A Comparative Study of Mulla Sadra and Kant’s Views on the

Capacity of Reason in Solving Metaphysical Problems

By:Nasir Arab Mu’mini

 

For Kant, pure reasoning and intellection, when unrelated to experience, lack any objective value and he considers every kind of intuition other than sense intuition as invalid. In contrast, although being uncertain in this regard and sometimes even despairing of rational knowledge, Mulla Sadra never rejects intellection and reasoning and in some cases he even regards them as superior to the sense perception experiences and holds that sense perception is supplement to them.

In this regard Kant believes that reason leads us nowhere, dogmatic metaphysics is absurd and like carrying water in a sieve (and as Khayyam would say, as useless as milking a bull),[1] and that metaphysicians, despite all their claims, only boast and will never attain knowledge which corresponds to reality.[2] And all this is caused by their going beyond the realm of sense experience, which results from combining sense perception and understanding, i.e., applying categories on sensory phenomena.[3] This, however, does not mean that there are no metaphysical truths and that all should be regarded as absurd illusions and thus we should be rid of them by rejecting them all.[4] Rather, we put reason aside, for in this realm reason makes contradictory statements and is forced to use antinomies. Therefore, by doing so we can pave the way for faith through morality and practical reason.

Kant discusses intelligible ideas such as the ideas of the world, of the soul and of God and the contradictory remarks of reason concerning each of these ideas in detail. He also describes the antinomies used by reason, but for the sake of brevity we will avoid referring to these issues.[5] Kant also rejects and criticizes the proofs for the existence of God, a brief account of which is presented below:

Critique of the Proofs for the Existence of God

Kant criticizes the proofs for the existence of God and concludes that they could be neither refuted nor proved. Proffering the three ontological, cosmological and physico-theological proofs he proceeds to criticize them. To avoid a lengthy discussion we will just point them out here.

The ontological proof was for the first time proposed by Anselm and then discussed from another point of view by Descartes. From Descartes’ point of view the argument says that existence is essential for the most perfect essence, just as having three sides is essential for the triangle, on which fact it is based, or as the existence of the valley is essential for the mountain, and as it is impossible to take away these attributes from the triangle and the mountain. And if we deny the existence of this most perfect essence, it will lead to a contradiction, for if this perfect essence does not exist, then another most perfect essence -which has an external existence- will be more perfect. As a result, this most perfect essence will not be the most perfect essence.

Kant’s objection to this proof is that if it is an analytical judgment then it signifies only a concept and thus cannot hold true for an external reality. If it is a synthetic judgment, it cannot be proved through the law of self-contradiction, and in this argument the concept and its referent are in fact confused. What Descartes says is true on the basis of the ‘definition’ of the ontological proof. From a definition, however, truth cannot be derived; moreover, a question may arise as to the origin of this definition.

The cosmological proof is similar to the proof of possibility, though not thoroughly. It says if anything exists (in the proof of possibility we say if some possible thing exists), then there should be an absolute Necessary Being. That is to say that since at least ‘I’ exists, thus a Necessary Being must exist, for every possible thing needs a cause. Kant regards this argument as the weakest and finds many drawbacks in it.

The physico-theological proof is in fact the same as the proof from design. This proof begins from the world of nature (the sensible world) and concludes that God is the final cause. It says that the world has an order and therefore it moves toward an end, and thus there is a supreme architect who has brought order and end into existence. Though being much interested in this argument, Kant accepted Hume’s objections to it.

At any rate, neither the cosmological proof nor the ontological proof proves the existence of the most real essence, God. According to Kant, both the cosmological proof and the proof from design ultimately lead to the ontological proof. He says, of course, that the proof from design -or the physico-theological proof- is dependent on the cosmological proof and the latter is dependent on the ontological proof, which is in fact a paralogism. Hence all these three proofs have common paralogisms and also their own individual paralogisms.[6]

Kant’s criticism closes the door to atheism and materialism and paves the way for moral faith. Following Kant’s criticism both proving the existence of God and rejecting it became impossible. And indeed the same reason that implies the inability of man’s intellect to prove the existence of God suggests the invalidity of any disproof as well.

That is why this criticism closes the door to atheism and materialism and paves the way for moral faith. As the late Furughi said, if philosophers fail to adduce a rational demonstration [for God’s existence], opponents will also be unable to reject it and the way of quest will remain open.[7]

 “It is only criticism which can eradicate materialism, determinism, atheism, open-minded disbelief, dogmatism and superstitions –all of which can harm every one -and idealism and skepticism, which are dangerous mostly for scholastic philosophers and rarely concern ordinary people.”[8]

Now we can understand what Kant means when he says, “I have therefore found it necessary to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith”. While refuting the proofs presented by those who deny metaphysical truths, this criticism rejects the contradictory proofs proposed by metaphysicians and then leads all to the realm of practical or moral reason.

“I have therefore found it necessary to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith. The dogmatism of metaphysics, that is, the preconception that it is possible to make headway without a previous criticism of pure reason, is the source of all that unbelief, always dogmatic, which wages war against morality.”[9]

In the beginning Mulla Sadra seems to be among those dogmatic philosophers, as Kant meant it, who are happy with futile debates, as he is very dogmatic and metaphysical in his methodology. In addition, he believes in reason as a valid source of knowledge. Therefore, we may juxtapose these two philosophers and consider them as opposing each other from the very beginning and hurriedly consider them in opposite fronts in adducing rational arguments to attain metaphysical truths. In Mulla Sadra’s works, however, we can find many points that bring such a hasty judgment under question. If we are to pass any judgment, it has to be after examining their works and comparing them with each other meticulously.

In many cases Mulla Sadra has a great respect for reason and philosophy and their findings. According to him, philosophy is not only a science, but also the source of all other sciences and able to meet the main needs of man and finally to lead man to the best states and to assume the traits of God.[10]

Mulla Sadra describes the way of the creation of the soul, and unlike Kant, who regards these issues as antinomies, adduces arguments for its existence. He says we see that there are gradual and voluntary effects in some bodies that cannot be seen in other bodies, such as feeling, motion, nutrition, growth and propagation. Now we say that the origin of these effects is not hyle, for that is pure potentiality, nor is it the corporeal form common in all bodies. If that were the case, all bodies would have to have such effects, whereas we find bodies that lack them, and therefore there should be incorporeal origins (souls) in bodies.[11] He also proposes proofs for the substantiality of the soul and its immaterial quality and in particular the immaterial quality of the rational soul.[12]

Also, unlike Kant, who regards discussion on these issues as futile, Mulla Sadra, in addition to having written a book on the origination of the world (åudêth al-`alam), discusses this issue in many parts of his Asfar. In his Mafatiå al-ghayb (Keys to the Invisible World) he demonstrates the origination of the world, including its temporal origination, and in this relation cites examples from the Holy Quran and from ancient philosophers.[13]  

In order to prove the existence of God he formulates certain proofs, among which the most important one is the proof of the righteous (siddiqin). On this he says, “Though there are many proofs and much evidence for the existence of God, and though it is said the ways to God are as many as there are people, for He has many attributes and aspects, some of them nobler, more authentic and more luminous than the others, the best proof for the existence of God is the proof of the righteous (siddiqin), in which the middle term is the same as the quest, and we do not appeal to other [than Him] to prove the quest.[14]

So far, all we have quoted from Mulla Sadra about the value of reason and philosophy confirms his approval of this divine blessing, but it should be noted that all he says is not confined to this approval. In addition to that, we find some doubts about the capacity of man’s reason to unveil immaterial truths. Below we will mention some of them as examples. In his Asfar for instance, he states that by the knowledge of God the Exalted and the knowledge of resurrection we do not mean the knowledge that an ordinary man or a jurisprudent attains through imitation.[15]

There are some points of fundamental importance in Mulla Sadra’s views:

1) The knowledge of metaphysical truths is not acquired through pure demonstration and reasoning; these are dark obstacles in the way of a wayfarer who travels to attain knowledge of truth.

2) This knowledge is attained through purification of the heart, and through spiritual struggle. That is why it has been entitled God-given (ladunni), which is a light descending from the Truth.

3) Mulla Sadra seeks [God’s] forgiveness for having spent a part of his life in the study of the views of philosophers and the people of debate.

4) Through strengthening his faith and concentrating on God the Beneficent he finds that the syllogisms employed by philosophers is futile and useless and leads nowhere.

He also warns us against preoccupation with the idle talk of ignorant     Sufis and against reliance on the words of philosophers, since all of them are misleading and keep man from following the right path. And when confronting the clear proofs of the Prophets they content themselves with their negligible knowledge and turn away from these clear proofs.[16]

Perhaps quoting Mulla Sadra’s rejection of pure intellection suffices so far, but in order to draw attention to the fact that he has not said all this carelessly it would not be amiss if we quote some of his other statements as well. In his Mafatiå al-ghayb he says, “There are certain issues which are beyond the capacity of wise men and thinkers, and perceiving which requires the light of prophecy (nubuwwah) and guardianship (wilayah). Among these issues are the knowledge of Divine Attributes and of observing Him in the loci of manifestations in these attributes, the knowledge of the creation of the heavens and the Earth in six days, of His sitting on the Throne, of the conditions of resurrection and the unveiling of graves, and of corporeal resurrection and corporeal heaven and corporeal hell”.[17] Also, in Asfar, while expressing his belief in Platonic Ideas, Mulla Sadra says that their knowledge is not attained through reasoning and debate, which occupy the minds of those who content themselves with these and lead them to doubt, so that every one of them condemns those who were prior to him. Every one who wishes to find knowledge of the Ideas has to choose the school of Plato and his followers.[18]

In his Sih asl (The Three Principles) he rejects the way of reason and regards it as incapable of finding immaterial truths. For example, he says, “Although philosophers do posses ample knowledge of this issue (the issue of the spirit), their knowledge, compared to the knowledge of those who believe in the Holy Quran and the hereafter, is like the knowledge of the plebian to the knowledge of the theologian.”[19]  “… For the knowledge of the world and the other world…and the like is among unveilings, which the mind of the people of thought fails to understand, and such knowledge is uncharted, except in the school of ‘[We] had thought him knowledge from Our Presence.’ [20]-[21]” And in the same book he writes, “Not only the senses but also reason is unable to find its way to the main desired one unless it is illuminated with the light of love.

Like the senses, which are incapable of perceiving supreme perceptible concepts, theoretical reason is also unable to perceive the axioms of the otherworldly affairs.[22] In his Mafatiå al-ghayb he maintains that reason has a limit beyond which one cannot go and where only the way of the heart and of divine inspirations is effective.[23]

As it can be seen in these statements, Mulla Sadra thinks that man can achieve nothing unless he treads the path of unveiling and intuition and is illuminated by the light of Divine Law; even reason is a veil and in fact the greatest veil. And how is it possible to achieve knowledge despite this obstacle? That is why his philosophy is more inclined towards Illuminationism (ishraq) rather than Peripatetic philosophy. And even in case of certain issues -except the issues of the origin and the resurrection and the world of immaterial beings- finding scientific facts and solving philosophical problems are also regarded a result of Divine favors and Lordly effusions and esoteric visions. He then explicitly declares that understanding these issues or solving these problems is a result of his entreating to the presence of the Truth (cf. previous discussions).

Now two fundamental questions are in order to be answered:

1) If the knowledge of metaphysical issues is restricted to the heart and mystical unveiling and intuition, then why should we debate and argue?

2) Is there not incoherence in Mulla Sadra’s statements on the capacity of reason and the value of its knowledge of truths?

To answer the first question perhaps it can be said that he does not intend to reject knowledge and philosophy absolutely. Rather, he means to compare God-given knowledge, which is acquired through mystical intuition, with demonstrative knowledge. As the former is much more suitable, he comes to the conclusion that demonstrative knowledge, as compared with God-given knowledge, is negligible. For those who are deprived of Divine effusions, however, it is everything and a necessary knowledge. It can be likened to a lamp that is not needed in daylight, but in the dark of the night when there is no light it becomes necessary. In this way, reason and the heart and the Divine Law do not oppose but supplement each other. Though one of them is more perfect than the other, if it is deprived of the other, it is imperfect. It would be far better if truths attained through intuition were adorned with intellectual demonstrations, and the least use of these arguments is that they make it easier to transfer intuitive findings.

Even in some cases no discrepancy can be found between demonstration and intuition, and truths derived through intuition are the same as truths reached by demonstrative thinking. This is also true in the case of the Divine Law and of prophecy and revelation; that is why Mulla Sadra tries to incorporate these three schools in his Transcendent philosophy.

In his book Asfar he says, “Beware of thinking that the words of great mystics are devoid of demonstration and that they are not compatible with valid demonstrations. The station of unveiling for mystics in attaining certainty, however, is superior to the station of demonstrations. Demonstration is a way in which caused things observe their cause, and if this is the case, then how can demonstration be in contradiction with intuition? And if, in the words of some mystics, demonstration is regarded as useless, it is not demonstration itself, but what is called demonstration (and is not in fact demonstration). Mulla Sadra says: “Indeed real demonstration is not against unveiling intuition.”[24]

Also, according to him, the words of the Divine Law are not inconsistent with demonstration, nor can the rules and issues of philosophy be other than what is said in the Book and the tradition.[25] Therefore, in the same way that he reconciles mysticism and philosophy, he reconciles religion and reason, and whenever any intricate philosophical problem arises he makes references to Quranic verses and Islamic works.

Hence, if we see that sometimes Mulla Sadra severely criticizes the demonstrations present in discursive philosophy, either his criticism is directed to false demonstrations, and not demonstrations in themselves (as we have said), or it is because intuition is stronger and more important. Why should we deal with less important issues to the expense of the most important one, and why should we not taste the real pleasure and content ourselves with just a description? It is as if he wishes to say that when he could have reached the eye of certainty ('ayn al-yaqin) and the truth of certainty (åaqq al-yaqin) through intuition, then why had he spent many years of his precious life content with the knowledge of certainty ('ilm al-yaqin), which was a lower degree of knowledge? Perhaps that is why he sought [God’s] forgiveness. But, since it is not possible for everyone to purify his soul and to take away material obstacles and to reach certainty, demonstration is necessary. Another justification which can be pointed out in this regard is that if he blames intellectual proofs and philosophical arguments, this is confined to particular issues such as knowledge of the Hereafter and heaven and hell, and not all metaphysical truths. He may also mean that no argument can lead us to the objective existence of God, and at most we an obtain terms such as ‘the Cause of all causes,’ ‘the Necessary Being,’ etc. through such demonstrations. And the objective knowledge of things, and in particular of the world of abstract things, cannot be acquired except through knowledge by presence. In other words, these demonstrations are only able to prove that there is a cause for all other causes, and do not prove the existence of God immediately. That is why Mulla Sadra says, “For reaching a goal, most of these issues play only the role of premises and cannot bestow peace of mind and satisfaction of the soul.[26] He also stipulates that theoretical reason claims mastery over truths, but this is not the case, for in accordance with its intellectual and theoretical power reason perceives nothing but mental concepts and the concomitants of existential ipseities; in this way, external truths cannot be perceived. The highest level of the ability of theoretical reason is an undifferentiated knowledge suggesting that there is a Creator who is free from corporeal imperfections and attributes. Theoretical reason is deprived of observing His essential self-disclosures through intuition.

What we have said in answering the first question can be applied to answer the second question as well, and there is no need for additional answers. What we have said in order to answer the questions in fact results from our optimistic attitude, and more than an answer it seems to be a justification. Moreover, if we are to be uncompromising, we can introduce many other questions, in particular where Mulla Sadra’s statements are similar to those of Kant.

So far we can conclude that Kant regards the judgment of reason concerning metaphysical issues as futile and even as an obstacle to reaching moral faith. Mulla Sadra however maintains a certain value for it, but there are ups and downs in his words, as if he reluctantly accepts reason to enter this realm. And if it were not for the above-mentioned justifications and his belief in knowledge by presence as well as rational intuition, we could say that like Kant Mulla Sadra thinks that reason is in fact an obstacle to reaching real faith. Yet there is no doubt that he does not regard reason as perfectly reliable, and if we take inner intuitions away from it, its arguments will not be so dependable. Thus, without blaming any of these two scholars, in a way we regard each of them right.

I would like to tell all those who consciously or unconsciously deny the validity of metaphysics or primary philosophy that everyone needs a kind of metaphysics. Whether or not one can do without primary philosophy or metaphysics is itself a metaphysical problem. If we scrutinize the issue, it becomes clear that Kant has gone beyond the realm he determined personally, i.e. the realm of experience. One of our objections to him is that, though his philosophy is critical, this philosophy is itself according to him exempt from this criticism. This is when what Aristotle is supposed to have said becomes meaningful: If we are to practice philosophy then we have to practice philosophy, and if we are not to practice philosophy, we still have to practice philosophy. This means that philosophy can be rejected only through philosophy and not through other disciplines. All of us are in fact thinking in a philosophical way, so it is unjust to regard metaphysics as the result of a philosopher’s daydreaming. It is in fact the fruit of the highest aspect of humanity and a splendid edifice erected in the best times of a philosopher’s awareness and around the most intricate and the subtlest issues and knowledge. The reason for this is that philosophy discusses postulates, and its premises are self-evident and necessary, and within its bounds the criterion for drawing a distinction between true and false is logic. In natural sciences, on the contrary, logic is not the only criterion. Correspondence with the world of sense and experience is also important. As the premises of primary philosophy are self-evident and the only criterion to draw a distinction between true and false is logic, then its results are certain truths, and this discipline can do without sense and experiment. And hence there is no reason for confining ourselves to Kant’s realm of experience. Does Kant make use of sense and experience and does he not go beyond the realm of experience when he adduces demonstration in order to refute dogmatic metaphysics? If one does not accept the validity of rational arguments, though unconsciously, how can he refute them, as Kant refutes -through demonstration- the three well-known proofs for the existence of God, one after another?

Obviously, every discipline has its own methodology, and in any study carried out on it, its respective methodology should be applied. For example, the issues pertaining to sense and experience cannot be proved through demonstration, and the philosopher, even if he tries hard, is not able to find, through rational analysis, which compounds can be achieved through combining which chemical elements. In the same fashion, the problems pertaining to metaphysics cannot be solved through sense experience, and they cannot be rejected through natural sciences either. These problems should be solved through intellectual and demonstrative methods.

Incidentally, Kant also says that metaphysical truths cannot be attained through empirical methods, but he was concerned with whence metaphysical issues came. It is true that postulates are the premises of these issues and that their results can be accepted as certain; this, however, is certain only in the mind, and does not include the external world, just as the truth of the syllogisms of formal logic never represents the external and objective world.

The same thing applies to mathematical problems: although they are completely certain and objective, their being proved does not mean that there is an external reality for them. For example, if we prove that the sum of the angles of the triangle is 180, this will not mean that there is such a triangle in the external world with such characteristics. It is based on the fact that formal truth does not mean real and external truth that Kant rejects the ontological argument of Descartes.

The reason why Kant regards authentic and reliable knowledge as belonging to the realm of both experience and reason is that despite the view of the empiricists it is not only the senses which are reliable in the realm of science; reason is at least as useful as the senses. The difference is that the application of reason to natural issues, which we perceive through the senses, is clear and we know for which issues we can appeal to reason. In case of metaphysical issues, however, the application of reason is not determined, and we apply it to issues which are not known to us and which we do not know from where and how have been acquired. In other words, Kant tries to say that though it is true that metaphysics is the result of the highest contemplation, and that it is an inevitable feature of the natural disposition of every man, this has nothing to do with its being representative.[27] All of these are improper and even false references. As we said before, Mulla Sadra also holds that theoretical reason deals only with mental concepts.[28] The difference between Sadra and Kant in this regard is that Kant maintains that these arguments only suggest the relations between mental images, while Mulla Sadra says that at least they guide us to God and to the fact that there should be a Necessary Being, though these arguments have no capacity beyond this point.

The main objection to Kant, as we have already said, is that he rejects any kind of intuition except sense intuition; and since he believes that metaphysical propositions are devoid of this intuition, he regards them as pure mental and intellectual relations whose ability to represent reality is not reliable at all. He does not believe in rational intuition (though he gets close to it), and even considers relying on common sense as irrelevant and as the inventions of those who indulge in idle talking and who are unable to follow the path of science.[29]

Mulla Sadra, however, in addition to rational intuition and common sense, believes in knowledge by presence. He believes that these can compensate for the lack of sense intuition, which is what Kant looks for. As regards rational intuition, we think that it cannot be denied, and that reason is at least as reliable as the senses. And the great problem with contemporary western philosophers is their lack of belief in reason and rational activities. That is why they look for the answer to every problem through reason and experience. Knowledge by presence means that man contemplates metaphysical truths and immaterial things and then goes on to make concepts, judgments, and syllogisms. Such an intuition is specific to mystics. (Even the statement that everything that is an effect has knowledge by presence of its cause is vague and cannot be accepted easily.) Therefore, reason without mysticism is imperfect and unable to represent reality. And if knowledge by presence means what Misbah believes, that is, from the soul’s knowledge of itself and its dispositions and acts by presence a secondary intelligible concept is made and then it is generalized to all external things and even to God, then it is very difficult to prove this view. Still more difficult is assigning such a doctrine to Mulla Sadra. Under secondary intelligible concepts, after expounding the mechanism of the acquisition of these concepts in the mind, we find that he does not believe in such an idea.

After all these discussions we can conclude that the issue of knowledge and of solving its problems, especially metaphysics, is very intricate. Defining philosophy as the science of the reality of things, offered by those such as Mulla Sadra, does not mean that it attains the reality of those things -at least so far as metaphysics is concerned. This can be accepted only if we say that unlike empirical science, which describes the characteristics of things (what they are), philosophy discusses the realities of things (why they are), whether they can attain these realities or not.

Moreover, it should be added that like Kant, Mulla Sadra believes in theoretical reason and practical reason and thinks that these two cannot be separated from each other.[30] The main difference between him and Kant is that with regard to the issues pertaining to metaphysics Kant considers practical reason as superior whereas Mulla Sadra deems theoretical reason as superior. To study this issue a separate article is needed, so we leave the issue here and content ourselves with an allusion to the fact that in modern terminology this issue pertains to the relationship between world-view and ideology and the superiority of one over the other.

In the end, it should be noted that Kant divides metaphysics into two categories: 1. dogmatic metaphysics and 2. critical metaphysics. If transcendental criticism is itself called metaphysics, then metaphysics is possible. But according to Kant metaphysics in the former sense (dogmatic) is not possible. He further says that if all the system and all a priori synthetic propositions which are related to pure natural sciences are put in order, then we will be able to speak of the metaphysics of nature. That is why he calls his own philosophy the metaphysics of nature.[31]

Also, metaphysics exists in all men at all times as a natural disposition. It is an internal and inevitable need which leads man to introduce such questions; and even those who claim that they are not interested in metaphysics are unintentionally inclined to introduce metaphysical issues. At the same time, this lack of interest is not indicative of pure lightness of the mind; it is an indication of mental genius.[32]

But since all attempts to provide answers to these natural questions lead to inevitable contradictions, man cannot content himself with natural dispositions in metaphysics. He should be able to reach certainty- either positively or negatively- through reason. That is to say that it should be decided whether it is possible for human reason to find answers to metaphysical questions or not. And that is when we are confronted with the following fundamental question: Is it possible to speak of metaphysics as a science? Kant’s answer is negative, and he concentrates on finding a way in which both the problem and its solution can be discussed. Time was when metaphysics was entitled the queen of all sciences and if the will is to be taken for the deed, the prominent importance of her accepted tasks gives her every right to this title of honor. Now, however, the changed fashion of the time brings her only scorn. A matron outcast and forsaken, she mourns like Hercuba: Modo maxing rerum, tot generis natisque potens- nunc trahor eul, inops. Her government, under the administration of dogmatists, was at first despotic. But in as much as legislation still bore traces of ancient barbarism, her empire gradually gave way to complete anarchy through intensive wars.”[33]

According to Kant, the cause of the ill-fame of metaphysics is that, unlike natural sciences and mathematics, it has not been able to find a reliable scientific method for solving its problems, and this leads us to the question: Why has not a reliable scientific method been found for this discipline? He wonders why metaphysics has not been accepted generally if it is a science like other sciences. And if it is not a science, why has it always been presented as a science, and why does it occupy man’s mind with questions which will never end and will never be answered?

Why is metaphysics an impossible science? The answer is what we have already provided. The realm of the application of categories or pure concepts is sense intuition, and the issues of metaphysics are beyond this realm. And the error that dogmatic philosophers have committed is that they have applied these intellectual concepts to real objects.

 

Notes

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