schools. We will see how the answer to five questions delineates the conception of Unity-of-Being and the Sadrian view of the quiddity. These five questions are:
1. Is existence precedent over essence?
2. Are forms external to God?
3. Are objects of knowledge needed for God to have knowledge or caused by God’s Essential Knowledge?
4. Quiddities (mahiyya) are simultaneous or originated as posteriors or effects?
5. Is there substantial union (oulul) with Creator and created?
Knowledge (`Ilm):
Question 1: “Is existence precedent over essence?”
In Sadrian thought it is established that existence is precedent over essence as shall be demonstrated in the latter sections of this paper. Suffice it to say for now that Suhrawardi, along with Qutb al-Din, held that essence was precedent over existence. This idea of existence precedent before essence was elemental in Mulla Sadra’s philosophical revolution. Sadrian thought was developed out of Ibn Sina’s thought.
Ibn Sina writes regarding mahiyat and wujud:
That whose essence (mahiyya) is other than existence is not the Necessary Existent. It has become evident that existence has an accidental meaning for that whose essence is other than existence(inniyya).
And it has also become evident that there is a cause for that which has an accidental idea (i.e. for that which has a contingent being). The cause of such a being is either the essence (dhat) of that entity in which it subsists or something else. (MA, pg. 55-56)
Question 2: “Are forms external to God?”
To begin with it is necessary to present an overview of the different perspectives regarding God’s Knowledge in the traditional aspects of Islam. The main question is whether God has knowledge of things by His existence or by some outside external existent to his existence.
Overview of different schools:
The major conflict between the different schools of thought on God’s Knowledge is that in regards to forms of knowledge as necessity for God to have knowledge. In this way we have:
Theologians:
“Since theologian affirmed attributes super added to His essence, they found no difficulty with respect to the connection (ta`alluq) of His knowledge with things outside His essence by means of forms (suwar) corresponding to those things and super-added to Him”. (DF,pg. 44)
Philosophers:
A. Ibn Sina:
1. “Since the first (al-awwal) apprehends (`aqala) His essence by means of His essence and because His essence is the cause (`illah) of multiplicity (al-kathrah), it follows that he apprehends multiplicity because of His apprehension of His essence by means of His essence.
2. Thus, his apprehension of multiplicity is a concomitant (lazim) effected by Him (ma`lul lahu), and the forms of multiplicity, which are the objects of His apprehension (ma`qulat), are also His effects (ma`lulat) and His concomitants ranked in the order of effects and therefore posterior to (muta`akhkhirah `an) the reality of His essence as an effect is posterior to its causes.
3. His essence is not constituted by them (mutaqawwimah) or by anything else. It is one, and the multiplicity of concomitants (al-lawazim) and effects (al-ma`lulat) is not inconsistent with the unity of their cause (`illah) of which they are the concomitants, regardless of whether these concomitants are established (mutaqarrirah) in the cause itself or distinct (mubayinah) from it.
4. Deduction: Therefore, the establishment (taqarrur) in the essence of the Self-Subsistent One, who is prior to them with respect to causality (al-`illiyah) and existence, does not necessitate His being multiple.”(DF, pg.45) [Emphasis and Numbering Added]
B. Sadra:
Knowledge, being a perfection, cannot be denied to God. For Sadra knowledge is existence. “Knowledge is neither a privation like abstraction from matter, nor a relation but a being (wujud). (It is) not every being but that which is an actual being, not potential. (It is) not even every actual being, but a pure being, unmixed with non-being. To the extent that it becomes free from an admixture of non-being, it’s intensity as knowledge increases.”(Sadra quoted by Raoman,MS, pg. 213) Sadra also holds that the Forms are internal as the existence of knower and known is one (cf. M113,pg. 64).
C. Sufi:
“… His attributes, does not require a form superadded to Him. Neither does His knowledge of the quiddities (mahiyat) of things or their ipseities (huwiyat), for their quiddities and ipseities are nothing but His transcendent essence (al-dhat al-muta`aliyah) clothed in these aforementioned considerations whose intellections are. There is no doubt that His knowledge of His essence and these considerations (al-i`tibarat) derived one from another”. (DF, pg. 49-50)
Sadra criticism of different schools:
Mulla Sadra refutes certain views of the schools of thought on the topic:
Mu`tazila: Essences subsist before their actual existence and in this state of subsistence (thubut) are known by God. All non-existents are, nevertheless, ‘something’ that can be talked about as referent of thought and hence ‘subsist’. Sadra rejects this saying essences have no reality at all unless they are invested with real, external existence and that the non-existent cannot ‘subsist’ by itself whether real or mental.
Peripatetic: Identify God’s knowledge with Platonic forms as separate from God’s being. Sadra rejects this saying. These forms are posterior to God’s existence and His knowledge of them. How could they, in that case, be God’s eternal and primordial knowledge? Sadra holds that the forms are not separate from God’s existence. Forms are identified by Sadra with the transcendental Intelligence’s of the Peripatetics; they are not ‘causes’ by Him, nor ‘emanate’ from Him, but are with Him. Sadra does not accept the traditional view that God’s knowledge, in it’s ‘simplicity’ ensures knowledge of all things. He upholds the doctrine of simplicity--a simple being is all things.
The Issues:
Succinctly the issue at hand in the preceding was the question of whether God’s Knowledge is dependent on an external form for Him to know. The theologians say there is an external form the Sufis and Sadra say that there is no necessity of an external form, God’s Knowledge is internal to Him. The next question regards the objects of knowledge.
The argument of God’s simple knowledge
Question 3: “Are objects of knowledge needed for God to have Knowledge or caused by God’s Essential Knowledge?”
The question at hand in this section is that regarding does God need objects of knowledge to know. Is God a self-subsisting and knowing t