Mulla Sadra’s Life, works, and Philosophy

Prof. S. M. Khamenei

 

His other famous decree, which was also against the common decrees of that time, stated that the unclean (mutinajjis) thing, unlike the agent of uncleanliness, does not transfer uncleanliness. After narrating all the related hadiths in this regard, he provides a justification for this decree which is worth reading.[1]

In voicing his ideas and decrees, Faydh employs a judgmental (ijtihadi), brave, inferential, and rational (and philosophical) tone of language rather than a traditional (akhbari), biased, challenging, and imitative one.

While giving his decrees, which are equipped with a jurisprudential and Shi’i judgmental logic, Faydh blames other jurisprudents who, due to caution or fear of illusive kinds of publicity or consensuses in jurisprudence, spread the dust of obscurity over God’s true principles, calls them imitators, and believes that they are caught up in the chain of imitation and blind adherence to others.

He has also some other decrees which are in contrast to the generally believed and dominant ideas of his time. Some of them include the essential purity of the people of the Book, the purity of the grape-juice after boiling, and the purity of the tanned skin of the dead, which are all supported by traditions and technical and jurisprudential reasoning.

It seems that in the light of his liberal thinking and innovations in jurisprudence, in addition to complying with his obligation as to exertion, Faydh wished to create a change in the jurisprudential method of his cotemporaries and alert them that observing caution does not always mean being cautious. Rather, it might sometimes be a deviation from the Divine principles and a clear reference for the holy verse: “… If any do fail to judge by (the light of) what Allah hath revealed, they are no better than unbelievers.” (Maidah Chapter: Verse 44). He also emphasized that pure commitment to the decrees given by preceding jurisprudents is beyond exertion and a kind of imitation.

However, these very scholarly braveries made Faydh the target of excommunication and reprimand so that even in later years and periods some thinkers avoided his ideas and works. An example of such pessimistic conducts is a letter written by a person called Mulla Ali Mazandarani, nicknamed as Rukn, to Muhaqqiq Qumi (the writer of Qawanin). In this letter, in addition to asking about gnostics such as Muhyaddin, Attar, Bayazid, and Rumi and wondering about the admissibility or non-admissibility of imprecating them, Rukn asked for some information about Akhund Mulla Muhsin Faydh, who had related the above verse to jurisprudents in safinat al-nijat.

In response, Muhaqqiq Qumi wrote: “This question is different from others and Akhund Mulla Muhsen’s sarcasm of jurisprudents is not rooted in religious beliefs… However, he frequently uses sarcasm when talking about jurisprudents … The reason is that in Akhund’s view, Imamiyyah jurisprudents, like the Sunnis, act on the basis of analogy and preference regarding fundamental principles…He has a lot of statements like this … The truth is that attributing such qualities to our scholars is wrong; they never follow the Sunnis and their principles in their acts, except for a few of Ashab scholars, such as Ibn-Junayd …In sum, he has numerous mistakes and negligences (?!) in his Mafatih, which cannot be mentioned here. Anyone with just a little knowledge of jurisprudence and Shi’ism knows that his decrees are baseless, and it is him, rather than jurisprudents, who acts through analogy …[2]

The existence of such claims and judgments, and possibly reprimands and insults, even one century after Faydh, shows the depth of these disagreements and conflicts and clearly portrays the features of Faydh and Mulla Sadra’s time.

*  *  *

Some thinkers judge Faydh as a jurisprudent who goes to extremes in following wisdom and reasoning and believe that, unlike what he says, he is a man of analogy and juristic preference and, naturally, against tradition in practice. By contrast, some others believe that his jurisprudence is far from research and reasoning and introduce him as a biased traditionist similar to literalists (Hashwiyyah) and Dahirites. In a treatise written on rejecting the objective necessity of the Friday Prayer, one of the members of this misguided group has written:

Mulla Muhsin Kashi, who is a literalist, has nothing to do with research and scrutiny; he sometimes follows Muhyaddin Arabi, sometimes preaches like Mohammed Gazzali, sometimes walks in the same path with Peripatetic philosophers, and sometimes traverses the way in the light of the niche of Ishraqi gnostics. He does not fear opposition with companions (ashab) and records whatever he gathers through eclecticism and plagiarism tactlessly in his books.[3]

The above quotation reveals the low level of its writer’s knowledge, piety, and understanding. He seems to have an immense ability in bringing mutually exclusive contraries together, and making Faydh a target of his ill-speaking and accusations. He not only considers Faydh strange to jurisprudence and a man of Hashwiyyah and Daheriyyah, but also introduces him as a Batini and a man of esoteric exegesis (ta’wil) like sufis and accuses him of false sufism.

One of the common accusations advanced against Faydh, as we saw in Mirza Qumi’s Rukniyyah treatise, was his sufism and ascetism (calender life). However, we know that Faydh and his master, Mulla Sadra, were among the scholars and philosophers who wrote critical books on sufism; for example, In his Kasr asnam al-jahiliyyah, Mulla Sadra has severely criticized sufism, and Faydh has denounced sufis every where, but, as the common tradition goes, when bringing slanders against someone or misjudging him, people sometimes even fail to see the mountain and some other times blow something all out of proportion through the magic of words.

Like his teacher, due to his mastery over different sciences and teachings, Faydh knew theology like theologians, the Peripatetic and Ishraqi schools of philosophy like philosophers, and the secrets and terminology of sufism like sufis. Moreover, like jurisprudents and scholars of hadiths (Muhaddithah), he was well-versed in hadith and a man of exertion (ijtihad). However, his heart was always with the Holy Qur’an, and he was a carrier and transmitter of this heavenly Book. He, himself, says:

I am neither a theologian nor a philosopher, neither a sufi nor an adulator; rather, I am an imitator and follower of hadith, the Qur’an, the Prophet (pbuh), and his descendants. I am fed up with the bewildering words of the four-fold sects and strange with what is other than the Holy Qur’an and the hadiths of the people of the Prophet’s house. Every thing I have read has left my mind except for the hadith of friend, which I repeat all the time.[4]

Such slanders have also been brought against Mulla Mohammed Taqi Majlisi (the father of the writer of Bahar al-anwar) and the like, and as long as the power is in hands of pseudo-scholar laymen, we will witness and hear such accusations over and over again.

*  *  *

Although he was not a sufi in the common sense of that time, he had a great share of gnosis in the sense expressed in the legacy of the Prophet’s descendants. He was, in fact, the true heir of his master, Mulla Sadra, and a link in an anonymous dynasty which had descended in wisdom from the holy Prophet (pbuh), Imam Ali (AS) (the Leader of the Believers and the commander of the Faithful), and his infallible children, who had been appointed to his Imamat (leadership). People of Knowledge are well-aware that the Qur’an and, particularly, the Shi’i hadiths are overflowing with supreme gnostic ideas and purports on the Divine oneness in essence, attributes, acts, beauty, glory, and majesty; concepts that the Platonistic and Ishraqi schools of gnosis cannot compete with even in their most sublime form.

It is not just an accident that a great number of pioneers of Islamic gnosis consisted of well-known muhadiths (traditionists) and jurisprudents of the history of jurisprudents and hadith, and this historical phenomenon can be observed not only in Shi’i schools of jurisprudence but also in non- Shi’i ones. From among the great muhadiths of non-Shi’i mysticism, we can refer to Muhyaddin Ibn Arabi, the gnostic and the founder of some particular gnostic manners. The reason here might have been that, unlike what naïve and ignorant people believe, gnosis and hadith are not contraries; rather, they are complementary, and the true gnosis should be considered the same as the teachings that have been originated from the hadiths of the Prophet (pbuh) and his descendants. One could perceive the true meaning of hadith only when he views the words of those holy rays with the eyes of a gnostic rather than with childish and ordinary ones.

In Risalat al-insaf Faydh says,

Whosoever abandons the path of the Qur’an and hadiths of the Prophet’s descendants in his way towards obtaining knowledge and follows any of these groups, he has lost the right path… I could only seek the right path through following the light of the Book and Sunna (the Prophet’s Rule). I have never followed anyone but the people of the Prophet’s house and despise any way other that.

Abstracts 

Knowledge by Presence or Acquired Knowledge

 Muhammad Taqi Faali

 In first division, knowledge is divided into two types: acquired knowledge and knowledge by presence. In this paper, by distinguishing between two levels of definition and realization – two questions are asked. The basic question posed at the first level is: “what is the source of difference between knowledge by presence and acquired knowledge?” Different views have been presented in response to this question. The other question is: “Is the basis for dividing knowledge into these two types a rational or an inductive one?” According to philosophers, restricting knowledge into presential and acquired types is a rational restriction, and this division is a restrictive one. The study of the characteristics and types of knowledge by presence is done at the level of definition. However, at the level of realization and when demonstrating either the presential or the acquired knowledge, the question is whether man’s knowledge is of the acquired type or the presential type or a combination of both of them. Three views are presented in response to this question.

 

Key Terms

knowledge                                                acquired knowledge

knowledge by presence                           known by essence

known by accident                                   mental form

intermediary                                            special faculty

A Comparative Study of Motion in Aristotelian and Transcendent Philosophies

Abbas Shaykh Shoa’i

 All philosophers agree on the principle of the existence of motion. Since motion belongs to the category of philosophical secondary intelligibles, it is not definable in terms of limits or imprints; however, we might be able to explain it with respect to its gradual change.

In Aristotle’s view, there exists a kind of motion without a beginning and an end, and it is the circular motion of spheres, which is perpetual, continuous, and eternal, but all other motions have a beginning and an end. In Mulla Sadra’s view, too, motion is eternal and limitless; however, his view of pre-eternal and eternal is bases on the trans-substantial motion. In some places he speaks about the continuity and subsistence of spherical motion on the basis of the principles advocated by his preceding philosophers; nevertheless, he emphasizes that what he means here is horizontal motion and, then, presents his ultimate view of trans-substantial motion.

 Key Terms

motion                                                      Aristotle

definition of motion                               pre-Socratic Philosophy

Eternity of motion                                  the Transcendent Philosophy

 

An Evaluation of the Purposefulness of the World of Nature in Peripatetic and Transcendent Schools of Philosophy

 Mansur Imanpur

The purposefulness of the world of nature and its various existents is one of the basic issues in the domain of philosophical rationalization, and the adoption of any position in this regard plays a significant role in the development of man’s world-view and the determination of the direction of his philosophical and scientific life. In this paper, the writer has evaluated the issue from the viewpoint of two philosophical schools of the Islamic world, i.e., Peripatetic philosophy and the Transcendent Philosophy.

Peripatetic philosophy, on the basis of its particular principles and bases, views the world of nature, like the world of immaterial things, an image and reflection of the divine religion and the prior system of imprinted forms. It also emphasizes that the effects and motions of material things originate from their nature, and the ends following such acts are necessitated by those fixed and unintelligent natures! However, the Transcendent Philosophy, on the basis of the trans-substantial and innate motion of all the existents of the world of nature, the diffusion of perception, love, and enthusiasm in all its particles, and the essential poverty of what is other than God, such as the world of nature, proves the purposefulness of all the existents of this world.

From the two above-mentioned approaches, the one followed by the Transcendent Philosophy, in the light of its cohesive principles and their related proofs, is rational and defensible. However, the approach followed by Peripatetic philosophy, due to its basic problems and defects and lack of necessary proofs, is refuted and unjustified.  

Key Terms

purposefulness                                        world of nature

trans-substantial motion                         resurrection

 

An Analytic Study of the Isfahan Philosophical Era and its Two Philosophical Schools

 Sayyed Mehdi Imami Jum’a

From the very beginning that Isfahan was chosen as the capital of the Safavid dynasty, a number of scholars and philosophers emigrated there and formed various academic centers in the domain of rational sciences. We know that, at least, three different centers were opened under the supervision of three prominent figures, including Shaykh Baha’i, Mir Damad, and Mir Fendereski. The last two characters, jointly, became the source of a specific philosophical trend; however, the differences between their insights and attitudes gradually increased and, finally, led to the development of two distinct philosophical schools. Mir Damad’s philosophy expanded rapidly and went beyond the borderlines of Isfahan and, even, Iran, and its social, cultural and philosophical influences were much vaster than the trend introduced by Mir Fendereski.

Nevertheless, we should take it into consideration that these two philosophical trends did not emerge as two distinct philosophical schools at the beginning of their development. Rather, they had their own ups and downs; their philosophical principles and bases were gradually strengthened, and, finally, they appeared in the form of two independent trends of thought.

Considering its genuine characteristics, the Isfahan philosophical era opened a new chapter in the history of Islamic philosophy and was totally distinct from its preceding eras, including the Shiraz era.

Key Terms

negative theology                                    Shi’i philosophy

anthological theology                             Mir Damad

Mulla Sadra                                             

Yamani wisdom

An Inquiry into the Definitions of the Possible

 Aynullah Khademi

 In this article, the writer first refers to a definition by Aristotle, a definition by Farabi and five definitions by Ibn-Sina concerning the possible. Then he examines and criticizes Ibn-Sina’s five-fold definitions and states the reasons for the superiority of the first definition over the others. In the rest of the paper, he explores the different positions on whether the definitions of the possible are real or simply consist of some descriptions for a word.

Key Terms

possible                                                    necessary

impossible                                               real definition

word description

Man’s Station in Mulla Sadra’s View

 Zohre Nikfarjam

 The discussion of man and his soul is a discipline with such a long historical record that it has become the basis for a large number of theological issues, including the origin and resurrection. According to Ibn Arabi, the reason for denominating man (insan) as so is that he is at the level of perfection and, thus, the ‘perfect man’ means man, and other individuals merely possess a human form. Some have defined man as the ‘rational animal’; however, in Ibn Arabi’s view, inanimate bodies, vegetations, and animals are also alive and rational, since, as stipulated in the Qur’an, all things praise God.

In his eyes, the reality of man is the same Lordly subtlety that God has breathed into man’s body. This subtlety is the very heart which is an immaterial luminous substance and by which man’s humanity is realized. Mulla Sadra, too, considers the ‘rational soul’ as man’s reality but not in the sense used by gnostics for ‘heart’.

Rather, he views the body as the lowest level of the soul on the basis of trans-substantial motion and the bodily origination of the soul. Therefore, in Mulla Sadra’s philosophy, the problem of the soul-body duality, which had troubled his predecessors to some extent, is removed.

Mulla Sadra believes that the human soul is continually in advancement and development, and it is in the light of this motion that it can move from the level of intermediary imaginal immateriality, then to rational immateriality, and finally to a station beyond immateriality, that is, the divine station, which suffers from no limitation and has no quiddity.

Key Terms

God’s vicegerent                                              man’s soul

knowledge of the soul                                      unity of existence

gradation of the reality of existence              unveiling

perfect man                                                   trans-substantial motion

The Difference between Philosophy and Gnosis

 Mir Hadi Musawinia

 It is impossible for two things to be exactly like each other in every respect. Duality requires certain criteria. If two things are similar in everything, they will be one thing rather than two or more. Theoretical gnosis and philosophy move in the same direction concerning several issues, and both are after the same end, i.e., ontology, but following two different approaches. Thus they are two independent types of knowledge and must be different from each other with regard to certain issues and aspects. The purpose of the writer here is to study such differences.

Key Terms

philosophy                                               theoretical gnosis

ontology                                                   knowledge

subject                                                      issues

 Essential Accident and the Four-Fold Problems

 Nadia Maftooni

 Essential accidents are among the complicated issues of the vast domain of philosophical-logical epistemology. In this paper, after a review of the meaning of the essential accident and its distinctive features from the viewpoint of philosophers such as Aristotle, Farabi, and Ibn-Sina, the writer poses the problems which are related to essential accidents. On the whole, two objections are advanced against the meaning of essential accidents and two more against its distinctive features.

On of the conceptual problems is related to determining the domain of the constitutive essential. It seems that in their attempt to solve this problem, philosophers have been caught in a vicious circle. The problems related to the distinctive feature of essential accidents have also been introduced through resorting to violating examples from mathematics and philosophy.

 

Key Terms

Essential accidents                                  intermediary in predication

Extensive intermediary                           peculiar intermediary

Equal intermediary                                  expertise