The Nature of the Mind
This paper is intended to give a brief explanation of the mind and its function from the viewpoint of Islamic philosophy. We can divide the related questions into two groups: primary questions and secondary questions. The primary questions are:
1- What is the mind? Or, what is the definition of the mind?
2- Is there anything that conforms to that definition? Or, does the mind exist?
And the secondary questions are:
1- What makes the knowledge of the mind necessary?
2- What are mental faculties?
3- How does the mind work?
4- Does the mind have any stages?
5- Is the mind immaterial? And if so, what are the reasons on the basis of which the immateriality of the mind can be demonstrated?
Now, in order to answer the above questions, this paper is organized as follows:
1- Preface: the necessity of knowing the mind
2- Subject matter:
2-1 The definition of the mind
2-2 The specifications of the mind
2-3 Demonstration of the existence of the mind
2-4 Demonstration of the immateriality of the mind
2-5 The functions of the mind
2-6 The relationship between the mind and the body
2-7 The relationship between the mind and the external world
The necessity of knowing the mind becomes more obvious when we note that it is the mind that produces or receives all of our conceptions. In other words, we know what we know about the external world through the mind. So any information about the mind will help us to know how much of our conceptions are real and how much of them are not. From another aspect, by knowing how the mind works we can easily analyze various philosophical conceptions such as causality, possibility, and existence. This will be very useful in solving the philosophical problems. Murtazà Mutahhari (died in 1402/1980) said, “We cannot understand knowledge if we do not know the mind”  (epistemological aspect). 
On the other hand, if we accept that philosophy discusses the universal judgments about existence, such as the division of existence into external and mental types, knowing the mind can help us in knowing about a major philosophical subject (ontological aspect).
If we cast a glance at Islamic philosophy sources, we can find several definitions for the mind. These definitions vary from one philosopher to another. Furthermore, some philosophers have defined the mind in several ways. Considering the limitation of these definitions, we can classify them into four categories, as mentioned below:
2-1-1 The human soul, for example, in Mullà Sadrà (died in 1050/1640) is: “The human soul is the mind,”  and in ‘Abd al-Razzàq Làhiji (died in 1072/1662) is: “The mind, namely the rational soul, does exist in the external world …”
2-1-2 What includes both knowledge by presence and knowledge by correspondence, for example, in ‘Abu Hayyàn Tawhidi (died in 403/1012) is: “It is asked: what is the mind? The answer is: the good specification of things,”  in Fàràbi (died in 339/945): “The mind is the power of identifying true judgments from a set of involved opinions and the faculty of correcting it.”  As a matter of fact, in both knowledge by presence and knowledge by correspondence we can identify true judgments from a set of involved opinions. So, this class of definitions includes these two kinds of knowledge.
2-1-3 What includes only knowledge by correspondence, for example, the definition of the mind given by Jurjàni (died in 808/1405) is:
Do know that human beings have a comprehensive faculty upon which are imprinted the forms of things, as in the mirror, … every form that is accrued in human’s comprehensive faculty, which is named the mind, is either a conception or acknowledgment. 
Another example is the second definition of ‘Abd al-Razzàq Làhiji in another work where he says, “The mind is the faculty and the instrument in which the forms of things are accrued.” 
2-1-4 Speculative knowledge by correspondence, for example, for Ibn Sinà (died in 428/1037) is, “The mind is a faculty of the soul which prepares it for acquiring definitions and opinions.” And, for Jurjàni it is: “The mind is full preparedness for the comprehension of sciences and gnostic knowledge by thinking.” Here, self-evident knowledge is not to be obtained through thinking, so this class does not include evident knowledge.
The following scheme shows the limitations of these definitions:
However, what is it that we call the mind, and which of these definitions best accounts for it? In order to answer this question, we should turn to Islamic philosophy sources and see if Muslim philosophers ascribe any specifications to the mind or not?
Muslim philosophers have referred to several specifications of the mind in a few scattered sentences. A study of Islamic philosophy sources reveals that there are at least five specifications in this regard, as follows:
2-2-1 The place for mental forms: A lot of Muslim philosophers have referred to this specification in their works. For Ibn Sinà, Nasir al-Din Tusi (died in 672/1071), Mullà Sadrà, and other philosophers, the mind is a place for mental forms.
2-2-2 Exploratory movements to the known in order to obtain the unknown: Ibn Sinà held, “Thinking is the movement of the mind towards the principles in order to obtain the quests.”  We can also witness this idea in Nasir al-Din Tusi and Mullà Sadrà. 
2-2-3 Possession of stages: Though the fact that the stages of the mind play a major role in philosophical problems, especially in epistemological ones, Muslim philosophers have referred to this fact only incidentally. If one searches in this regard in Islamic philosophy texts, he will find out that Muslim philosophers have talked about secondary intellectual concepts and explained them in a way that refers to this specification of the mind. ‘Abd al-Razzàq Làhiji, above all, clarified this subject and maintained that the intellect abstracts it [the secondary intellectual concept] from the essence that exists in the mind with respect to their existence in the mind and not with respect to its existence in the external world. This expression obviously states that the intellect (one side of the mind) abstracts secondary intellectual concepts with respect to its existence in the mind (another side of the mind); therefore, we can conclude that the mind has several stages. Ibn Sinà, Sadr al-Din Taftàzàni (died in 792/1188), Mullà Sadrà and other philosophers have referred to this point, too.
2-2-4 Possessing faculties: The mind has several faculties whose common specifications have contact with mental forms. These faculties can be divided into three sets: external senses, internal senses, and the theoretical intellect. They are explained briefly below:
2-2-4-1 External senses: Every human being has five external senses, namely, touch, vision, hearing, smell, and taste. It is emphasized that every sense employs its own instrument for sensing. For instance, the eye is considered the instrument for vision; the ear is the instrument for hearing, etc.
2-2-4-2 Internal senses: In spite of their disagreements on a specific number, Muslim philosophers have referred to five internal senses for human beings, including the common sense, the imaginal faculty, the estimative faculty,  the retentive faculty, and the dominant faculty.
2-2-4-3 Theoretical intellect: The task of this faculty is to abstract universal conceptions from the particular conceptions received previously by other faculties. 
According to these specifications, the mind:
(1) is the place for mental forms;
(2) makes exploratory movements to the known in order to obtain the unknown;
(3) possesses stages; and
(4) has faculties.
Obviously, such specifications coincide well with the divination of the mind as the soul, because as indicated before, it is the soul that enjoys several faculties. Nevertheless, a question arises here: Are there any differences between the mind and the soul? If so, what are these differences? In order to answer this question, we must first study the arguments adduced to demonstrate the existence and immorality of the mind. Second, we must try to explain the functions of the mind.
The first argument on the demonstration of the existence of the mind was given by Ibn Sinà. He said, “The universal conceptions are in the mind rather than in the external world.”  The logical form of this argument is as follows:
(1) We comprehend universal conceptions. (Self-evident premise)
(2) Every conception that we comprehend exists. (Self-evident premise)
(3) Universal conception exists. (Inference from premise (1) and premise (2))
(4) Everything that exists in the external world is particular. (Self-evident premise)
(5) Universal conceptions do not exist in the external world. (Inference from premise (3) and premise (4))
(6) Universal conceptions do exist in some place other than the external world. We call that place ‘the mind’. (Inference from premise (3) and premise(5))
Nasir al-Din Tusi gave the second argument: “And it [existence] is divided into mental and external types; otherwise, the verity-proposition would be wrong.”  The logical form of this argument is as follows:
(1) There are verity-propositions that are true. (Self-evident premise)
(2) The realization of a state or attribute for a thing requires the realization of the thing itself. (Self-evident premise)
(3) The truth of positive propositions requires the existence of their subject.(Inference from premise (1) and premise(2))
(4) Some extinctions of the subject of verity-propositions do not exist in the external world. (Self-evident premise)
(5) Those extinctions do exist somewhere that we call ‘the mind’. (Inference from premise (3) and premise (4))
And now we organize in the logical form the third argument, which was given by Mullà Sadrà in his great work as follows: 
(1) We conceive several non-existential things. (Self-evident premise)
(2) We distinguish these non-existential things from each other. (Self-evident premise)
(3) The diversification of non-being is impossible. (Self-evident premise)
(4) The diversification of a non-existential thing that does not exist at all is impossible. (Inference from premise (2) and premise (3))
(5) Non-existential things do exist somewhere that we call ‘the mind’. (Inference from premise (1) and premise (4))
So far, we have arrived at the conclusion that there is some existent which is not external and contains non-existential things, extinctions of the subject of verity-propositions, and universal conceptions.
Muslim philosophers hold that the mind is an immaterial being; however, by searching in Islamic philosophy sources, one can hardly ever find an argument on the demonstration of the immateriality of the mind. So, it should be noted that all of the arguments referred to above could be inferred from all the topics that Muslim philosophers have discussed. The first argument is as follows:
(1) Everything that is material has three specifications: divisibility, temporality and spatiality. (Inference from the premise on the definition of material being)
(2) Mental forms cannot be divided. (Self-evident premise)
(3) Mental forms do not have these specifications. (Inference from premise (1) and premise (2))
(4) Anything that does not enjoy the specifications of material things is immaterial. (Conversion by contradiction of premise (1))
(5) Mental forms are not material. (Inference from premise (3) and premise (4))
(6) The mind is the abode of mental forms. (According to the conclusion of the third argument on the demonstration of the existence of the mind)
(7) The place of anything with respect to division is subordinate to its accidents. (Self-evident premise)
(8) Anything that is a place for indivisible things cannot be divided, too. (Inference from premise (6) and premise (7))
(9) The mind cannot be divided. (Inference from premise (6) and premise (8))
(10) The mind does not have the specifications of material things. (Inference from premise (1) and premise (9))
(11) The mind is not material. (Inference from premise (4) and premise (10))
(12) The mind is immaterial. (The obversion of premise (11))
The second argument can be organized as follows:
(1) We comprehend big and great things, such as mountains and seas, in our mind. (Self-evident premise)
(2) If what we comprehend were material, the mind would necessarily include the mountains and seas. (According to premise (1))
(3) The mind is smaller than any mountain or sea. (Self-evident premise)
(4) The impression of the big on the small is impossible. (Self-evident premise)
(5) If the mind included the mountains and seas, the impression of the big on the small would be necessary. (Inference from premise (2) and premise (3))
(6) The mind does not include the mountains and seas. (Inference from premise (5) and premise (4))
(7) What we comprehend is not material. (Inference from premise (2) and premise (6))
(8) What we comprehend is immaterial. (The obversion of premise (7))
(9) We comprehend immaterial things, such as mountains and seas, in our mind. (Inference from premise (1) and premise (8))
(10) The accident of anything with respect to division is subordinate to its place. (Self-evident premise)
(11) If the mind were material, it would be possible to divide what we comprehend. (Inference from premise (10) and the definition of the material being)
(12) It is impossible to divide what we comprehend. (Inference from premise (8) and the definition of the material being)
(13) The mind is not material. (Inference from premise (11) and premise (12))
(14) The mind is immaterial. (The obversion of premise (13)) 
Thus far we have demonstrated the existence and immateriality of the mind. Now, we will try to discover the functions of the mind by casting a glance at Islamic philosophy sources.
The functions of the mind can be divided into three types: affection, action, and memorizing.
2-5-1 Affection: When an eye faces an external object, it is affected by it and, as a result, a form of that object accrues in the mind, which is also affected by the external object later.
2-5-2 Action: In this case, after being affected by external objects, the mind tries to generate a new conception. In doing so, it considers two external objects such as a crow and a wall in a situation in which the crow is sitting on the wall. Here, the mind compares the crow to the wall and, by abstracting the concept of ‘being on something’ from this situation, generates a new conception. Many mental conceptions have been obtained through action. These conceptions have an important role in philosophy and other intellectual realms.
2-5-3 Memorizing: Suppose you are walking in a street. Suddenly, you see a man whose face is very familiar to you. Then you realize that he is your friend. The fact that you remember your friend’s face after many years allows you to claim that the mind enjoys a memorizing function.
Before studying the relation between the mind and the body, we must return to the questions that we promised to answer; namely ‘Are there any differences between the mind and the soul?’ And if so, ‘What are these differences?’
According to Islamic philosophy sources, we can claim that for Ibn Sinà, Fakhr al-Din Ràzi, Nasir al-Din Tusi, Mullà Sadrà, and other philosophers, the mind is the soul itself. Here are some pieces of evidence that affirm the unity of the mind and the soul:
First of all, a glance at Islamic philosophy sources reveals that a great number of Muslim philosophers have ascribed the satisfactions of the mind to the soul. Furthermore, it appears that they use the words ‘mind’ and ‘soul’ interchangeably. For example, in one case we see that Ibn Sinà ascribes to the mind what he ascribes to the soul somewhere else. Fakhr al-Din Ràzi in one page attributes to the soul the specification that he does to the mind in the next line. Here is the translation of his expression:
That form is one which exists in a particular soul, so it has an existence in the external world. Therefore, things that apparently exist in the mind have also an existence in the external world. (Italics added) 
Nasir al-Din Tusi does the same, too. However, this can be more clearly seen in Mullà Sadrà, because in addition to ascribing to the soul the specification that he ascribes to the mind, he holds that human faculties and the soul are the same.  As soon as we realize this fact, we will see that all of the faculties that we ascribe to the mind also qualify the soul. So there is no other entity that enjoys the same faculties that the soul does.
Secondly, if the reader denies this and argues that the use of ‘the soul’ instead of ‘the mind’ is not enough in itself to affirm that the mind is the soul, we will reply that we can return to the arguments which we presented before to affirm the existence of the mind and see if those arguments can affirm an entity, namely, the mind, independently from the soul or not. Those arguments merely affirm the following:
(1) Universal conceptions do exist in some place that is not the external world, and we name that place ‘the mind’. (Inference from premise (3) and premise (5)), as in the first argument,
(2) Those extinctions do exist somewhere that we call ‘the mind’. (Inference from premise (3) and premise (4)), as in the second argument; and
(3) Non-existential things do exist somewhere that we call ‘the mind’. (Inference from premise (1) and premise (4)), as in the third.
In other words, there must be something in which the mental forms (‘universal conceptions’, as in the first argument, ‘some extinctions of the subject of verity-propositions’, as in the second argument, and ‘non-existential things’ as in the third) accrued. Now, one might ask: ‘Could the soul be the place in which mental forms accrue?’ The answer is ‘absolutely yes’, especially in Mullà Sadrà’s opinion. He held that human faculties and the soul are the same. Thus when the soul has several faculties that perform the same tasks as the mind, there will be no need to separate them from each other.
Lastly, if someone thinks about this issue carefully, he will find out that our position is exactly that of denying the existence of the mind. So far, the readers must have been convinced that in Islamic philosophy the mind is the soul itself.
After all, we can say that Muslim philosophers use the word ‘mind’ instead of ‘soul’ concerning various issues to refer to one aspect of the soul which is separate from the practical faculty. They have abstracted this concept from those faculties of the soul that manage knowledge by correspondence. Accordingly, in their writings, Muslim philosophers sometimes use the word ‘soul’, sometimes the word ‘mind’, and sometimes the term ‘specific faculties’.
Ibn Sinà, for example, has presented several discussions from which we can learn about the relationship between the mind and the body. He says:
The foundation of the stimulator faculty, the comprehension faculty, and the faculty of temperament is one thing that you can name the soul. This is the substance which is spread in all members of your body, and your body as a whole. This substance is one, and it is, indeed, you. It has minutiae and spreads the faculties in your members. 
Ibn Sinà continues to explain the interplay between the soul and the body. He holds that the soul influences the body and vice versa. He illustrates this point by instancing the bristle of one’s hair when experiencing God’s great presence. For him, the influence of the body’s custom on the soul to work easily is a good example representing the influence of the body on the soul. 
Nowadays, the relation between the mind and the external world is considered to be the most remarkable issue of epistemology. Yet, in order to understand this relation in Islamic philosophy, we should focus on the discussions which are related to the nature of knowledge by correspondence. In fact, the mind is recognized here as a mental being. Muslim philosophers have generally attempted to explain the nature of knowledge by correspondence or mental being from an ontological aspect; therefore, their explanation does not include the entire domain of the relationship between the mind and the external world. Thus almost all we describe to them are explained incidentally in their discussions about the nature of knowledge by correspondence.
Here, we will first classify the Islamic standpoints concerning this issue into three main groups, and then explain each of them.
Shams al-Din Isfahàni (died in 688/1289) believes,
We do not agree that what is ascribed to mental existence is the essence of the known; however, we believe that mental existence is its shadow and idea. Though this shadow and idea corresponds with the known, it is contrary to it. 
It is thought that if we claim that mental existence is the shadow of the known, we will reach skepticism, because it rejects the correspondence between the mental thing and the known. 
The second view belongs to Fakhr al-Din Ràzi. He thought that knowledge is the relation between the knower and the known object. He said, “We say that knowledge, comprehension, and awareness are relative issues.” Though some scholastic philosophers hold that knowledge is a specific relation between the knower and the known,  Mullà Sadrà rejects this approach. 
Most Muslim philosophers hold that knowledge is nothing but a mental form. Though the majority of them accept this idea, when they try to explain it, they do not agree with the same version of this thought. They do not pay attention to this subject partly because they are not familiar with its epistemological aspects. However, we can divide the interpretations of this line of thought into three groups, as illustrated bellow:
2-7-3-1 Essential explanation: Most Muslim philosophers hold that mental forms are those mental essences which correspond with external essences. However, mental essences differ from external essences in that the former lack external effects. Bahmanyàr (died in 485/1066) wrote, “You previously knew the reality of the intellectual and knew that it is nothing but the essence itself, such as whiteness.” 
2-7-3-2 Conceptual explanation: There is also another approach in Islamic philosophy texts. It should be noted that Muslim philosophers did not distinguish these approaches from each other; therefore, one can find more than one of these explanations in a philosopher’s works. Mullà Sadrà says, “What exists in the mind, namely, the concept of animal, exhumation, motion, heat, and the like are just the concepts of those things and their meanings, rather than their essences and realities.”
2-7-3-3 Conceptual-intentional explanation: Some contemporary professors, especially Qulamreza Fayyadi, believe that mental forms are, indeed, the concepts of those things whose intentional aspect is essential to them. In this view, mental forms include essences, being, and even non-being, not just the concepts of the essences, as other versions do. This explanation, however, is not a common one and has not yet been well explained. It is worth to find out whether this explanation is useful in solving epistemological problems or not. 
So far, we have illustrated the nature of the mind and its place in Islamic philosophy. Now and according to the subjects to which we referred previously, we can conclude the following:
(1) The best definition of the mind is: The mind is one aspect of the soul which manages knowledge, namely, the knowledge through the forms of things by correspondence.
(2) The specifications of the mind are those of the soul itself rather than those of the practical faculty.
(3) The arguments that demonstrate the existence of the mind, in fact, demonstrate the existence of the soul.
(4) The arguments that demonstrate the immateriality of the mind actually demonstrate the immateriality of the soul.
(5) We must, indeed, ascribe the functions of the mind to the soul.
(6) The relationship between the mind and the body is like the one between the soul and the body itself.
(7) The relationship between the mind and the external world is, indeed, like the one between the soul and the external world.
(8) Finally, following Murtazà Mutahhari’s idea, quoted in the outset of this paper, we must say that we cannot comprehend knowledge if we do not know the soul.
. Mutahhari, Murtazà, Sharh mabsut manzumah, vol. 1, p. 368. Tehran: Hikmat Publications, 1366 AS.
. Nevertheless, we must pay attention that when we study epistemological issues, we should not confuse the judgments about the functions of the mind with those about the epistemological validity of conceptions.
. For example, Mullà Sadrà defined the soul in three different ways. See:
- Sadr al-muta’allihin, al-Hikmat al-muta‘àliyah fi’l-asfàr al-‘aqliyyat al-arba‘ah, 4th edition, vol. 3, p. 15. Beirut: Dar al-Ehya al-Arabi, 1410 AH.
- Ibid., pp. 515-516. Also see, Sadr al-muta’allihin, Mafàtih al-ghayb, edited by Muhammed Khawansàri, p. 138. Tehran: Studies and Cultural Research Institute, 1363 AS.
- Sadr al-muta’allihin, al-Hikmat al-muta‘àliyah fi’l-asfàr al-‘aqliyyat al-arba‘ah, vol. 4, p. 251.
. Sadr al-muta’allihin, Ibid., vol. 4, p. 251.
. Làhiji, ‘Abd al-Razzàq, Shawàriq al-ilhàm, annotated by Aqà ‘Ali Mudarras, p. 54. Tehran: Fàràbi Library.
. Tawhidi, Abu Hayyàn, al-Muqàbisàt, edited by Muhammed Tawfiq Hossein, p. 362. Tehran: Academic Publication Center, 1366 AS.
. Al-Fàràbi, Abu Nasr, Muntazi‘h fusul, edited by Fowzi Metri Najjàr, 2nd edition, pp. 58-59. Tehran: Al-Zahra Publications, 1405 AH.
. Jurjàni, Mir Sayyid Sharif, al-Kubrà fi’l-mantiq, pp. 21-23. Qum: Office for Expanding Islamic Teaching, 1369 AS.
. Làhiji, ‘Abd al-Razzàq, Gohar murad, edited by Zayn al-‘Abidin Qurbani, p. 54. Tehran: Publishing Organization of the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, 1372 AS.
. Ibn Sinà, al-Shifà’, al-Burhan Book, p. 259. Egypt: Vizarat al-Tarbiat wa’l Ta‘lim, 1375 AH.
. Jurjàni, Mir Sayyid Sharif, Kitàb al-Ta‘rifàt, 3rd edition, p. 108. Beirut: Dar al-Kitab al-‘Ilmiih, 1408 AH.
. Ibn Sinà, al-Ta‘liqàt, investigated by ‘Abd al-Rahmàn Badavi, p. 64. Cairo: al-Heia’t al-Mesri al-‘Amih lil-Kitab, 1392 AH.
. Tusi, Khwàjah Nasir al-Din, Sharh al-ishàràt wa’l-tanbihàt, 3rd edition. vol. 2, p. 359. Tehran: Daftar Nashr al-Kitab, 1403 AH.
. Allàmah Hilli, al-Jawhr al-nazid, al-Tasawwur wa’l-tasdiq Risàlah, p. 314. Qum: Bidar Publications, 1363 AS.
. Yet, according to Mullà Sadrà, when we say that this thing exists in the external world and that thing exists in the mind, we do not mean that the mind is a place, space, or locus, but we mean that things have existences which lack external repercussions.
. Ibn Sinà, al-Shifà’, al-Mantiq part, vol. 1, p. 259. Qum: Maktab al-Mara‘shi al-Najafi, 1405 AH.
. Tusi, Khwàjah Nasir al-Din, Ibid.
. Allàmah Hilli, Ibid., p. 324.
. Làhiji, ‘Abd al-Razzàq, Shawàriq al-ilhàm, p. 71.
. Ibn Sinà, al-Shifà’, p. 23.
. Yazdi, Mullà ‘Abdullàh, al-Hàshiyah ‘ala Tahdhib al-mantiq, 10th edition, p. 19. Qum: Islamic Publications Institute, 1424 AH.
. Sadr al-muta’allihin, Ibid., vol. 1, p. 332.
. Fakhr al-Din Ràzi (died in 606/1017) denies this faculty. See:
- Fakhr Ràzi, Sharh ‘Uyun al-hikmah, investigated by Ahmad Hijàzi, vol. 2, p. 249. Tehran: al-Sadiq Institute, 1373 AS.
And Mullà Sadrà interprets it as a rational faculty. See:
- Sadr al-muta’allihin, Ibid., vol. 8, p. 217.
. For a more detailed explanation, see:
- Tusi, Khwàjah Nasir al-Din, Ibid., p. 331.
. Ibn Sinà, al-Ta‘liqàt, p. 183.
. Allàmah Hilli, Kashf al-muràd fi sharh tajrid al-i‘tiqàd, edited by Hassanzadeh, p. 28. Qum: Islamic Publications, 1363 AS.
. Sadr al-muta’allihin, Ibid., vol. 1, p. 268.
. Suhrawardi, Shahàb al-Din, Majmuih musannafàt Shaykh Ishràq, investigated by Henry Corbin, vol. 2, p. 100. Tehran: Iranian Society of Philosophy, 1397 AH.
. Ibid., p. 15. Also see Ibn Sinà, al-Ta‘liqàt, p. 69.
. Ibn Sinà, al-Shifà’, p. 259; Allàmah Hilli, al-Jawhar al-nazid, p. 312; Sabziwàri, Sharh al-manzumah, annotated by Hassanzadeh, 2nd edition, vol. 2, p. 124. Qum: Nab Publication, 1380 AS.
. Tusi, Khwàjah Nasir, Ibid., p. 331.
. Ràzi, Fakhr al-Din, al-Mabàhith al-mashriqiyyah, vol. 1, p. 338. Tehran: Maktabah al-Asadi, 1966.
. Sadr al-muta’allihin, Ibid., p. 370.
. Sadr al-muta’allihin, Ibid., vol. 8, p. 221.
. Tusi, Khwàjah Nasir al-Din, Ibid., p. 302.
. Ibid., p. 307.
Mullà Sadrà provides the following example to illustrate the influence of the body on the soul: “Your image of ‘sour’ affects you.” See: Sadr al-muta’allihin, Ibid., vol. 1, p. 275.
. Isfahàni, Shams al-Din, Matàli‘ al-anzàr ‘ala tawàli‘ al-anwàr, p. 211. India: Shirkat Elmieh, 1305 AH.
. You can find these objections in: Sadr al-muta’allihin, Ibid., vol. 1, p. 314.
. Ràzi, Fakhr al-Din, Ibid., p. 331.
. Ràzi, Qutb al-Din and others, Shuruh al-shamsyyah, p. 60. Egypt: Shirkat Shams al-Shumus, Bita.
. Sadr al-muta’allihin, Ibid., vol. 1, p. 291.
. Bahmanyàr, al-Tahsil, edited by Murtazà Mutahhari, p. 745. Tehran: Tehran University Press, 1349 AS.
It should be noted that he has also referred to the conceptual-intentional explanation and written, “Their existence for us consists of their affections.” See: Ibid., p. 403.
. Sadr al-muta’allihin, Ibid., vol. 1, p. 291.
. More detailed discussions can be found in:
- A philosophical talk on epistemology by Muhammed Taqi Misbàh Yazdi, Ahmad Ahmadi, Muhammed Liginhawzen and Gholamreza Fayyadi is available.
- ‘Abbas ‘Arifi, “Compalibity of Mental Forms with the External World”, p. 90. Teaching and Research Institute of Imam Khomeini, Qum.