THE NATURE OF MIND/ PAGE 1
By:Hassan Abdi
This paper tries to give a brief explanation of mind and its function from Islamic philosophy point of view. We can divide the questions to which this paper answers, into two groups: primary questions and secondary questions. The primary questions are:
1- What is mind? Or what is the definition of mind?
2- Is there any thing that conforms to that definition? Or does mind exist?
And the secondary questions are:
1- What makes knowledge of mind necessary?
2- What are mental faculties?
3- How does mind work?
4- Does mind have stages or not?
5- Is mind immaterial? And if so, what are the reasons upon which the immateriality of mind can be demonstrated?
Now, to answer the questions above, we organize the paper in this way:
1- Preface: the necessity of knowing mind
2- Subject matter:
2-1 The definition of mind
2-2 The specifications of mind
2-3 Demonstration of the existence of mind
2-4 Demonstration of the immateriality of mind
2-5 The functions of Mind
2-6 The relationship between mind and body
2-7 The relationship between mind and external world
3- Ending: conclusions
1- Preface: the necessity of knowing mind
The necessity of knowing mind will be very obvious if we note that it is the mind that produces or receives all of our conceptions. In other words we know what we know about the external word through the mind. So any information about mind will help us to know how much of our conceptions are real and how much of them are not. In another aspect, by knowing how mind works we shall easily analyze various philosophical conceptions, such as causality, possibility, and existence. This fact will be very useful for dissolution of philosophical problems. Murtada Mutahhari (d. 1402/1980) sided that: “we cannot understand knowledge if we do not know the mind”1 (Epistemological aspect)2.
On the other hand, if we accept that philosophy discusses the universal judgments about existence, such as division of existence into external existence and mental existence, knowing mind should help us in one of the main philosophical subjects (Ontological aspect).
2- Subject matter
2-1 The definition of mind
Having a glance at the Islamic philosophical sources, we can find several definitions of mind. These definitions vary from one philosopher to another. Furthermore some philosophers have defined mind in several ways3. According to the limitation of these definitions, we classify them in four classes as mentioned below:
2-1-1 The human soul; as for example in Sadr al-Mutaallihin (d. 1050/1640): “the human soul is mind”1, and in Abd al-Razzaq al-lahiji (d. 1072/1662): “the mind, namely rational soul, does exist in the external world …”2.
2-1-2 What include both knowledge by presence and knowledge by correspondence; as for example in Abu Hayyan al-Tohidi (d. 403/1012): “It is said that: what is mind? The answer is: the good specification of things3. Or as in al-Farabi (d. 339/945): “mind is the power of identifying true judgments from a set of involved opinions and the faculty of correcting it”4. As a matter of fact in both of knowledge by presence and knowledge by correspondence we can identify true judgments from a set of involved opinions. So this class of definition includes these two kinds of knowledge.
2-1-3 What includes only knowledge by correspondence; such as the definition of mind which is given by al-Jurjani (d.808/1405): “Do know that human being has comprehensive faculty that the forms of things impressed in it, as in the mirror, … every form that is accrued in human’s comprehensive faculty, which is named mind, is ether conception or acknowledgment”1 And Abd al-Razzaq al-lahiji (d. 1072/1662)’s second definition in another work where he says that: “mind is the faculty and the instrument that the forms of things are accrued in it”2.
2-1-4 Speculative knowledge by correspondence; For example Avicenna (d. 428/1037) says that: “mind is a faculty for the Soul, which makes the Soul ready for acquiring definitions and opinions”3. And for al-Jurjani (d.808/1405): “mind is the full preparedness for comprehension of sciences and gnostic knowledge by thinking”4. There is something about this class of definition and it is that self-evident knowledge is not to be obtained through thinking, so this class does not include evident knowledge.
Here is a scheme that shows the limitations of these definitions:
However, what is this called mind and which of these definitions can we take as the correct definition about mind? To answer this question we should turn to the Islamic philosophy sources and see if Muslim philosopher ascribed any specifications to mind or not?
2-2 The specifications of mind
Muslim philosophers in a few stray statements have mentioned to several specifications of mind. By searching in Islamic philosophy sources we find no less than five specifications for mind. These are:
2-2-1 The place for mental forms; a lot of Moslem philosophers mentioned to this specification. For Avicenna (d. 428/1037)1, Nasir al-din al-Tusi (d. 672/1071)2, Sadr al-Mutaallihin (d. 1050/1640)3 and other philosophers mind is a place for mental forms.4
2-2-2 Exploratory movements to the known for obtaining the unknown; Avicenna (d. 428/1037) held that: “thinking is the movement of mind to the principles for obtaining the quests”.5 We con find this matter in Nasir al-din al-Tusi (d. 672/1071)1, Sadr al-Mutaallihin (d. 1050/1640)2.
2-2-3 Possession of stages; though the fact that mind’s stages have main role in philosophical problems, especially in epistemological ones, Muslim philosophers have mentioned to this fact incidentally. In this ground, if you search in the Islamic philosophy courses you would find that Muslim philosophers have talked about secondary intellectual concepts and have explained them in the way that refers to this specify of mind. Abd al-Razzaq al-lahiji (d. 1072/1662), above all, clarified this subject and assumed: The intellect abstracts it [secondary intellectual concept] from the essence that exists in mind from the respect of its existence in mind not from the respect of its existence in external world3. This expression obviously states that the intellect (one side of mind) abstracts secondary intellectual concept from the respect of its existence in mind (another side of mind), therefore we can conclude that mind has several stages. Avicenna (d. 428/1037)4, Sad al-din al-Taftazani (d.792/1188)5, Sadr al-Mutaallihin (d. 1050/1640)1 and other philosophers have mentioned to this theme too.
2-2-4 Having faculties; Mind has several faculties the common specification of which has contact with mental forms. These faculties can be divided into three sets: external senses, internal senses, and theoretical intellect. Here is some explanation about each of them:
2-2-4-1 External senses; every human being has five external senses, namely touch, vision, hearing, smell, and taste. Notes that every sense has its own instrument for sense. For instance the eye is considered as an instrument for vision, ear is in the role of instrument for hearing, and so on.
2-2-4-2 Internal senses; though do not agree on especial number, Muslim philosophers counted five internal senses for human being. These are: common sense, imaginal faculty, estimate faculty2, retentive faculty, and dominant faculty.
2-2-4-3 Theoretical intellect; the task of this faculty is to abstract universal conceptions from particular conceptions received previously by other faculties.3
According to these specifications mind must be an entity that:
(1) is the place for mental forms,
(2) has exploratory movements to the known for obtaining the unknown,
(3) possesses stages,
(4) have faculties.
Obviously such specifications are well coincide with the divination of mind as the Soul, because as we indicate lately it is the Soul that has several faculties. But here arises another problem. Is there any difference between mind and the Soul? If so, what is/are the difference/the difference? To answer to this question we first study the arguments that are adduced to demonstrate the existence and the immorality of mind then we will try to explain the functions of mind and after that we would return to answer this question.
2-3 Demonstration of the existence of mind
Traditionally the first argument given for demonstration of existence of mind has developed by Avicenna (d. 428/1037). He has said that: “the universal conceptions are not in external world but in mind”1. The logical form of this argument is as follows:
(1) We comprehend universal conception. (Self-evident premise)
(2) Every conception that we comprehend exists. (Self-evident premise)
(3) Universal conception exists. (Inference from premise (1) and premise (2))
(4) Every thing that exists in the external world is particular. (Self-evident premise)
(5) Universal conception does not exist in the external world. (Inference from premise (3) and premise (4))
(6) Universal conception does exist in some place that is not the external world and we name that place “mind”. (Inference from premise (3) and premise (5))
Nasir al-din al-Tusi (d. 672/1071) has given the second argument: “And it [existence] is divided into mental and external otherwise verity-proposition would be wrong”1. The logical form of this argument is as follows:
(1) There are verity-propositions that are true. (Self-evident premise)
(2) The realization of a state or attribute for a thing requires the realization of the thing itself. (Self-evident premise)
(3) The truth of positive propositions requires the existence of their subject. (Inference from premise (1) and premise (2))
(4) Some extinctions of the subject of verity-propositions do not exist in the external world. (Self-evident premise)
(5) Those extinctions do exist somewhere we name it “mind”. (Inference from premise (3) and premise (4))
And now we organize in logical form the third argument, which was given by Sadr al-Mutaallihin (d. 1050/1640) in his great work1 as follows:
(1) We conceive several non-existential things. (Self-evident premise)
(2) We diversify these non-existential things from each other. (Self-evident premise)
(3) The diversification of nonbeing is impossible (Self-evident premise)
(4) The diversification of non-existential thing that does not exist at all is impossible. (Inference from premise (2) and premise (3))
(5) Non-existential things do exist somewhere we name it “mind”. (Inference from premise (1) and premise (4))
So far we arrive at the conclusion that there is some existent, which is not external and contains non-existential things, extinctions of the subject of verity-propositions and universal conceptions.
2-4 Demonstration of the immateriality of mind;
Though Muslim philosophers hold that mind is an immaterial being but by searching in Islamic philosophy sources, one can hardly ever find an argument for demonstration of immateriality of mind. So it should be noted that all of argument to which we mention here could be inferred from the whole of the topics which Muslim philosophers expressed. The first argument is so:
(1) Every thing that is material has these three specifications: being divisible, being in time and being in space. (Premise upon the definition of material being)
(2) Mental forms cannot be divided. (Self-evident premise)
(3) Mental forms do not have these specifications. (Inference from premise (1) and premise (2))
(4) Every thing that does not have the specifications of material is not material. (Conversion by contradiction of premise (1))
(5) Mental forms are not material. (Inference from premise (3) and premise (4))
(6) Mind is place of the mental forms. (According to the conclusion of the third argument for demonstration of existence of mind)
(7) The place of any thing from the respect of division is subordinate to its accidents. (Self-evident premise)
(8) Every thing that is place of undividable things cannot be divided too. (Inference from premise (6) and premise (7))
(9) Mind cannot be divided. (Inference from premise (6) and premise (8))
(10) Mind does not have the specifications of material. ((Inference from premise (1) and premise (9))
(11) Mind is not material. (Inference from premise (4) and premise (10))
(12) Mind is immaterial. (The obversion of premise (11))
The second argument can be organized as follows:
(1) We comprehend big and great things, such as mountains and a sea, in our mind. (Self-evident premise)
(2) If what we comprehend were material, this would require that mind includes the mountains and a sea. (According to the premise (1))
(3) Mind is smaller than any mountain and a sea. (Self-evident premise)
(4) The impression of the big in the small is impossible. (Self-evident premise)
(5) If mind includes the mountains and a sea, this would require the impression of the big in the small. (Inference from premise (2) and premise (3))
(6) Mind does not include the mountains and a sea. (Inference from premise (5) and premise (4))
(7) What we comprehend is not material. (Inference from premise (2) and premise (6))
(8) What we comprehend is immaterial. (The obversion of premise (7))
(9) We comprehend immaterial things, such as mountains and a sea, in our mind. (Inference from premise (1) and premise (8))
(10) The accident of any thing from the respect of division is subordinate to its place. (Self-evident premise)
(11) If mind were material it would be possible to divide what we comprehend. (Inference from premise (10) and upon the definition of material being)
(12) It is impossible to divide what we comprehend. (Inference from premise (8) and upon the definition of material being)
(13) Mind is not material. (Inference from premise (11) and premise (12))
(12) Mind is immaterial. (The obversion of premise (13))1
Thus far we demonstrated the existence and immateriality of mind. At the moment through having a glance at the Islamic philosophical sources we try to discover the functions of mind.
2-5 The functions of Mind
The functions of mind can be classified in three ways: affection, action, and memorizing.
2-5-1 Affection1; when an eye faces an external object become affected from it and through this affection a form of that object is accrued in mind. So mind becomes affected from the external object too.
2-5-2 Action2; In this case mind after being affected by the external objects tries to generate a new conception. To do so mind considers two external objects, such as a crow and a wall in a situation that the crow is standing on the wall, mind compares the crow to the wall and abstracts from this situation the concept of ‘abovenees’. Here mind generates new conception. Many mental conceptions have been obtained through the action. These conceptions have an important role in philosophy and other intellectual realms.
2-5-3 Memorizing3; suppose that you are walking in a street, suddenly you face a man whose face is very familiar for you. Then you know your friend. This fact that you remember your friend’s face after many years leads us to clime that mind a memorizing function.
Now and before studying the relation between mind and body we must return to the questions, which we promised to answer, namely “Is there any difference between mind and the Soul? If so, what is/are the difference/the difference?”
According to the mine Islamic philosophical sources we can clime that for Avicenna (d. 428/1037), Fakhr al-din al-Razi (d. 606/1017), Nasir al-din al-Tusi (d. 672/1071) as well as Sadr al-Mutaallihin (d. 1050/1640), and other philosophers mind is the Soul itself. Here are some evidences that affirm the unity of mind and the Soul:
First of all, by having a glance at the Islamic philosophical sources, one can easily find out that many of Moslem philosophers have ascribed the satisfactions of mind to the Soul. Furthermore it looks like as if they use the word ‘mind’ instead of the word ‘soul’ and visa versa. For example, in one case we see that Avicenna (d. 428/1037) have ascribed to mind what he have ascribed to the Soul somewhere else. Fakhr al-din al-Razi (d. 606/1017) in one page ascribes to the Soul the specification that ascribes to mind in the next line. Here is the translation of his expression: “That form is the form, which exists in a particular soul so it has an existence in external world therefore things from the face that exist in mind have existence in external world”. (Italics added)1
And Nasir al-din al-Tusi (d. 672/1071) has done so too. However, this fact became very clear in Sadr al-Mutaallihin (d. 1050/1640), because in addition to the fact that he also ascribes to the Soul the specification that have ascribed to mind1, he hold that human’s faculties and the Soul are the same2. As soon as we realize this fact we will understand that all of the faculties that we have ascribed to mind are indeed of the Soul. So there is not an entity, which has some faculties other than the Soul.
Secondly, if the reader denies this subject and argues that the use of ‘the Soul’ instead of ‘mind’ in itself is not enough to affirms that mind is the Soul, we would reply that we can return to the arguments which we have presented before to affirm the existence of mind and see if those arguments can affirm an entity, namely mind, independent from the Soul or not. All of what those arguments did affirmed was so:
(6) Universal conception does exist in some place that is not the external world and we name that place “mind”. (Inference from premise (3) and premise (5)), as in the first argument,
(5) Those extinctions do exist somewhere we name it “mind”. (Inference from premise (3) and premise (4)), as in the second argument, and
(5) Non-existential things do exist somewhere we name it “mind”. (Inference from premise (1) and premise (4)), as in the third.
In other words, there must be something that the mental forms (‘Universal conception’ as in the first argument, ‘Some extinctions of the subject of verity-propositions’ as in the second argument, and ‘Non-existential things’ as in the third) accrued in it. Now, we ask: Could the Soul be the place that mental forms accrued in it? Absolutely can, especially on Sadr al-Mutaallihin (d. 1050/1640)’s opinion; he hold that human’s faculties and the Soul are the same. So when the Soul has several faculties that act tasks of mind, there will be no need to an independent entity.
Lastly, if someone thinks of this fact carefully will find that the position is exactly the same as we deny the existence of mind. So far, you must be able to hold that in Islamic philosophy mind is the Soul itself.
After all, we can say that Moslem philosophers in various issues instead of using the word soul have created the word mind to mention to one aspect of the Soul, which is separated from practical faculty. They abstracted this concept from those faculties of the Soul that manage knowledge by correspondence. Given that, in their writings Moslem philosophers use ‘the Soul’ somewhere and ‘mind’ somewhere else and ‘specific faculties’ in the third.
2-6 The relationship between mind and body;
Avicenna (d. 428/1037), for example, has presented several subjects through which we can obtain what relationship between mind and body is. The translation of his words is so: “The foundation of stimulator faculty, faculty of comprehension and faculty of keeper of temperament is another thing, you can name it the Soul, and this is the substance which is spread in members of your body then in your body and this substance is one and indeed it is you, and it has minutiae, namely spread faculties in your members”1. Avicenna (d. 428/1037) continues to explain the interplaying relation between the Soul and body. He holds that the Soul influence on body and body influence on the Soul too. He instances the bristle of one’s hair when meeting experience of God’s great presence, for the influence of the Soul on body. For him the influence of body’s custom on the Soul to work easily is an example for the influence of body on the Soul2.
2-7 The relationship between mind and external world
Nowadays the problem of the relationship between mind and external world is considered as the most remarkable problem in Epistemology. Yet to understand the relationship between mind and external world from Islamic philosophy point of view we should focus on those discusses which are about the nature of knowledge by correspondence. Probably the reader understands the reason that forces us to focus on these discusses. Actually, in this grand mind is recognized as a mental being. Moslem philosophers have generally attempted to explain the nature of knowledge by correspondence or mental being from ontological aspect, so their explanation does not include the entire domain of the relationship between mind and external world. Therefore nearly all of what we describe to them are explained incidentally in their discusses about the nature of knowledge by correspondence.
Here we first classify the Islamic standpoints toward this issue into three mine classes then explained each of them.
2-7-1 Explanation of shadow
Shams al-din al-Assfahani (d. 688/1289) believes that: “we do not accept that what is ascribed to the mental existence is the essence of the known thing, however, the mental existence is the shadow and idea of the known thing. Though this shadow and idea is correspondent with the known, it is contrary to it”1. It is thought that if we clime that the mental existence is the shadow of the known thing it will lead us to skepticism, because it rejects the correspondence between the mental thing and the known thing.2
2-7-2 Explanation of relation
The second standpoint is that of Fakhr al-din al-Razi (d. 606/1017). He thought that knowledge is the relation between the knower and the known object. Here is his plain word: “Chapter six; the study of the true view on knowledge, we say that knowledge and comprehension and awareness are relative cases”.1 Though some of scholastic philosophers hold that knowledge is a specific relation between the knower and the known object 2, Sadr al-Mutaallihin (d. 1050/1640) has rejected this approach.3
2-7-3 Explanation of mental forms
Most of Moslem philosophers hold that knowledge is nothing but mental form. Though the majority of them accepted this standpoint but when they are going to explain this idea they do not agree with the same version of the thought. They did not pay attention to this subject partly because they were not familiars with epistemological aspect of the subject. However we can divide the interpretations of this line of the thought into three groups as illustrated bellow:
2-7-3-1 Essential explanation; most of Moslem philosophers holds that the mental forms are mental essences, which are correspondent with the external essences, but mental essences differ from external essences in the fact that mental essences do not have external effects. Bahmanyar (d. 485/ 1066) has written that: “you previously knew the reality of the intellectual and knew that it is nothing but the essence itself, such as whiteness”.1
2-7-3-2 Conceptual explanation; in Islamic curses we can find another approach. It should be note that Moslem philosophers did not distinguish these approaches one from the other therefore one can find more then one of these explanations in a philosopher’s works. Here is the translation of Sadr al-Mutaallihin (d. 1050/1640)’s words: “what exists in mind namely the concept of animal, exhumation, motion, heat and so on are just the concepts of those things and their meaning not their essences and realities2.
2-7-3-3 Conceptual-Intentional explanation; some contemporary professors, especially Ghollamreza Fayyazi, believe that mental forms, indeed, are concepts of things whose intentional aspect is essential to them. In this view mental forms included essences, being, and even nonbeing not just the concepts of the essences, as other versions hold. This explanation, however, is not the common one and is not explained very well yet. It is worth to study and find out that if this explanation is useful in solving epistemological problems, as it looks like, or not.1
3- Ending: conclusions
So far we have illustrated the nature of mind and its place in Islamic philosophy. Now and according to the subjects to which we mentioned previously we could conclude that:
(1) The best definition of the mind is so:
Mind is one aspect of the Soul, which manages knowledge by correspondence, namely the knowledge through the forms of thing.
(2) The specifications of mind are those of the Soul itself other than practical faculty.
(3) The arguments that demonstrate the existence of mind, in fact, do demonstrate the existence of the Soul.
(4) The arguments that demonstrate the immateriality of mind actually demonstrate the immateriality of the Soul.
(5) We must indeed ascribe mind’s function to the Soul.
(6) The relationship between mind and body is the relationship between the Soul and body itself.
(7) The relationship between mind and external world is indeed the relationship between the Soul and external world.
(8) And finally, as an explanation to Murtada Mutahhari (d. 1402/1980)’s idea, which was quoted in the beginning of this paper, we con not comprehend knowledge if we do not know the Soul.
Finally I want to thank Dr. Mohammad Legenhausen for giving me a pamphlet, which help me to write this paper.
© Copyright 2006 SIPRIn. All Rights Reserved.
